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I. INTRODUCTION
"Speak, God."'
"I know you're lonely for words that I ain't spoken, but tonight we'll be
free, all the promises'll be broken."2
A. The Argument
God promised Abraham a multitude of nations, but just one
land for them to live in.3 That covenant has been kept with a ven-
geance. The promised land of biblical lore is claimed by three sov-
ereignties: Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian." Yet such conflicts
are endemic to the world we have inherited. Every claim to sover-
eignty rests upon a collective history; yet, if history is what distin-
guishes communities it is also what relates them to one another.
Thus the national destinies that in theory are autonomously deter-
mined, in practice intertwine. In an increasingly interdependent
world, every national charter is written on the back of some other
people's promissory note; every promised land is mortgaged to
the hilt.
International law appears to offer an escape from this wilder-
ness-but this vision is a mirage. The modern international legal
1. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrmcs 295 (1975).
2. Springsteen, Thunder Road, recorded on B. SPRINGSTEEN, BORN TO RUN. Courtesy and
copyright. 1975 CBS Inc. Published in the U.S.A. by Columbia Records. All rights
reserved.
3. Genesis 17:4-8.
4. Israel claims sovereignty over not only the territory contained within the 1949 ar-
mistice lines and East Jerusalem, but over the West Bank as well. This claim is based on
two factors: ancient possession, and the fact that no other nation has a better claim. On this
view, the Arab Palestinian State contemplated by the U.N. Partition no longer exists, and
the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank was the result of aggressive conquest. See Blum,
The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 297
(1968); Murphy, To Bring an End to the State of War: The Egyptian Israeli Peace Treaty, 12
VAND. J. OF INT'L L. 897, 927 n.151 (1979); Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 344 (1970); Speech by Itzchak Shamir, Israeli Foreign Minister, before the Knesset
(Sept. 8, 1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1158 (1982).
The P.L.O. claims sovereignty to all of the same territory pursuant to the Palestinian
National Charter of 1968, reprinted in J. MOORE, THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLiCT: READINGS
AND DOCUMENTS 1085 (1977). The case for this claim, based on the self-determination of
the residents, may be found in an essay by the P.L.O.'s official observer at the U.N. Cattan,
Sovereignty over Palestine, reprinted in J. MOORE, supra, at 11.
In 1950, Jordan annexed jhe West Bank, but with the understanding, imposed by its
Arab League treaty partners, that the territory was to be held in trust for its residents. See
Murphy, supra, at 920.
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system rests on a paradox-its legitimacy derives from the sover-
eignty of nations; yet, its function is the constraint of such sover-
eignty. This means that precisely where international law speaks
loudest it says the least. Where, as in the Middle East, conflicting
claims to sovereignty converge, every doctrinal claim implies its
own negation. The legal order, for example, may defend sover-
eignty,' but cannot thereby infringe it;6 states should abjure the
use of force,7 but may not give up the right of self-defense, Far
from resolving political conflicts, international law translates them
into doctrine. This essay will trace one such doctrinal conflict
from its appearance in the context of a recent political conflict to
its roots in the contradictory nature of international politics gen-
erally. The doctrinal conflict we will consider concerns the validity
and relative applicability of conflicting treaties. We will discover
that authorities on international law hold two deeply opposed
views on this question. The older view, that the latter of two con-
flicting treaties is void, has been articulately defended and is easily
grasped. The newer view, that such a treaty is valid, has been less
articulately defended and remains ambiguous as to whether the
earlier of two conflicting treaties is enforceable. This essay will
offer an explanation for the ambiguity of this view and for its co-
existence with the older view. Developing such an explanation will
require us to explore the role of nationalism and internationalism
in the discourse of international law, and the sources of national-
ism and internationalism in international politics. This escapade
will suggest that international law can chart the wilderness of in-
ternational politics but can indicate no escape from it.
B. The Argument Outlined
Our journey will begin with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
participants in the Camp David peace process proposed to resolve
this conflict by delivering the promised land simultaneously to
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. I, arts. 39, 42. See infra note 87 for the text of these two
articles.
6. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
7. Id. at arts. 2-4.
8. Id. at art. 51. See infra discussion of the relationship between these passages in text
accompanying notes 75-97.
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each of its claimants. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East
according to President Carter, establishes
[t]he principles ... which will govern a comprehensive peace settlement. It
deals specifically with the future of the West Bank and Gaza, and the need to
resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The framework document
proposes a five year transitional period in the West Bank and the Gaza dur-
ing which the Israeli military government will be withdrawn and a self gov-
erning authority will be elected with full autonomy .... The Palestinians
will have the right to participate in the determination of their own future, in
negotiations which will resolve the final status of the West Bank and Gaza,
and then to produce an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. These negotiations
will be based on all the provisions and all the principles of. . . Resolution
242. And it provides that Israel may live in peace within secure and recog-
nized borders. 9
On March 26, 1979 Egypt and Israel began the implementa-
tion of this plan by concluding a treaty of peace. 10 By a side letter
to this treaty they offered their commitment to arrange a six year
transition to peace." More than six years later this transitional re-
gime has not even been established. The Israeli military govern-
ment has not been withdrawn and no autonomous self-governing
authority has been elected in the occupied territories. As of this
writing no negotiations have taken place regarding the " final sta-
tus" of these territories, or involving the Palestinian Arabs.1 2 By
now it is clear-the Camp David peace process produced, not a
comprehensive solution, but a separate peace.
In fashioning a separate peace, Egypt and Israel sidestepped
the difficult political question of Palestinian nationality. In thus
fleeing the political question, however, Egypt and Israel stumbled
upon an equally intractable doctrinal question. That Egypt's sepa-
rate peace violated its prior commitments to its Arab allies was
9. 17 I.L.M. 1463 (1978).
10. Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, 18 I.L.M. 362-93 (1979).
11. Letters and Memoranda concerning the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace, reprinted
in 18 I.L.M. 530 (1979). By the terms of this letter, Egypt and Israel committed themselves
to begin negotiations within a month of ratification of the Peace Treaty (both sides ratified
by mid April). They allowed themselves one year in which to complete negotiations for the
establishment of self rule. One month after any elections agreed upon in these negotia-
tions, the transitional self-governing authority would be established, and the five year tran-
sition period would begin.
12. A brief review of the course of negotiations in the first three and one half years
following the signing of the peace treaty may be found in President Reagan's address on
"United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East." Televised Address to the Nation by
President Reagan (Sept. 1, 1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1199 (1982).
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relatively clear;13 but whether such an agreement can be legally
valid, is unclear to this day.
This question, concerning the legal effect of conflicting treaty
obligations, will be the second step on our itinerary. Because in-
ternational law is largely built on treaties, instances of treaty con-
flict are an embarrassment to the unity and validity of interna-
tional law. They suggest that international law may itself develop
contradictory rules. A review of the practice of states and interna-
tional tribunals in instances of treaty conflict will reveal a pattern
of avoiding the question of the validity of conflicting treaties."' A
review of the doctrinal tradition, however, will reveal contradic-
tory approaches to the problem of treaty conflict. One group of
authorities views the latter of the two conflicting treaties as void
ab initio; another group might view them as breaches of prior
commitments, but nevertheless would give them legal effect. 5
Subsequent explorations will show that any attempt to resolve
this conflict by reference to more fundamental principles of inter-
national law merely exposes more fundamental contradictions.
The first view mentioned is derived from a conception of treaties
as a source of property rights,"6 while the second view derives
from a conception of treaties as, at most, a source of more limited
liability rights.'7 These opposed conceptions of treaty rights ema-
nate in turn from contradictory conceptions of the relationships
between sovereignty and the international legal order. If treaty
rights are rooted in a transcendent international legal order, then
they may constrain sovereignty;' 8 if, however, they are dependent
upon the will of the signatories they may at most create obliga-
tions.' 9 The former view is generally associated with the claim
that sovereignty is conferred on states by the international legal
order; the latter view is generally associated with the claim that
sovereignty is created by particular communities.2 Proponents of
a powerful international legal order generally assume that a
13. See infra notes 26-116 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 117-70 and accompanying text. The few exceptions to this pattern
are, however, instructive. See infra text accompanying notes 127-34.
15. See infra notes 171-232 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 233-94 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 295-351 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 233-94 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 295-540 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 541-69 and accompanying text.
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proliferation of international commerce will require greater coop-
eration among states. Proponents of national sovereignty in turn
assume that the survival of their own states, in the face of such a
proliferation of international commerce, would require greater
competition with other states. The world of the internationalists is
simple and harmonious; the world of the nationalists is complex
and agonistic. 21
The tension between national sovereignty and international
order pervades not only existing international legal doctrine, but
our collective capacities to imagine a more legitimate world. Our
efforts to create legitimate domestic institutions seem to require
the nurturing of vital political communities. Yet such communities
cannot be completely autonomous. On the one hand, the effort to
escape foreign domination is likely to be futile; on the other hand,
the effort to realize the common will may entail the domination of
others. International efforts to protect marginal communities and
resolve disputes between communities, however, may simply rein-
force the political and cultural domination of the most powerful
nations.22
There is a growing body of legal scholarship which identifies
contradictions structuring legal doctrine. Some authors treat these
contradictions as historically contingent-that is, as aspects of a
consciousness which is now dominant but may be transcended.
Others seem to treat them as inherent in human experience.2 3 In
21. See infra notes 541-629 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 621-29 and accompanying text.
23. Much of the work of critical legal scholars is devoted to identifying contradiction
within a realm generally acknowledged to be historically contingent: that of legal discourse.
See, e.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978); Kelman, Interpretive
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Other scholars,
not self-consciously identified with the Critical Legal Studies movement, have focused on
doctrinal contradiction as well, most notably George Fletcher. For a description of his
methodological perspective, see Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YAIyE L. J. 970
(1981). What distinguishes the critical scholars is their claim that doctrinal contradiction is
causally linked to more fundamental contradictions of social life. In most cases, these more
fundamental contradictions are themselves viewed as historically contingent upon a partic-
ular form of society. Thus, as stated by Kennedy: "The [fundamental] contradiction is an
historical artifact. It is no more immortal than is the society that created it or sustains it."
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFFALO L. REv. 205, 221 (1979).
For Kennedy and Kelman, the contradictions of doctrine seem ultimately referrable to a
mode of thinking identified by Roberto Unger as "Liberal Thought." K UNGER, KNowL-
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my view, the contradiction between nationalism and international-
ism is historically contingent; yet I feel that the gravitational pull
of history toward this contradiction is almost irresistible. Our no-
tions of political community condition not only our sense of our
own histories, but our vision of what history itself could be. Since
the romantic epoch, history has functioned as an important me-
dium for fusing individuals into communities. 2 If we truly con-
ceived of our existence as communal rather than individual, how-
ever, history might acquire a different political function. History
then might be seen not as the experience which differentiates
communities, but as the medium which binds them together.
C. The Outline Explained
The rhetorical structure of this essay is deliberately perverse:
it proceeds from particular conclusions to fundamental premises.
The result is that the exposition may seem unnecessarily elliptical.
Points are presented as paradoxical which are subsequently ex-
plained within one of the two competing frameworks of thought
described above. Other points are established on the basis of
premises which are subsequently relativized.2 5 I could have re-
EDGE AND POIrrics 1-144 (1975). See Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 305, 345
(1984); Kennedy, Blackstone's Commentaries, supra, at 210. For Marxists such as Freeman,
the contradictions of doctrine and philosophy alike can be explained in terms of the strug-
gle of opposed material interests. See Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship,
90 YALE L. J. 1229 (1981). All three of these scholars, however, have also acknowledged
the influence of Al Katz. See Freeman, supra at 1231; Kelman, supra, at 305; Kennedy,
supra, at 210. Katz' work seems to suggest that contradiction is inherent in human experi-
ence. See Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BuF-
FALO L. REV. 383-84 (1979) (unity, duality, mediation, analysis and synthesis are fundamen-
tal forms of human thought rooted in human experience beginning with birth as
"simultaneously a moment of separation and symbiotic unity"). See also A. Katz, Foucault
for Lawyers (unpublished manuscript available in State University of New York at Buffalo
Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as A. Katz, Foucault]. (Legal and sociological norms
are both means of managing, denying and repressing irreducible difference). Katz, writing
in the deconstructive tradition of Foucault and Derrida, views "difference" as at once the
source and nemesis of meaning within any cultural framework. Thus the contradictions of
any particular ideology are historically contingent; but contradiction is an inherent feature
not only of ideology, but of historical experience. See infra text accompanying notes 560-
569 and 653-660 for an elaboration of this problem.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 630-60.
25. See infra notes 171-232 and accompanying text (citing authority for the claim that
treaty conflict is illegal, only to show that the claim is meaningless; then explaining the
apparent meaninglessness of the claim in terms of the diametrically opposed interpretations
of it given by its academic supporters).
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versed the order of presentation-begun with an elaboration of
the contradictions structuring our collective vision of the future of
the international order, proceeded to demonstrate how these con-
tradictions entail contradictory approaches to the relationship be-
tween national sovereignty and international legal institutions,
and finally claimed that these in turn entail opposing resolutions
of the treaty conflict problem. Such a method of exposition would
have lent a reassuring sense of groundedness to what follows.
Nevertheless, I have preferred perversity for four reasons:
First, the alternative would be misleading. Our contradictory
collective aspirations for the international system do not logically
entail the particular doctrinal forms that have emerged within in-
ternational legal discourse. By now it has become a clich6 of criti-
cal legal studies that the results derived from contradictory prem-
ises are indeterminate. While fundamental contradictions in
international politics may be a necessary condition for doctrinal
contradiction in international law, they cannot provide sufficient
explanation for the particular forms of contradiction that have
evolved. Providing such an explanation would involve a much
more complicated story than the one I have told here.
Second, the alternative would trivialize my subject. Starting
from the premise that our thinking about the international system
is riven with fundamental contradictions, we would be led to ex-
pect doctrinal contradiction in every area of substantive interna-
tional law. From the perspective of such a starting point, the selec-
tion of any particular doctrinal subject area is arbitrary. On the
other hand, identifying the fingerprints of contradiction in every
area of international legal doctrine would require an investigation
of epic proportions.
Third, perversity is endemic to the enterprise as I conceive it.
I intend this essay to constitute a critique in the Kantian sense:
that is, an investigation of the conditions which render the prob-
lem of treaty conflict, as it emerges in the discourse of interna-
tional law, possible. Such a project necessarily entails reasoning
backwards from conclusions to premises. Given this approach, the
path of the argument is neither indeterminate nor arbitrary. If I
am right in thinking that some vision of international society is a
necessary, though not a sufficient condition for the development
of international doctrine, then the movement from a specific doc-
trinal conflict to an underlying contradictory vision is character-
[Vol. 34
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ized by more necessity than its converse. None of this is to suggest
that my conclusions are logically compelled or "objective"-they
reflect, as any interpretive effort must, a great deal of intuition
and guesswork. Nevertheless, they provide what I hope will be a
satisfying answer to a determinate question: why the problem of
treaty conflict is irresolvable within the framework of interna-
tional legal doctrine.
Fourth and finally, perversity makes for a better story. Treaty
conflict, no less than any other doctrinal wrangle, is ultimately ba-
nal. The struggle between equally appealing visions of the interna-
tional order that its investigation reveals, however, is interesting
and important. I have chosen the gradual transcendence of the
banal rather than the inexorable entombment of the interesting,
in part out of a tactical concern with holding the interest of a
reader, in part out of a vulgar generic preference for suspense
over tragedy.
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II. TREATY CONFLICT AND THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS
A. A Definition of Treaty Conflict
A treaty is an agreement between two international actors
which creates obligations defined by international law.26 The ap-
plication of this concept, therefore, requires that an agreement be
valid in international law, at least for some purposes. Moreover, it
seems to presuppose the existence of a valid system of interna-
tional law.2 Treaty conflict occurs when a state concludes a treaty
which creates international obligations the performance of which
would be inconsistent with the performance of an international
obligation to a third state under a previously concluded treaty.
It should be noted that this definition of treaty conflict ex-
cludes the creation of international obligations inconsistent with
earlier obligations to the same party. This situation arises fre-
quently in international relations and is sometimes classified as a
form of treaty conflict.28 I exclude it from this discussion, how-
ever, because it lacks the problematic sine qua non of treaty con-
flict-the simultaneous existence of two mutually exclusive obliga-
tions. In most municipal legal systems, new treaties supersede
prior inconsistent treaties as valid law.29 In concluding a subse-
26. This definition is a combination of the following two definitions: (1) "[T]reaties
are agreements, of a contractual character, between States, or organisations of States, cre-
ating legal rights and obligations between the parties." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 491, at 877 (1963); (2) "'Treaty' means an international agreement concluded be-
tween States in written form and governed by international law. . . ." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, reprinted in S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 108 (1970). Some commentators have
defined treaties as international agreements intended to create obligations in international
law: "A treaty is a written agreement by which two or more States or international organi-
zations create or intend to create a relation between themselves operating within the
sphere of international law." A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 4 (1961). "A 'treaty' is a
formal instrument of agreement by which two or more States establish or seek to establish
a relation under international law between themselves." Draft Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 653, 657 (1935). I have declined this approach for heuristic
reasons. The definition I have chosen makes it easier to see the real dificulty that treaty
conflict poses for any effort to conceive of international law as a coherent system.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 135-36.
28. See G. HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES 294-300
(1973).
29. There are two principal methods by which states incorporate treaties in national
law. Many states, including the commonwealth, incorporate treaties into national law
through supplementary legislation. Most states, however, including the United States, in-
corporate treaties into national law automatically without the necessity of any additional
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quent inconsistent treaty, therefore, a state voices its assent to the
termination or modification of the earlier treaty. If all parties to
the earlier treaty consent to the termination or modification of an
obligation imposed by the earlier treaty, however, this obligation
ceases to exist from the standpoint of international law. 30 As a re-
sult, the obligations created by treaty cannot, as a matter of inter-
national law, conflict with any obligations existing under a previ-
ous treaty between the same parties.
legislative action. See V. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND NATIONAL LAW 2
(1982). Both treaties and statutes are referred to in the U.S. Convention, Article VI, Sec-
tion 2, as the "supreme law of the land." A subsequent inconsistent statute has the power
to render a treaty null as a matter of domestic law, to the extent of the conflict. Washing-
ton v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979); Reid v. Couvert 354 U.S. 1 (1957);
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 128.1 (1965). Similarly a subsequent inconsis-
tent treaty has the power to render a prior statute invalid. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW, supra § 124.1. Thus, treaties and statutes can function quite similarly in states
employing the automatic incorporation system. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even
under the automatic incorporation system, there is an important limitation to the validity
of treaties as domestic law. In the United States, and most other countries employing this
system, treaties enter automatically into force as domestic law only to the extent that they
are "self-executing." V. LEARY, supra, at 54. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313-14 (1829):
A treaty . . . is . . . to be regarded in the courts of justice as equivalent to an
act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legis-
lative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must exe-
cute the contract before it can become a rule for the court.
In application, this doctrine is deeply ambiguous. See V. LEARY, supra, at 55-65; Feo, Self
Execution of United States Security Council Resolutions Under United States Law, 24 U.C.LA L.
REV. 387, 394-95 (1976); Schacter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provi-
sions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REv. 643, 645 (1951). As a result, American courts have
sometimes failed to invalidate statutes on the basis of subsequent inconsistent treaties. See
Sei Fujli v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). American courts might re-
spond similarly in the event of a conflict between prior and subsequent treaties.
30. United Nations Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, Article 30.3, reprinted in S.
ROSENNE, supra note 26, at 208. This is not to say that the conclusion of treaties inconsis-
tent with existing treaties between the same parties is unproblematic. Where the parties do
not specify their intent either to modify or terminate a previous treaty, it is unclear
whether the effect of a subsequent inconsistent treaty is to replace the previous treaty in its
entirety or merely to modify specific provisions while leaving others in force. See G.
HARASZTI, supra note 28, at 295-97. See also 5 G. HAcKwoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 304-07 (1927); Aufricht, The Supersession of Treaties in International Law, 37 CORNELL
L. Q. 661-62 (1952). Nevertheless, this problem is not one of resolving a conflict between
existing legal obligations, so much as determining the legal obligations created or recog-
nized by the subsequent treaty. The problem of treaty supersession is, in other words, a
problem of treaty interpretation. Once the intent, actual or fictional, of the parties has
been determined, the problem has been resolved. See G. HARASZTI, supra note 28, at 295.
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While the above definition of treaty conflict excludes situa-
tions sometimes identified as treaty conflicts, it includes situations
which some authors have been reluctant to treat as genuine in-
stances of treaty conflict. The obligations created by treaty are
often contingent upon events. The most obvious examples of such
obligations are provisions for mutual defense,3 1 the complete exe-
cution of which are, at least in part, dependent upon acts of ag-
gression by third parties. Some authors argue that the creation of
such contingent obligations cannot give rise to treaty conflict un-
less circumstances actually arise to which the obligation is applica-
ble.32 Others argue that even potential inconsistency between the
obligations of one party to different treaties places the validity of
both treaties in question.3 3 The contours of this debate will be ex-
plored below,3 ' but because it is intimately related to the larger
dispute over appropriate responses to treaty conflict, we must, at
least temporarily, classify potential conflicts as properly part of
our subject.
B. The Camp David Treaties
The problem of treaty conflict stumbled onto the stage of
world politics during the negotiations that took place pursuant to
the historic Camp David agreements between Israel, Egypt and
the United States. These agreements posed at least potential con-
flicts with a number of prior Egyptian obligations. On the one
hand, these conflicts almost prevented the implementation of the
Egyptian-Israeli treaties because of Israeli doubts as to the trea-
ties' legal validity;35 on the other hand, they effectively removed
Egypt from its traditional leadership role in the Arab League
treaty system.36
The Camp David agreements consisted primarily of two docu-
31. Third party aggression is not necessarily a sufficient condition for the activation
of an obligation to aid a partner to a mutual defense treaty; often such an obligation can
only be triggered by a request from the victim state. On the other hand, some mutual
defense arrangements create obligations which must be performed well in advance of
armed conflict, e.g., joint contingency planning, or the stationing of troops in a partner's
territory.
32. A. McNAIR, supra note 26, at 222; but see id. at 548-49.
33. See, e.g., R. ROXBURGH, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND THIRD STATES 33 (1917).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 175-99.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 50-51.
36. See infra text accompanying note 116.
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ments, signed September 17, 1978, entitled Framework for Peace in
the Middle East and Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty
Between Israel and Egypt.a3 A revised version of the latter was
agreed upon at Blair House on October 21, 1978;31 after further
negotiations, a peace treaty was signed on March 26, 1979.9
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East was, of course,
binding only on the signatories, but established guidelines for a
general solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute to which, it was
hoped, all parties to the dispute would ultimately adhere. It con-
sisted, in essence, of the following five principles: (1) A commit-
ment to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all par-
ties;' 0 (2) Consistency with the additional principles enunciated in
United Nations Resolution 242;41 (3) Replacement of the Israeli
military government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with a
provisional system of self-rule as to domestic matters, limited to
five years in duration;42 (4) Negotiations involving Egypt, Israel,
Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian people regarding fi-
nal disposition of these territories and the establishment of peace-
ful relations among all parties;4' and (5) The requirement that any
solution recognize the "legitimate rights and just requirements"
of the Palestinian people."
The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between
Israel and Egypt bound Egypt and Israel to conclude a peace treaty
within three months. This treaty would conform to the following
four conditions: (1) Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula in
phases; (2) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal for Is-
raeli shipping; (3) Recognition of the Gulf of Aqaba and the
Straits of Tiran as international waterways; and (4) The establish-
ment of normal diplomatic relations upon final withdrawal of all
Israeli troops from the Sinai.' 5
37. 17 I.L.M. 1466 (1978).
38. See 37 CONG. Q. 556 (1979).
39. Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, 18 I.L.M. 362-93 (1979).
40. Framework for Peace in the Middle East, supra note 37, preamble. "Peace re-
quires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every
state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries
free from threats or acts of force." Id.
41. Id. para. 1.
42. Id. § A, para. 1.
43. Id. § A, paras. 1(b), 1(c), 4.
44. Id. § A, para. 1(c).
45. 17 I.L.M. 1470 (1978).
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The substance of a peace treaty implementing this framework
was agreed upon at Blair House on October 21, 1978.46 However,
on December 13, 1978, a few days before the agreed upon dead-
line for conclusion of a peace treaty, negotiations between Israel
and Egypt broke down. Prime Minister Begin of Israel objected to
two proposed side letters interpreting the Blair House agree-
ment.47 Each of these letters had the effect of rendering the stabil-
ity of an Egyptian-Israeli peace contingent upon a comprehensive
solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Begin was insistent that Egypt
conclude a separate peace.
The first proposed side letter protested by Begin concerned
the so-called "linkage" problem-a dispute over the degree of ac-
tual dependence between the two agreements signed at Camp
David.48 The Framework for Peace in the Middle East implicated a
settlement of some kind between Israel and the Palestinian peo-
ple; the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Israel
and Egypt, however, did not. Thus the term "linkage" came to
stand for the insistence upon such a settlement as a prerequisite to
any final peace between Israel and Egypt.49 If the two Camp David
agreements were to be read as one, Israel's good faith in negotiat-
ing with Jordan and the Palestinian people would be assured by its
desire to preserve its treaty with Egypt; but, the security of that
treaty would then be contingent on the cooperation of these par-
ties. Accordingly, Israel objected to any suggestion that the two
agreements were in any way linked.
The second side letter proposed by Egypt concerned the rela-
46. The Blair House Conference, lasting from Oct. 12 to 21, 1978, is described in M.
DAYAN, BREAKTHROUGH 199-221 (1981), and C. VANCE, HARD CHOIcES 232-38 (1983).
47. See C. VANCE, supra note 46, at 240-42. See also M. DAYAN, supra note 46, at 249-
51.
48. C. VANCE, supra note 46, at 240.
49. The "linkage" problem surfaced during the Blair House conference and plagued
the negotiations throughout:
As the treaty negotiations proceeded, our conclusion that linkage of the imple-
mentation of the treaty to the autonomy talks would be the most difficult issue
proved correct. The Egyptians wanted 'synchronization' between the two nego-
tiations in order to respond to Arab criticisms that they were signing a separate
peace with Israel. This took the form of Egyptian pressure for Israel to agree,
in a side letter, to a specific date for completion of the autonomy talks and the
holding of the elections for the self-governing body. The Egyptians insisted that
the two be coterminous with the interim withdrawal from the Sinai .... The
Israelis were granitelike in their resistance.
C. VANCE, supra note 46, at 233. See also M. DAYAN, supra note 46, at 212.
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tionship between the Blair House agreement and other treaty ob-
ligations of the signatory powers.5 It was Begin's objection to this
side letter that brought the problem of treaty conflict to the fore.
The Israeli negotiators feared that Egyptian commitments to its
partners in the treaty system of the Arab League might interfere
with Egypt's commitment to peace with Israel, especially in the
event that the Camp David peace process would not culminate in
a comprehensive solution. 1
C. Prior Egyptian Commitments
The Camp David agreements represented the climax of a ma-
jor shift in Egyptian policy, causing consternation both within
Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. Since the Egyptian
revolution of 1952, Egypt had sought a leadership role among
Arab nations by giving voice to a pan-Arab nationalist movement,
at times even proposing to merge with other Arab states.52 Of
great symbolic importance in this enterprise was Egypt's central
role in expressing Arab hostility toward Israel, in consequence of
which Egypt had borne the brunt of every Arab-Israeli war.
Within the vision of pan-Arab nationalism, Palestine is properly
an Arab land, while Israel is an outpost for European imperialism,
introduced into the Middle East by western powers. 53 The Middle
50. C. VANCE, supra note 46, at -241-42. This issue, also, emerged during the Blair
House negotiations, id. at 234; see also M. DAYAN, supra note 46, at 212. It was not resolved
until March 12, 1979. See M. DAYAN, supra note 46, at 268-78.
51.
If our peace treaty did not have priority over Egypt's commitments to her ear-
lier treaties with the Arab States, she would have to go to the help of Syria, for
example, if that country launched an attack on the Golan Heights. To this, the
President replied: 'But the Egyptians don't claim that' and he turned to Khalil
for confirmation. Khalil remained silent, refusing to endorse Carter's state-
ment. He would give no undertaking that Egypt would not join Syria in sLch an
event.
M. DAYAN, supra note 46, at 265.
52. Egypt instigated and hosted the first summit conference of Arab leaders, resulting
in the formation of the Arab League. However, this may have only reflected Egypt's desire
to keep a watchful eye on developments that would otherwise have taken place without
her. R. MACDONALD, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES 34-38, 74-76 (1965). Egypt actually did
merge with Syria from 1958 to 1961, to form the United Arab Republic. Id. at 100. For an
analysis and critique of Egyptian foreign policy from the standpoint of pan-Arab national-
ism, see Heikal, Egyptian Foreign Policy, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 714 (1978).
53. R. MACDONALD, supra note 52, at 85-94. The sense in which Israel's creation was
perceived as a threat to pan-Arab nationalism is revealed by the following passage:
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East itself is viewed as a cultural entity defined by its indigenous
population, rather than a geopolitical entity defined in terms of its
proximity to natural resources and sea lanes of strategic impor-
Its creation in the very heart of the African-Asian land bridge dealt a severe
blow to Arab hopes of unity by cutting off the Arabs of Asia from those of
Africa. Certainly, too, the fact that Israel's creation entailed the dismantling of
a Palestinian home and the denial of the Palestinians' rights did nothing to en-
dear this new entity to the Arabs. Their hostility was further confirmed by
Israel's relations with countries like Britain and the United States, the one iden-
tified with traditional colonialism, the other accused of neocolonialism.
Heikal, supra note 52, at 718. The objection to Israel's presence is aesthetic: it is an impu-
rity introduced from outside, a tactic in the struggle of one hegemonic force against its
successor. Israel is conceived as a barrier to communication between Egypt and the Levant;
the implications of Israel's presence for the Palestinian Arabs are mentioned almost as an
afterthought. Such a pan-Arabist position, viewed from the perspective of Palestinian na-
tionalism, falls victim to the same critique as Zionism:
A considerable majority of the literature on the Middle East . gives one the
impression that the essence of what goes on in the Middle East is a series of
unending wars between a group of Arab countries and Israel. That there had
been such an entity as Palestine until 1948, or that Israel's existence-its "inde-
pendence," as the phrase goes-was the result of the eradication of Palestine:
of these truths beyond dispute most people who follow events in the Middle
East are more or less ignorant, or unaware.
E. SAID, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE 5 (1980). Contrast Said's own perceptions of Zionism
as a Western imposition:
The Zionist fuses with the white European against the colored Oriental . . .
and also-because he 'understands the Eastern mind from within' -represents
the Arab, speaks for him, explains him to the European . . . . Zionism's con-
flict with the Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere in the region was seen as ex-
tending, perpetuating, even enhancing . . . the age-old conflict between the
West and the Orient, whose main surrogate was Islam. This was not only a
colonial matter, but a civilizational one as well . . . . Israel was a device for
holding Islam-and later the Soviet Union or communism at bay.
Id. at 28-29. "The element that made it possible to connect these aspirations of Jewish
shopkeepers, peddlers, craftsmen, and intellectuals in Russia and elsewhere to the concep-
tual orbit of imperialism was one small detail that seemed to be of no importance: Palestine
was inhabited by another people." Id. at 38 (quoting M. RoDINsoN, ISRAEL A COLONIAL
SETTLER STATE? 38 (1973)). Of course, what Said's account suggests is that the relationship
between Zionism and colonialism is in fact richer than Rodinson claims. Zionism's appeal to
the West was that it confirmed the foreignness which they already attributed to the Jews in
their midst; by placing them in a foreign land, as dependents of the British crown and
French capital, it colonized the Jews. In a sense the leaders of Zionism could offer the
colonial powers an entire population of substitute orientals, already colonized in advance.
Said reveals an oppressive reduction not only of Palestinian Arabs but of Jews as well, with
his insight that the latter represented the former to the West. For additional Palestinian
views, see Cattan, Sovereignity Over Palestine and Nakhleh, The Liberation of Palestine is Sup-
ported by International Law and Justice in J. MOORE, supra note 4, at 11, 121. For a discussion
of the relationship between Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, see text accompanying
notes 646-52.
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tance to the great powers. 4 Accordingly, Egyptian policy toward
Israel was, at least until after the 1973 war, shaped more by its
relations with other Arab nations, than by its relations with the
great powers. 5 As a result, when Egyptian policymakers began to
contemplate diplomatic solutions to the Middle East conflict, they
had in mind a comprehensive solution that would be reached in
concert with Egypt's Arab allies.56 Thus, Egyptian President
Sadat's unilateral decision to establish peaceful relations with
Israel violated settled expectations throughout the Arab world, in-
spiring a raft of hostile newspaper editorials57 and dissent within
the Egyptian foreign policy establishment itself.58 Egypt appeared
to be abandoning its commitment to pan-Arab nationalism.
This commitment, however, had been expressed not only by
means of public statements, but through binding treaty obliga-
tions as well. These obligations may be divided, for purposes of
analysis, into two related categories: (1) commitments to maintain
54. Heikal interprets much of the recent history of the Middle East in terms of:
a long and bitter feud in the area between two rival systems, whose struggle for
predominance continues to this day ...
1. The Middle Eastern System[:] This system saw the Middle East in geographi-
cal terms, as a vulnerable land mass lying close to the Soviet Union. Wholly
preoccupied with the Soviet threat, the architects of the system held that the
countries of the area must organize themselves against this threat by joining in
an alliance with others who were concerned for the region's security ....
2. The Arab System[:] [Biased on a different outlook toward the region, this
system saw the Middle East not as a hinterland lying between Europe and
Asia-a simple geographical expansion-but as one nation having common in-
terests and security priorities distinct from those of the West. According to this
logic, the countries of the area, which enjoyed unity of language, religion, his-
tory and culture should-indeed could-create their own system to counter
any threat from whatever source.
Heikal, supra note 52, at 719.
55. Id. at 718-25. Heikal argues that after 1973, American influence over Israel in-
duced Egypt increasingly to orient its policy toward America in order to secure the release
of the occupied territories. Id. at 725-27. For the classic argument that events in the Mid-
dle East are best understood-even by the great powers-in the terms indigenous to the
region, see Binder, The Middle East as a Subordinate International System, 10 WORLD POL 408
(1958).
56. Bassiouni, An Analysis of Egyptian Peace Policy Toward Israel: From Resolution 242
(1967) to the 1979 Peace Treaty, 12 CASE W. REs. J. IN 'L L. 3, 10 (1980).
57. Murphy, supra note 4, at 898.
58. Heikal had served as Editor-in-Chief of the semi-official Egyptian newspaper Al
Ahram, a member of the Arab Socialist Union, and advisor to President Sadat before his
disillusionment with Sadat's foreign policy. See Heikal, supra note 52. See also M. HEKAM,
AUTUMN OF FURY: THE ASSASSINATION OF SADAT (1983).
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collective security with existing Arab governments; and (2) com-
mitments to advance the national aspirations of the Palestinian
people.
The Blair House agreement, consistent with the Framework for
the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt, ended the
state of war between the two nations,59 and committed them to
avoid not only aggression,60 but the use of force as well.6 1 Compli-
ance with these provisions could prevent Egypt from fulfilling its
obligations under the Alexandria Protocol of 1944, the Pact of
the League of Arab States of 1945, and the Joint Defense and
Economic Cooperation Treaty Between the States of the Arab
League of 1950. These treaties call for mutual defense in the
event of aggression against one of the signatories,62 joint military
59. Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, art. I, para. 1, 18 I.L.M. 362-67
(1979). The finalized peace treaty was substantially similar to the Blair House agreement.
60. "They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence." Id. art. III, para. 1(a). "They recognize and will respect each
other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries." Id. para. 1
(b).
61. "They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against
each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means." Id. art. III, para. 1
(c):
Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostilty, or
violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory,
or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its
territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party .
Id. para. 2.
62.
In case of aggression or threat of aggression by a State against a member State,
the state attacked or threatened with attack may request an immediate meeting
of the Council.
The Council shall determine the necessary measures to repel this aggression.
Its decision shall be taken unanimously. If the aggression is committed by a
member State, the vote of that State shall not be counted in determining
unanimity.
Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 6, 70 U.N.T.S. 237, 254 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Pact of the League of Arab States].
The Contracting states consider any [act of] armed aggression made against any
one or more of them or their armed forces to be directed against them all.
Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collec-
tively, they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States
against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, indi-
vidually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to
repel the aggression and restore security and peace. In conformity with Article
6 of the Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the
Arab League Council and the U.N. Security Council shall be notified of such
act of aggression and the means and procedure taken to check it.
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planning and action in the event of a threat of hostilities involving
any of the signatories,0 3 and cooperation in matters of foreign pol-
icy." In addition, Egypt had signed mutual defense treaties with
Syria and Jordan which may or may not have remained in force at
the time the Camp David treaties were signed.6 5 That the out-
break of hostilities between Israel and Egypt's Arab League part-
ners could place Egypt under conflicting obligations is fairly clear;
but even in the absence of a general Middle East war, Egypt's obli-
gations under the Blair House agreement could run afoul of its
various treaties with the states of the Arab League. First, Egypt
may have violated its obligations to cooperate with its Arab part-
ners in matters of foreign policy merely by pursuing peace unilat-
erally. Second, Egypt has compromised its ability to engage in
Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League,
June 17, 1950, art. 2, reprinted in R. MACDONALD supra note 52, at 328 [hereinafter cited
as Joint Defense].
63.
At the invitation of any one of the signatories of this Treaty the Contracting
States shall hold consultations whenever there are reasonable grounds for the
belief that the territorial integrity, independence, or security of any one of the
parties is threatened. In the event of the threat of war or the existence of an
international emergency, the Contracting States shall immediately proceed to
unify their plans and defensive measures, as the situation may demand.
Joint Defense, supra note 62, art. 3. "The Contracting States, desiring to implement fully
the above obligations and effectively carry them out, shall cooperate in consolidating and
coordinating their armed forces, and shall participate according to their resources and
needs in preparing individual and collective means of defense to repulse the said armed
aggression." Id. art. 4.
64. " The object of the League will be to control the execution of the agreements
which the above states will conclude . . . to coordinate political plans so as to ensure their
cooperation, and protect their independence and sovereignty against every aggression by
suitable means .... " The Alexandria Protocol, Oct. 7, 1944, art. 1, reprinted in R. MAC-
DONALD, supra note 52, at 315 [hereinafter cited as The Alexandria Protocol].
j [E]very state shall be free to conclude with any other member state of the
League, or other powers, special agreements which do not contradict the text
or spirit of the present depositions.
In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to
the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed.
Id. at 316. Egypt can hardly escape the consequences of this last clause by claiming that far
from making a separate peace, it was acting on behalf of the League to generate a compre-
hensive solution: "The treaties and agreements already concluded or that may be con-
cluded in the future between a member state and any other state shall not be binding on
other members." Pact of the League of Arab States, supra note 62, art. 9, at 256.
65. Egypt entered into joint defense pacts with both Syria and Jordan in 1967. Both
pacts were valid for five years and both were renewed in 1972. It is not clear whether they
are still in force. See Bassiouni, supra note 56, at 20-21.
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joint military planning in anticipation of such hostilities, through
its commitment not to use force against Israel. Third, Israel and
the Arab League states may already be belligerents. Egypt aside,
none of the Arab League participants in the many Arab-Israeli
wars have ever formally recognized an end to hostilities between
themselves and Israel. 6 In addition, the Israeli occupations of the
West Bank and the Golan Heights may be considered continuing
acts of aggression against Jordan and Syria, respectively.67 Thus
Egypt may be considered to be under a continuing obligation to
join in hostilities against Israel at the request of either country or
pursuant to an appropriate decision by the Arab League.
The second area of conflict between the Camp David agree-
ments and the Arab League treaties concerns the Arab League's
commitment to the Palestinian cause. The Alexandria Protocol
and the Pact of the League of Arab States commit the signatories
to the following goals respecting Palestine: cessation of Jewish em-
igration, preservation of Arab lands, and the independence of Pal-
estine as an Arab state.68 Palestine, a British mandate at the time
of these agreements, included all of what subsequently became
Israel, as well as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Alexan-
66. The Security Council has taken the position that the armistice is of a permanent
character and that it is therefore appropriate to act as if the state of war has been ended. It
has not, however, confirmed that the state of war actually has ended. Israel has taken the
latter position and yet refuses to recognize the armistice lines as permanent borders, or
accept Jordan's subsequent annexation of the West Bank. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 927
n. 151.
67. See Bassiouni, supra note 56, at 21 n.34.
68.
The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an important part of
the Arab world and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched
without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab world.
The Committee also is of the opinion that the pledges binding the British
Government and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the preser-
vation of Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for Palestine are
permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation would constitute a step
toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization of peace and security.
The Alexandria Protocol, supra note 64, § 5(a), at 317-18 (A Special Resolution Concerning
Palestine).
At the end of the last Great War, Palestine, together with the other Arab
States, was separated from the Ottoman Empire. She became independent, not
belonging to any other state ...
Her existence and her independence among the nations can, therefore, no
more be questioned de jure than the independence of the other Arab States.
The Pact of the League of Arab States, supra note 62, at 260 (Annex on Palestine).
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dria Protocol makes Arab opposition to the formation of a Jewish
state in this territory explicit.69 Subsequent decisions of the
League Council affirmed the League's commitment to Arab Pales-
tinian sovereignty over this territory, rejected any partition, and
decreed that, "following its liberation, Palestine should be handed
over to its owners so that they may rule it in the way they wish."7 0
The Arab League has invited Palestinian participation in its Coun-
cil since 1950,71 and has recognized the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (P.L.O.) as the "sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people" since the Rabat summit of 1974.2 The
P.L.O., however, adheres to the Palestinian National Charter of
1968 which calls for the formation of a unitary Arab state in the
69.
The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting the woes
which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European dictatorial
states. But the question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for
there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of
the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs
of Palestine of various religions and denominations.
The Alexandria Protocol, supra note 64, § 5(A), at 318.
70. On April 13, 1950, in response to indications that Jordan intended to annex the
West Bank, The League Council adopted the following resolution:
First: To reaffirm the decision taken by the Political Committee on April 12,
1948, with the unanimity of Member States, which provides that the entrance
of the Arab armies into Palestine for its rescue should be regarded as a tempo-
rary measure without occupation or partition significance, and that following its
liberation, Palestine should be handed over to its owners so that they may rule
it in the way they wish.
Second: To consider this decision as effective and expressive of the present
policy of the Arab States in this respect.
Third: Should any Arab State violate this decision, it shall be considered as
having repudiated its obligations as well as the provisions of the Pact in accor-
dance with Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Pact, and the Special Annex on
Palestine.
Fourth: In the event of such violation, the Political Committee shall be con-
vened and take the necessary measures in accordance with the Provisions of the
Pact.
H. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DispuTEs 34-35 (1975). Shortly
thereafter, Jordan proceeded with the annexation and the Political Committee ruled that
this action violated the above resolution. Ultimately, Jordan agreed to declare that it held
the West Bank in trust for the Palestinian people and would accept any final disposition of
the territory agreed upon by all other members of the League. Id. at 39-40. These events
are discussed by Murphy, supra note 4, at 920 n. 119, 921, and by Bassiouni, supra note 56,
at 20 n.32.
71. Murphy, supra note 4, at 920 n.119.
72. Id. at 906.
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mandate territory, rather than a partition." Thus the Arab
League is committed to supporting the P.L.O. in its quest to re-
place Israel with a Palestinian state. Recognition of Israel and ac-
ceptance of Israeli occupation of the West Bank are inconsistent
with this policy and violate the Pact of the League of Arab
States.7
4
D. Egypt's Attempted Resolution of the Conflicts
As awareness of these conflicts emerged during the negotia-
tion process, Egyptian spokespersons attempted to resolve them
73. Palestinian National Charter of 1968, art. 1, July 1-17, 1968, reprinted in J.
MOORE, supra note 4, at 1086-91. "Palestine is the Homeland of the Arab Palestinian peo-
pie ... ." Id. art. 1.
"Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British mandate, is an indivisible terri-
torial unit." Id. art. 2.
"The Palestinian Arab People possess the legal right to their homeland and have the
right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accor-
dance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and free will." Id. art. 3.
"Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not
merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people. . . assert their right to a normal life
in Palestine and to exercise their right to self determination and sovereignty over it." Id.
art. 9.
"The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national duty and it attempts
to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the
elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab
nation peoples and governments." Id. art. 15.
"The liberation of Palestine from an international point of view, is a defensive action
necessitated by the demands of self defense." Id. art. 18.
"The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are
entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of
the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland." Id. art. 19.
"The Arab Palestinian people. . . reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total
liberation of Palestine ...." Id. art. 20. J. MOORE, supra note 4, at 1085. There is some
ambiguity as to whether the liberation of Palestine would involve the displacement of Jew-
ish residents. Article 6 of the Charter says that "[t]he Jews who had normally resided in
Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians." This
would exclude the overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews. Article 20 holds that: "Judaism,
being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation
to which they belong." Article 15 insures "freedom of worship and visit to all, without
discrimination of race, color, language, or religion." The attribution of sovereignty to
"Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine," and their descendants,
however, would suggest that at the very least, Jews who had emigrated in the last century
and their descendants would be denied citizenship. Id. art. 5. For an alternative approach
see Toward a Democratic Palestine, in J. MOORE, supra note 4, at 794.
74. See supra note 40; see also CAMP DAVID. A NEW BALFOUR DECLARATION? (F. Zeachey
ed. 1979) (Palestinian reactions to the Camp David agreements); F. SAYEGH, CAMP DAVID &
PALESTINE (1978).
DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY
by reinterpreting both treaties in terms of transcendent principles
drawn from other sources in international law. The side letter to
which Begin responded attempted to resolve the conflict between
Egypt's commitment not to use force against Israel and its mutual
defense arrangements with Jordan and Syria. The letter, as re-
fined by American mediators, interpreted the Blair House agree-
ment to exclude the use of force by either party against the other
unless the latter were deemed the aggressor in a conflict with third
parties.7 5
This interpretation has a plausible foundation in international
law. The Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty be-
tween the States of the Arab League was organized as a collective
security arrangement pursuant to Article 51 of the United Na-
tions Charter .7  Article 51 holds that "[n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations." If one understands this provision to establish an
inalienable right of collective self-defense, then one might argue
that the Blair House agreement could not limit Egypt's capacity to
respond to Israeli aggression against other Arab states. There
are four ways that this position might be defended; each is
problematic.
1. Application of Article 103. The simplest, and least satisfying,
approach is to say that limitations on the right of collective self-
defense violate the United Nations Charter. Article 103 of the
Charter holds that "[i]n the event of a conflict between the obliga-
tions of the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other international agree-
ment, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."
Collective self-defense, however, is not an obligation under the
Charter (except at the behest of the Security Council);78 it is only
a right.79 Thus Article 103 does not compel the Egyptian inter-
75. C. VANCE, supra note 46, at 241.
76. See supra note 62.
77. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 922.
78. See infra note 87.
79. Consider Kelsen's analysis of the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 under the Charter.
This pact required the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy and thus
placed a restriction on the right of collective self-defense. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27,
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. 796, 94 U.N.T.S. 57. Kelsen argues:
If it is assumed that the Briand Kellogg Pact is still in force in relation to the
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pretation of the treaty.
2. Subordination of Treaties to the U.N. Charter. The Charter
has often been viewed as constitutive of the post-war international
legal system.80 If one interprets this claim to imply that the Char-
ter is an exhaustive source of international law, then the authority
of treaties as a source of law derives from the Charter, rather
than vice versa. The sanctity of treaties, enunciated in the pream-
ble to the Charter,81 becomes a creature of positive law, subject to
the limitations imposed by its legislators. Article 51 can then be
read as a limitation on the power of treatymaking, denying valid-
ity to any treaty insofar as it alienates the right of collective secur-
ity. The problem with this argument is that it overstates the im-
portance of the Charter in international law. Even the claim that
the Charter has any privileged status as against other treaties is
controversial.8 2 The claim that it has exhaustive authority is belied
by the language of the preamble itself, Article 95 of the Charter,
and Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.83
former enemy states, it does not follow that Article 103 of the Charter applies,
that is to say, that Articles 107 and 53 of the Charter prevail over the prohibi-
tion of the Pact. For Article 103 is applicable only in the event of conflict be-
tween 'obligations' of the Members, and Articles 107 and 53 do not impose
obligations but only confer rights upon the Members. The latter may or may
not exercise these rights, and may, by obligations under other engagements, be
prevented to exercise them. Article 103 does not provide that the 'Charter'
prevails; it stipulates only that the 'obligations' under the Charter do prevail.
Hence, the Pact of Paris may be interpreted to constitute a restriction to the
rights conferred upon the Members by Articles 107 and 53.
H. KnssEN. THE LAW OF THE UNrrED NATIONS 121 (1951).
80. See I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 166; Waldock, General Course on Public Inter-
national Law, 2 RECUEIL DES CouRs 20-38 (1962).
81. "We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to establish conditions
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources
of international law can be maintained. . . have resolved to combine our efforts to accom-
plish these aims." U.N. CHARTER preamble.
82. See G. HARASZT1, supra note 28, at 297-301.
83. The language of the preamble, cited supra note 81, implies the existence of
sources of international law prior to ratification of the Charter, and that the Charter's
function is the maintenance of the authority of these sources.
Article 95 of the Charter provides that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall prevent
Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other
tribunals . . . concluded in the future." It is fair to say that such language recognizes the
authority of other agreements, and does not establish it.
Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice (incorporated into the Char-
ter by Article 92) provides that:
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3. Application of a "Peremptory Norm." Article 53 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "[a] treaty
is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremp-
tory norm of general international law."" While such norms (re-
ferred to as "jus cogens") are notoriously difficult to identify,8 5
they are generally derived by designating certain policies embod-
ied in rules of international law as fundamental." One might em-
ploy this method to read Article 51, in conjunction with those ar-
ticles of the Charter conferring powers on the Security Council to
requisition military aid from all United Nations members in re-
sponse to aggression s8 in support of a fundamental policy favor-
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting States;
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case
ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
Lauterpacht takes the position that the authority of law-making treaties such as the
Charter derives from the authority of treaties in general as a source of international law. 1
L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 18.
84. Article 53 continues: "For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character." S. ROSENNE, supra note 26, at 290.
85. A. McNAiR, supra note 26, at 215; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 505. Because
the sanctions for violation of jus cogens are so severe, however, some have argued that
they should be interpreted restrictively. See C. RozAms, THE CONCEPT OF Jus COGENS IN THE
LAW OF TREA-rES 44-45, 53-55 (1976) (arguing that they should be confined to those prin-
ciples which are not only generally adhered to, but those which are generally recognized as
fundamental).
86. C. RozAKis, supra note 85, at 58-73. The sources ofjus cogens may be either cus-
tomary or conventional. A. McNAiR, supra note 26, at 214-16. The most common example
of a treaty violating jus cogens is an agreement to wage war against a third state. 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 505; C. RozAKs, supra note 85, at 49 n.8. McNair holds the
Kellogg-Briand pact renouncing war, supra note 79, to constitute ajus cogens. A. McNAiR,
supra note 26, at 216.
87. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTEM, art. 2,
para. 4.
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of. . . aggression and shall make
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ing collective security. The difficulty with this approach is that it
proves too much. Jus cogens is not a principle for the interpreta-
tion of treaties, but a criterion for their validity:88 if the treaty as
written violates a peremptory norm of international law it is void,
ab initio. The jus cogens doctrine is the international analogue to
the civil law principle of boni mores (good morals).8 " These doc-
trines are enforced by harsh remedies because their violation im-
plies an illegal purpose.90 The mere alienation of a right of collec-
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." Id. art. 39.
"[The Security Council] may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of
the United Nations." Id. art. 42.
"All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on
its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance,
and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security." Id. art. 43.
88. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Compare with Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention which provides: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose." (Not in derogation of its object and purpose if illegal.) S.
ROSENNE, supra note 26, at 214. See also paragraph 3(c) of Article 31, which provides that
"[tihere shall be taken into account, together with the context . . . any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties." Id. On the importance of
distinguishing between the restrictive interpretation of treaties and their invalidation on
grounds of jus cogens, see G. HARASZTi, supra note 28, at 157-58.
89. C. ROzAKIs, supra note 85, at 1-3. "The concept ofjus cogens was of course known
to the great majority of the members of the International Law Commission. . . .For most
of them, the concept of jus cogens-or some corresponding notion having the same func-
tion-was already an institution of their domestic private law." Id. at 47. Section 138 of
the German Civil Code provides that "a juristic act ...contra bonos mores is void."
B OGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 138 (W. Ger.). For an extensive discussion of the
application of this doctrine in German contract law, see Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion:
The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1976). Article 1133 of the French Civil Code
provides that "[a] cause is illicit when it is prohibited by law or when it is contrary to good
morals or to the ordre public." CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 1133 (Fr.). Article 1108 provides
that "[a] licit cause for the obligation" is "essential to the validity of the agreement." Id.
art. 1108.
90.
[A] treaty is contrary to international law and void if its object or execution
involves:
a) the use or threat of force in contravention of the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations;
b) any act or omission characterized by international law as an international
crime; or
c) any act or omission in suppression or punishment of which every State is
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tive self-defense, however, seems too innocuous to inspire such
condemnation. Moreover, where collective self-defense measures
are mentioned in the Charter, they are always justified as a means
to the end of "international peace and security.""1 The members
are admonished to seek, wherever possible, the peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes.9 2 This would suggest that unconditional peace
treaties be favored over mutual defense pacts. Any other policy
would systematically preclude the negotiation of separate peaces,
with the result that conflicts would inevitably broaden. If compre-
hensive solutions are the only legal possibilities, one might argue,
the world's diplomats might as well hang up their spats.
4. Application of an-Implied Clause. Article 62 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a party may ter-
minate or suspend operation of a treaty due to a change in a cir-
cumstance essential to the consent of the parties.9 3 This doctrine,
the international analogue to the civil law doctrine of clausula re-
bus sic stantibus,94 is fundamentally concerned with the enforce-
required by international law to cooperate.
Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 52, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD. 1, reprinted in C. ROZAKS, supra note 85, at 13.
91. See supra note 87.
92. Article 1 of the Charter provides that the purposes of the U.N. are
to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or sit-
uations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1. Article 2, para. 3 provides that "[a]ll members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered."
93.
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with re-
gard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was
not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from the treaty unless:
a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the con-
sent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still
to be performed under the treaty.
See generally G. HARASZT1, supra note 28, at 327-420 for an extensive discussion of this
doctrine.
94. Where the principle of good morals may be invoked to invalidate contracts as
sources of "objective right," in the parlance of civil law jurisdictions, clausula rebus sic stan-
tibus may be invoked to prevent or modify the enforcement of "subjective rights." Section
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ment of agreements, rather than their validity. Thus one might
argue that while there is nothing inherently wrong with an uncon-
ditional peace agreement, the enforcement of such an agreement
to frustrate efforts to aid a victim of aggression would permit an
"abuse of right."
An act of aggression against an ally of Egypt would be like a
breach of good faith and would therefore change a circumstance
essential to Egypt's consent to the treaty. Unfortunately, aggres-
sion, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholderY5 No scenario
could illustrate this more effectively than the Arab-Israeli conflict,
in which Israel justifies all of its military activity as defensive; its
Arab neighbors view Israel's occupation of their territory as a
continuing act of aggression; and parts of the Palestine Liberation
157 of the German Civil Code holds that "[c]ontracts shall be interpreted according to the
requirements of good faith, ordinary usage being taken into consideration." BGB § 157.
Section 226 provides that "the exercise of a right is forbidden if it can have no other
purpose than to harm some person." BGB § 226. Article 2 of The Swiss Civil Code, simi-
larly, provides that "every person is bound to exercise his rights and to fulfill his obliga-
tions according to the principles of good faith. The law does not protect a manifest abuse
of right." SCHWEIZElSCHES ZIVILGFSETaBUCH, CODE CIVIL SUISSE, CODICE CIVILE SVIZZERO
[ZGB, C.Q, COD. cxv.] art. 2 (Switz.). Swiss and German courts have applied these clauses to
rescind contracts that became onerous because of changes in economic conditions, The
underlying theory is that to require performance under such conditions would manifest
bad-faith and therefore constitute an abuse of right on the part of the promisee. See cases
and materials collected in K SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 365-91 (1950); A, VON MEH-
REN, THE CIVIL LAW SymsEm 1073-99 (1977). See also Cohn, Frustration of Contract in Ger-
man Law, 28 J. COMP. LEGAL & INT'L LAw 15 (1946); Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private
Contracts: Germany 1914-1924, 33 MICH. L. REV. 171 (1934). See infra notes 208-17 and
accompanying text.
95.
There are great difficulties of application in real world situations arising
from the occasional arbitrariness of identifying as "aggressor" the state that
makes initial recourse to force. Given alignments and the patterns of group
voting in the political organs of the United Nations it is not possible to entrust
the power of authoritative decision fully to the organized international commu-
nity. Pariah states such as South Africa, Portugal and Israel cannot expect to
receive a norm-guided determination of a dispute involving a controversial use
of force.
Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order, in 1
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 50 n.69 (1969). See also, Stone, Hopes and
Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 224 (1977) (critiques defini-
tion of aggression adopted by U.N. General Assembly). For trenchant examples indicating
the indeterminancy of judgments of aggression, particularly in the context of invocations
of the right of collective self-defense, see N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SysrEM (1981). Where sovereignty is in dispute,
these examples indicate, intervention in support of one disputant party will be perceived as
aggression.
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Organization view the very existence of Israel as a mutilation of
Palestinian sovereignty. 96 Suffice it to say that in any such conflict
each side will not only accuse the other of aggression, but will also
believe its own accusations. Given the subjectivity which inevitably
attends these judgments, to render treaty rights contingent upon
them would, arguably, annihilate those rights entirely.
This was the view of the Israeli negotiators who, accordingly,
refused to accede to the Egyptian-American interpretation of the
Blair House agreement.9
A second Egyptian approach to the problem of reconciling
the Camp David agreements with the Arab League treaty system
involved interpreting both as consistent with the terms of Resolu-
tion 242."8 The peace treaty recognized the "urgent necessity" of
96. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 922-23; see also supra note 73. For the legal argument
against Israeli sovereignty, see Cattan, supra note 4, 11-44. For an enlightening discussion
of patterns of armed conflict in the Middle East, see Yost, The Arab Israeli War. How it
Began, in J. MOORE, supra note 4, at 293. Yost argues that neither side desired war in the
1967 conflict.
97. See M. DAYAN, supra note 46, at 219.
98. On November 22, 1967 the Security Council adopted the following resolution:
The Security Council
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by war and the
need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can
live in security,
Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter
of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with
Article 2 of the charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establish-
ment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include
the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international water-
ways in the area;
b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence
of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment
of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a special representative to pro-
ceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States
concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a
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establishing "a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the mid-
dle east in accordance with Security Council resolutions 242 and
338." In addition, it mentioned the signatories' continued adher-
ence to the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, which repeated
the terms of Resolution 242.' 9 This is the basis of the Egyptian
position that the peace treaty and the Framework for Peace in the
Middle East are linked-that Egypt's establishment of peaceful re-
lations with Israel is contingent upon Israel's fulfillment of the
conditions specified in Resolution 242 and the Framework for Peace
in the Middle East. Since these documents both call for Israel's
withdrawal from the occupied territories, Egypt has argued that,
far from compromising its commitment to defend its allies against
Israeli aggression, the peace treaty fulfills that commitment-and
by peaceful means.1 00 Of course, Israel has not yet withdrawn
from any additional occupied territory or shown any inclination to
do so. Moreover, according to the Israeli interpretation, Resolu-
tion 242 does not necessarily require withdrawal from this terri-
tory. They point out that it does not specify withdrawal from all
territory, but that it does mandate "secure and recognized bor-
ders."101 This, conclude the Israelis, means that they must with-
draw only to borders which they consider secure, and only after
such borders are recognized by their neighbors.0 2 This view is
reflected in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East which pro-
vides for withdrawal to such boundaries, after negotiation.103
Egypt's Arab League partners, however, view Resolution 242 as
requiring immediate Israeli withdrawal from all occupied
territories.'10
peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and
principles of this resolution.
22 U.N. SCOR (1382d mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/Res/242 (1967).
99. See Bassiouni, supra note 56, at 21; Murphy, supra note 4, at 919. See also supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
100. See Bassiouni, supra note 56, at 18, 21; Murphy, supra note 4, at 921.
101. See supra note 98.
102. For a vigorous exposition and defense of this view see Rostow, The Illegality of the
Arab Attack on Israel of October 6, 1973, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 272 (1975). Rostow argues that
the Israeli position is supported by the diplomatic history of the resolution's drafting.
103. Camp David Agreement, Sept. 17, 1978, Egypt-Israel, Preamble, 17 I.L.M. 1467
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Camp David Agreement].
104. Murphy, supra note 4, at 925. Note, however, that neither Syria nor the P.L.O.
had accepted the validity of Resolution 242 as of the time of the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty. See id. at 926.
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Egypt also invokes Resolution 242 and the Framework for
Peace in the Middle East to refute the claim that it has violated
Arab League policies of support for Palestinian sovereignity. Res-
olution 242 calls for a "just settlement of the refugee prob-
lem. ' 10 5 The Framework for Peace in the Middle East provides that
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be granted "full auton-
omy"10l for a five-year period and that any ultimate disposition of
the territory must "recognize the legitimate rights" and "just re-
quirements" of the Palestinian people.10 7 Egypt reads all of these
provisions to require Palestinian statehood, and thus argues that
the entire "peace package" advances Palestinian interests as far as
possible within the constraints of Resolution 242. a08 The P.L.O.,
however, has never accepted Resolution 242 insofar as it requires
recognition of Israeli sovereignty; and, it has noted the absence of
any explicit requirement for Palestinian statehood or self-determi-
nation in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East.109 It has been
noted that the phrase, "legitimate rights," may imply that some
rights claimed by the P.L.O. are illegitimate. 10 Of particular con-
cern is the right of self-determination, the legitimacy of which
some American and Israeli commentators have denied. 1 -
In short, Egyptian efforts to reconcile the peace treaty with
Egypt's obligations to the Arab League treaty system convinced
neither the Israelis nor the Arab League. As a consequence, Is-
raeli negotiators became concerned as to which treaties would be
valid in the event of a conflict. For reasons to be explored at
length below, an extensive survey of scholarly commentary proved
inconclusive.1 12 Israel sought to escape this doctrinal thicket by
adopting a technique employed by the framers of the United Na-
tions Charter-they simply wrote the priority of the peace treaty
105. See supra note 98.
106. Camp David Agreement, supra note 103, § A, para. 1.
107. Id. § A, para. 1(c).
108. Murphy, supra note 4, at 920-21. But cf. E. WEiZMANN, THE BATrLE FOR PEACE
321 (1981) ("Sadat. . . repeated firmly: 'Ezer, you've got nothing to worry about-there
won't be any Palestinian state' ").
109. Murphy, supra note 4, at 926.
110. Id..at 926. Note, however, that this phrase appears in article 18 of the Palestine
National Charter of 1968. J. MOORE, supra note 4, at 1089.
111. See Feinberg, The Question of Sovereignty Over Palestine, in J. MOORE, supra note 4,
at 45, 48-52; Rostow, Book Review, 82 YALE L. J. 829, 844-54 (1973).
112. Public Lecture by Jack Waltuch, Ass't Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office of
Israel, at Yale Law School (October 1979) (speaking on the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty).
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into the treaty itself. Thus, article VI(5) of the treaty provides
that "[s]ubject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in
the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties
under the present Treaty and any other obligations, the obliga-
tions under this Treaty will be binding and implemented."' 3
As far as Egypt is concerned, however, even this language re-
solves nothing. Egypt relies for support on the agreed minutes
which provide that "there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails
over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or
agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be
construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(5) of the
Treaty."11 Egyptian spokespersons have suggested that Egypt
might well honor its mutual defense commitments to the Arab
League, if requested to do so." 5
As far as the Arab League is concerned, however, the relative
validity of the two treaty systems is irrelevant. The members of
the League viewed the peace treaty as a violation of Egypt's Arab
League commitments and unanimously voted to suspend Egypt
from the League, remove the League headquarters from Egypt,
sever diplomatic relations, and boycott Egypt economically.116 In
the end, it was politics rather than doctrine that determined
which treaty would be honored. By isolating Egypt politically,
Israel achieved its intended separate peace. The Camp David ne-
gotiations exposed the doctrinal problem of treaty conflict, but
did not resolve it; they resulted only in the closing of a bargain,
not a doctrinal lacuna.
113. 18 I.L.M. 365-66 (1979).
114. Id. at 392.
115. Murphy, supra note 4, at 923.
116. Id. at 898.
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III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TREATY CONFLICT
The first recourse of scholars and diplomats bent on resolving
a question of international law is a review of the past practice of
states and international tribunals. This Chapter surveys instances
of treaty conflict which have occasioned formal protest since the
advent of the modern system of international law, focusing on
those protests that have been invoked in arguments about the va-
lidity of conflicting treaties. This survey will show that the prac-
tice of states and international courts provides little useful prece-
dent for determining the validity of conflicting treaties. While
there has been some condemnation of treaty conflict, there has
been little indication of an appropriate remedy, apparently be-
cause the international legal system has been incapable of any au-
thoritative response. As a consequence, the question of remedies
remains academic; its evolution must be treated more as intellec-
tual than as diplomatic history.
Our review of international responses to treaty conflict will be
divided into three parts: The first discussing responses of the Eu-
ropean powers to treaty conflicts during the century between the
fall of Napoleon and the advent of World War I; the second dis-
cussing the responses of international tribunals to treaty conflicts
since the start of World War I; and the third discussing extrajudi-
cial responses to treaty conflicts during the same period.
A. Treaty Conflict and the Concert of Europe
The modern international legal system originated with the
Congresses of Vienna occasioned by the fall of Napoleon." 7
117. The effort to secure peace in Europe by means of a legal system began with the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
This marked the end of a period of violent religious wars and the disappear-
ance of the Papacy and Holy Roman Empire as effective instruments for regu-
lating the affairs of Europe. The intention was to create a system which would
be stable and permanent, resting on a concept of a European public peace and
public law. This judicial order was to rest on the political status quo which was
assumed to represent a 'Balance of Power' or principe d'equilibre between the
various states or groups of states.
I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 14 (1963). The treaties
establishing the Peace pledged the parties "to defend and protect all and every article of
this peace against anyone, without distinction of religion." The Treaty of Minster, art.
CXXII quoted in Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 24 (1948).
This guarantee and others induced David Jayne Hill to characterize it "as an international
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These Congresses fixed European borders by mutual consent of
constitution, which gave to all its adherents the right of intervention to enforce its engage-
ments." 2 D. HILL, A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EU-
ROPE 602 (1925). Paradoxically, however, the very mechanism by which this peace was to
be guaranteed, military intervention, proved its undoing.
In the realm of universal history balance of power was concerned with states
whose independence it served to maintain. But it attained this end only by con-
tinuous war between changing partners . . . . The action of the same principle
safeguarded for over 200 years the sovereignty of the states forming Europe at
the time of the Treaty of Munster and Westphalia (1648). When, seventy-five
years later, in the Treaty of Utrecht, the signatories declared their formal ad-
herence to this principle, they thereby embodied it in a system, and thus estab-
lished mutual guarantees of survival for the strong and the weak alike through
the medium of war. The fact that in the nineteenth century the same mecha-
nism resulted in peace rather than war is a problem to challenge the historian.
K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR
TIME 6 (1957). While the Peace of Westphalia may have established a stable state system, in
other words, it failed to establish a truly international system-an institutional framework
for formulating joint policy and for peacefully resolving disputes. "The next attempt, the
settlement of Vienna of 1815 and the Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle of 1818, which in a
sense completed the former, gave birth to that loose system of consultation between the
great powers known as the concert of Europe." Gross, supra, at 20. "International legisla-
tion, or even international administration, if the phrases be permitted, can hardly be said
to have appeared on the scene until the Congress of Vienna, with the possible exception of
one or two cases in which, as at Utrecht, there was recognized a change of succession or of
royal title." G. BUTLER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (1928).
The Congress of Vienna generated three important developments, each of which may
be understood as an accomodation of the internationalizing influence of the French
Revolution: first, a restructuring of Europe's borders and balance of power with bold, al-
most Napoleonic strokes:
The opportunity of reorganizing Europe upon a more stable basis was at hand
if statesmen could be found to undertake the task. The Congress of Vienna,
meeting from September 1814 toJune 1815, assumed. . . what was practically
the role of a great law-making body. It formed new states by the union of Swe-
den and Norway and of Holland and Belgium, and it confirmed the action of
Napoleon in consolidating the numerous German states and formed them into a
loose confederation of thirty-nine members. Its chief object, however, was the
restoration of the balance of power in Europe which had been so greatly
unsettled.
C. FENWIcK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-18 (4th ed. 1965). See also P. CORBETT, THE GROWTH OF
WORLD LAW 91-92 (1971); M. NATHAN, THE RENASCENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1925);
see generally C. WEBSTER, THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA (2d ed. 1934). The second development
was a codification of several areas of international law, partly inspired by the Napoleonic
codifications. The subjects covered were the slave trade ("Declaration sur 'abolition de la
traite des negres" (February 8, 1815)), diplomatic procedure ("Reglement sur le rang etre
les-agents diplomatiques" (March 19, 1815)), and navigation ("Reglement pour la libre nav-
igation des rivieres" (March 24, 1815)). See M. NATHAN, supra at 15; 9 J. VERZIJL, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 11-12 (1968). The third development, already al-
luded to, was the most ineffable: the creation of an enduring system of dispute resolution:
"European society and the public law became heavily institutionalized. The concept of the
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almost every sovereign in Europe and initiated what is somewhat
exaggeratedly referred to as the "hundred years peace."",," What
marked these agreements as the birth of an international legal sys-
tem were two factors: first, their comprehensiveness-the partici-
pation and consent of almost all the governments in Europe gave
the resulting decisions a kind of transcendent legitimacy that pre-
vious treaties had lacked; second, their continuing influence as a
model for international cooperation-during the course of the
ensuing century, new disputes were submitted to similar con-
gresses for resolution.119 During this period the disputants were
careful to ensure that all signatories to any treaties relevant to the
dispute were included in its resolution.1 20 By institutionalizing the
concert of Europe and the Congress system raised a strong presumption against unilateral
changes in the status quo." I. BROWNLIE, supra, at 19. See generally C. Dupuis, LE PRINCIPE
D'EQUILIBRE ET LE CONCERT EUROPEEN (1909); E. GUICK, EURoPE's CLASSICAL BALANCE OF
POWER (1955); M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 30-41 (1962); R. MOWAT, CONCERT OF EUROPE (1930); Dupuis, Les Anticidents
De La Sociti Des Nations, 60 RECUEIL DFi CoURs 67 (1937).
The Concert's success in keeping the peace may ultimately be attributed not so much to
its institutional structure, as to the forces unleashed by the very revolution over which it
purportedly triumphed. "The entirely new factor, we submit, was the emergence of an
acute peace interest . . . . The backwash of the French Revolution reinforced the rising
tide of the Industrial Revolution in establishing peaceful business as a universal interest."
K. POLANYI, supra, at 7. The birth of the international legal system, in short, coincided with
the defeat of France, but with the triumph of the French Revolution; for the power en-
trenched at Vienna was the force unleashed at the Bastille---capital.
118.
The nineteenth century produced a phenomenon unheard of in the annals of
Western civilization, namely, a hundred year's peace-1815 to 1914. Apart
from the Crimean War-a more or less colonial event-England, France, Prus-
sia, Austria, Italy and Russia were engaged in war among each other for alto-
gether only eighteen months. A computation of comparable figures for the two
preceding centuries gives an average of sixty to seventy years of major wars in
each.
K. POLANYI, supra note 117, at 5.
119. See generally infra text accompanying notes 125-34; G. BUTLER & S. MACCOBY, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 427-86 (1928).
120.
Thus the Treaty of Paris, signed on 30 March 1856, was signed not only by the
belligerents in the Crimean War but also by the other Great Powers, Austria
and Prussia. To some extent territorial changes depended for their permanence
and validity under the public law upon collective recognition. The appearance
of Greece as an independent state was the outcome of collective intervention by
the Major Powers and general recognition of the new situation. However, the
Concert of Europe depended on the agreement of the Great Powers; European
states with interests which conflicted with those of the Great Powers, and states
outside the European Concert, were liable to various forms of forcible
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European Concert, European diplomatic practice retained the
transcendent legitimacy generated by the Congress of Vienna
throughout the nineteenth century. Legitimacy and continuity
gave the European Concert the character of a legal system-and
these conditions required that no change be effected in matters
regulated by treaty without the consent of all parties. The very
character of the Concert of Europe as a legal system, in short,
depended upon the rarity of treaty conflict.
What made such consensus possible was the influence of two
factors: a balance of power among the major European states and
a commonality of economic interest. A balance of power had been
maintained in Europe since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, but
it had been maintained by means of war rather than diplomacy.
The factor adduced by Karl Polanyi to explain the development
of the diplomatic Congress as a means of maintaining the Euro-
pean balance of power was "the emergence . . . of peaceful busi-
ness as a universal interest. 1' 21 The industrial revolution made
possible the widespread production of commodities for distant
consumption. As a result, the economies of the great powers of
Europe became increasingly intertwined, and the economy of each
became increasingly dependent upon undisrupted trade. Since a
major war on the European continent would certainly disrupt
trade, every European power stood to lose by it. The only possible
exception was Russia, which entered the industrial age late in the
nineteenth century and which other European powers viewed with
suspicion throughout much of this era.122
The antipathy of the European Concert towards war during
this period resulted in a minimum of treaty conflict. However, it
also prevented the development of any systematic response by the
European Concert to treaty conflict. European powers were loathe
to risk war to enforce a treaty, unless its breach threatened to up-
set the balance of power or disrupt commerce. In nineteenth cen-
tury Europe, the rarity of treaty conflict was more the constitutive
interference.
I. BROWNUE, supra note 117, at 20 (citations ommitted). See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NA-
TxONS 332-33 (6th ed. 1963); G. BUTLER & S. MACCOBY, supra note 119, at 427-86; M.
KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 117, at 116-18; H. TOBIN, THE TERMINATION OF
MULTI-PARTITE TREATIES 206-49 (1933).
121. K. POLANYI, supra note 117, at 7.
122. E. CRANKSHAW, THE SHADOW OF THE WINTER PALACE 138-50 (1978).
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condition than the consequence of a system of international law.
Most instances of treaty conflict that occasioned protest dur-
ing this period did not implicate the balance of power. Some con-
cerned essentially colonial situations peripheral to the European
continent. In 1865 and 1912 England protested the preferential
treatment of American vessels by small Caribbean states in appar-
ent violation of English treaty rights. In each case a treaty conflict
was involved, but in neither case was the conflict remedied. 123 In
123. The Crimean War was concluded by the Congress of Paris in 1856. The result-
ing treaty contained a convention against privateering, subsequently acceded to by many
nations, including Haiti. In 1869, however, Haiti signed a treaty with the United States
providing that American privateers would be admitted to Haitian ports in time of war.
Britain, a signatory to the Declaration of Paris, protested this treaty in 1865. A MCNAIR,
supra note 26, at 228-29. Within months, however, the American Civil War ended, and
with it, the threat that the United States would commission privateers.
Today, apart from the doubtful question of the position of successor States, it is
believed that the only maritime State not a party to the Declaration of Paris is
the United States, and they refrained from the use of privateers in the Civil
War, in the war against Spain and in the two world wars.
Id. at 225-26. For discussion of the original American position on the Declaration of Paris,
see G. BUTLER & S. MACCOBY, supra note 119, at 310-11.
In 1901 the United States and Great Britain concluded the Hay-Paunceforte Treaty
regarding the construction and regulation of the Panama Canal. Article 3 of this treaty
required that vessels of all nations using the canal be charged equal tolls. In 1903, how-
ever, the United States concluded the Hay-Varilla Treaty with Panama, Article 19 of
which exempts all Panamanian vessels from tolls in using the canal. Quincy Wright com-
mented in 1917:
Section 5 of the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, recognizes the ex-
emption of Panama vessels. Great Britain protested against the exemption given
to American vessels, also contained in this section, and in the same note made
mention of the Panama exemption as being also contrary to the Hay-
Paunceforte Treaty, but did not insist upon it. This treaty conflict does not
seem to have come before the courts, and it is highly probable that, in view of
the peculiar position of Panama in reference to the canal, the exemption of her
vessels from tolls being one of the conditions upon which she permitted the
canal to be constructed, this exemption will not be seriously questioned.
Wright, Conflicts Between Internation Law and Treaties, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 577-78 (1917).
At least one instance of apparent treaty conflict occurred in our own history, prior to
the Congress of Vienna:
Such a conflict arose between Article 17 of the treaty of the United States with
France of 1778 and Article 24 of the treaty with England of 1794. The former
required the United States to admit French privateers and their prizes to Amer-
ican ports for purposes of repair and supplies, whereas the latter required her
to forbid all belligerent privateers these privileges.
Id. at 566, 576-77. In Moodie v. The Amity, 17 F. Cas. 650 (D.S.C. 1796), the District
Court for South Carolina recognized the validity of the earlier treaty, holding that it pre-
cluded admiralty jurisdiction over sale on land of prizes captured by lawfully commissioned
French privateers. In so doing, however, the court seemingly ignoed plaintiff's argument
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1894 France protested the Belgian king's lease, from England, of
African territory he had earlier acknowledged as French. While
France succeeded in inducing the Belgian king to abandon the
lease, England simply occupied the disputed territory, eventually
returning possession of a portion of it to the Belgian king.124 Just
as nuclear deterrence in no way inhibits superpower intervention
in the Third World, the balance of power in Europe permitted
military superiority in a colonial region to be exploited with impu-
nity. Because of the balance there was little incentive for a Euro-
pean power bested in the colonies to retaliate at home. Nor was
there any reason for the Concert of Europe to become involved in
a colonial dispute. While the European powers traded with one
another, colonies traded primarily with their rulers. Accordingly a
colonial war would injure the economic welfare only of the loser,
whereas a war on the European continent could injure all the
Concert members. Colonial treaty conflict did not sufficiently
threaten the Concert to warrant a negative response.
Occasionally, even continental disputes were resolved without
the immediate supervision of the entire Concert. In 1846 Russia
and Prussia agreed to Austria's annexation of Cracow. Britain
protested that the Vienna Treaty of 1815 required those three
powers to guarantee the independence and neutrality of Cracow.
Yet the function of this provision was probably to prevent dis-
putes among these three powers, and their agreement on Austrian
annexation was probably more an index of peaceful cooperation
among the three than of Austrian ascendancy. In any case, the
matter died.125
A somewhat more alarming instance of treaty conflict was the
Treaty of Villafranca which precipitated the unification of Italy.
The Vienna Treaty accorded Austria sovereignty over Lombardy
and Venetia. In 1859, after establishing an understanding with
France, Sardinia began to provoke Austria. While conditions for a
new congress to resolve the crisis were still under negotiation, war
that jurisdiction attached because the case arose under the treaty with Britain.
124. AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY 879 (W. Langer 5th ed. 1972). See G. BUT-
LER & S. MACCOBY, supra note 119, at 472-73 for discussion of the Congo Conference of
Berlin. See also 6 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 54, 529-31
(1973) (discussion of this case in connection with problem of treaty conflict and citation of
bibliographical references to treaties discussed).
125. A. McNAIR, supra note 26, at 228.
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broke out between Austria and Sardinia, which was aided by
France. What could have become a cataclysmic war ended quickly
when France, having established Sardinian rule over Lombardy by
signing the Treaty of Villafranca with Austria, withdrew. The
Sardinian successes inspired a wave of nationalist insurrection
throughout the Italian peninsula. The other great powers, wary of
a resurgence of French expansionism, sought to convene a con-
gress on the Italian situation. This effort failed when the belliger-
ents refused to rubberstamp it. Yet events proved such a congress
to be unnecessary. The unification of Italy under Sardinian rule
strengthened the balance of power by providing a check against
the territorial ambitions of both Austria and France. 26
There was one context in which treaty conflict repeatedly
elicited a more vigorous response from the Concert of Europe.
This context was provided by the "Eastern Question": the threat
to stability of the European political and economic system posed
by the decline of Ottoman power. The only general European war
of the nineteenth century, the Crimean War, resulted from Brit-
ish and French resistance to Russia's designs on the Ottoman Em-
pire's Balkan provinces.1 27 The war was concluded by the Treaty
of Paris which guaranteed Ottoman independence and territorial
integrity, and required that disputes between the Ottoman Em-
pire and any other signatory be mediated by the remaining
signatories.
By thus bringing the Ottoman Empire into the European
Concert, the great powers appeared to further two common goals:
first, they strengthened the balance of power by inhibiting any Eu-
ropean power from unilaterally plundering Ottoman possessions;
second, in their capacity as collective protectors of Ottoman sov-
ereignty, the European powers could insure Ottoman solicitude
for the Concert's objective of undisrupted trade. Yet the second
goal was at odds with the first: because internal discord in a large
empire might be as disruptive to trade as a war, every European
power could claim an interest in the Ottoman Empire's internal
affairs. This in turn encouraged the Sultan's disgruntled sub-
jects-particularly in the Balkans-to seek support from Euro-
pean powers-particularly Russia.
126. G. BUTLER & S. MACCOBY, supra note 119, at 451-53.
127. See E. CRANKSHAW, supra note 122.
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When, in 1875, Christian revolts broke out in the Empire's
Balkan territories, the European powers 128 forced Turkey to the
conference table. At the Congress of Constantinople, held in
1876-77, the European powers proposed that they become in-
volved in the administration of the Empire's Christian provinces.
When the Turks refused this proposal, the conference disbanded
and the European powers issued the London Protocol. This
amounted to an ultimatum that the Sultan quickly improve the
treatment of his European Christian population and negotiate a
joint military demobilization with Russia, or suffer concerted Eu-
ropean intervention in the Balkans. Turkey responded negatively
to this ultimatum and Russia attacked with considerable success.
Hostilities ended in 1878 with the Treaty of San Stefano in which
the defeated Ottoman Empire conceded many rights guaranteed
by the Treaty of Paris.
Great Britain, notwithstanding its acquiescence in the London
Protocol, which effectively modified the Treaty of Paris without
Turkey's consent, protested the Treaty of San Stefano on the
ground that it modified the earlier treaty without the consent of
all parties 29 This protest is frequently cited in support of the ille-
gality of treaty conflict, perhaps because it was one of the few
such protests that was at all efficacious.230 A proposal to convene a
general European congress to resolve this problem at first foun-
dered: Russia and England could not agree as to whether the con-
ference would ratify the Treaty of San Stefano or renegotiate it.
When, however, these two powers agreed on the terms of a modi-
fication of the treaty, a congress was convened in Berlin to ratify
this compromise. 1"
Subsequent treaty conflicts engendered by the erosion of the
Ottoman Empire were resolved similarly. In 1908, Austria an-
nexed the Ottoman suzerainties of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while
Bulgaria declared its independence of the Ottoman Empire. As
England viewed these actions as violative of the Treaty of Berlin,
she attempted to arrange a congress to consider them. Austria,
128. Russia, England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Sardinia. G. BUTLER & S. MACCOnY,
supra note 119, at 465.
129. G. BUTLER & S. MACCOBY, supra note 119, at 463-66; A. MCNAIR, supra note 26,
at 230.
130. E.g., A. McNAIR, supra note 26, at 230.
131. G. BUTrLR & S. MACCOBY, supra note 119, at 466-69.
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with the support first of Germany, then of Russia, refused to co-
operate without prior assurances that such a congress would sim-
ply ratify her annexations. After Turkey agreed to accept com-
pensation from Austria, however, the great powers eventually
recognized Austria's annexation and compelled a recalcitrant Ser-
bia to accede as well.13 2 In 1912, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, all
former Ottoman possessions, 133 again became restive and made
war on the Ottoman Empire, despite efforts on the part of the
great powers to negotiate the dispute. Hostilities were suspended
in 1913 by the Treaty of London in which Turkey ceded control
of some disputed territory to the Balkan allies and consigned
other territories to the great powers for disposition. Almost im-
mediately, however, war broke out again among the victors and
was settled by the Peace of Bucharest without the involvement or
consent of the great powers, in apparent violation of the Treaties
of Berlin and London. The great powers, by virtue of their mili-
tary presence in Albania were nevertheless able to enforce some
of the terms of the Treaty of London, notwithstanding Serbian
resistance.""
In each of these three instances of treaty conflict, the Euro-
pean Concert was able to effect some modification in the terms of
Turkey's capitulation. In no case, however, were they able to com-
pel the belligerents to return to the status quo ante. The vigor of
the Concert's response in these cases reflects not so much its effec-
tiveness as a legal system, as its anxiety over the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire. The fact that treaty conflicts arose concerning
matters of such vital importance to the Concert was one indication
that the system was breaking down.
The foundation of international law in this period was collec-
tive consent manifested in adherence to multilateral treaties gov-
erning the distribution of power in Europe. Conflict among such
treaties removed the constitutive condition for international law
by circumventing collective consensus. Since treaties create obliga-
132. Id. at 471-72.
133. The independent Kingdom of Greece was created by agreement between France,
England, and Russia in 1827, joined by Turkey in 1829. The boundaries of Greece were
fixed by succeeding protocols among these parties. G. BUTLER & S. MACCOBY, supra note
119, at 427-32. Serbia was recognized as an independent state at the Treaty of Berlin in
1878. Id. at 467. Bulgaria emerged as described above. See supra text accompanying notes
131-32.
134. G. BUTLER & S. MACCOBY, supra note 119, at 476-77.
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tions in international law, the validity of treaties by definition de-
pends upon the presence of an international legal system. If con-
sensus was the foundation of international law in nineteenth
century Europe, then treaty conflict undermined the validity of
every treaty.
I am not merely offering a version of the familiar positivistic
argument that the absence of a transcendent sovereign authority
deprives international law of its legal character. 35 To the con-
135. This position is most commonly associated with John Austin:
Society formed by the intercourse of independent political societies, is the prov-
ince of international law, or of the law obtaining between nations. For (adopt-
ing a current expression) international law, or the law obtaining between na-
tions, is conversant about the conduct of independent political societies
considered as entire communities . . . .Speaking with greater precision, inter-
national law, or the law obtaining between nations, regards the conduct of sov-
ereigns considered as related to one another.
And hence it inevitably follows, that the law obtaining between nations is
not positive law: for every positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person or
persons in a state of subjection to its author.
1 J. AUsTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE Lec. 231 (1875). While other positivist philoso-
phers have not taken such an extreme position, they have manifested great difficulty in
assimilating international law to their conceptions of law. H.L.A. Hart, though a critic of
Austin's definition of law as the command of a sovereign, is nevertheless skeptical of inter-
national law's legal status:
The absence of [an international legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdic-
tion, and centrally organized sanctions] means that the rules for states resemble
that simple form of social structure, consisting only of primary rules of obliga-
tion, which, when we find it among societies of individuals, we are accustomed
to contrast with a developed legal system. It is indeed arguable . . . that inter-
national law not only lacks the secondary rules of change and adjudication
which provide for legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition
specifying "sources" of law and providing general criteria for the identification
of its rules.
H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961). Nevertheless, while international law lacks the
paradigmatic characteristic of legal systems (a union of primary and secondary rules) Hart
contends it is analogous to other legal systems in important respects, and could become
similar in all respects by developing the requisite institutional framework. Id. at 226-31.
Hans Kelsen similarly postulates such institutions as all but essential to the existence of
an international legal system. See H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 320-47 (1967). In the
absence of such institutions, however, he sees international law as a "primitive legal
order":
This primitive law can be understood only if we distinguish-as does primitive
man-between killing as a delict, and killing as a sanction. In order to under-
stand international law, a differentiation must also be made between war as a
delict and war as a sanction, despite the fact that the practical application of this
distinction in a concrete case may be difficult . . ..
Should we, however, contrary to the theory of "just war," refuse to regard
war as in principle forbidden and permitted only as a reaction against a delict,
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trary, I am assuming that international law can function as a legal
system in the presence of conditions fulfilling criteria of legiti-
macy recognizable as such to the participants. I make no assump-
tion as to what the criteria of legitimacy for international legal
institutions must be; rather I assume that these criteria are inter-
nally developed and elaborated. In the international system of the
nineteenth century, however, the legitimacy of international law
was precariously balanced upon the unanimous consent of the
great powers of Europe.
we would no longer be in a position to conceive of general international law as
an order turning the employment of force into a monopoly of the community.
Under these circumstances, general international law could no longer be con-
sidered as a legal order.
H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 339 (1961).
Critics of the positivist tradition suggest that it is not international law but international
legal theory which is primitive.
[T]he social environment within which international law is expected to function
cannot be taken for granted to nearly the extent that it might be in investigat-
ing the borderlands of the known, knowable, and unknowable in a domestic
legal context. For the theorist to assume the social and political environment of
international law is to risk other perils, the most frequent of which is implicit
reliance upon a model of law transplanted from domestic life. Since such a
model does not fit the international setting, the effect is likely to be a theory of
international law that is excessively formal (Kelsen) or simplistically cynical
(Morgenthau).
The first requisite of an adequate theory of international law is a concern
with the distinctive attributes of law in an environment with the characteristics
of the international system. Because Myres McDougal has made such a powerful
demonstration of his awareness of this starting point for a theory of interna-
tional law, I would identify him as our most important theorist. . . . Because
of his insistence upon contextual analysis, McDougal makes the environment of
world affairs relevant to any particular decision about the meaning of a legal
rule. The necessity for this reference to context suggests that international le-
gal theory is quite undeveloped, for, so long as it is necessary to take so much
into account in making each legal appraisal, it is evident that there is no agree-
ment about the role and character of law in the social order.
Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law-Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50
VA. L. REv. 231, 233-34 (1964). See generally M. McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER (1960); M. McDOUGAL, H. LAsswELL & J. MILTER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PUn3C ORDER (1967). Cognizant of these criticisms, McDougal and others have
attempted to develop a conception of law applicable to the international system, which they
characterize as "horizontal" and "consensual" rather than "vertical" and "authoritative."
See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configura-
tive Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968). See also C. BErrz, POLITICAL THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979); G. Gottlieb, The Nature of International Law: Toward a
Second Concept of Law, in 4 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (C. Black and
R. Falk eds. 1972); Murphy, Some Reflections upon Theories of International Law, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 447 (1970).
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B. Treaty Conflict and International Tribunals
The conceptual and practical possibility of an international le-
gal response to treaty conflict depends upon the existence of in-
ternational legal institutions which transcend the particular treaty
arrangements which may come into question. The possibility of
such an institution is itself in doubt since the only mechanism for
bringing such an institution into existence is itself a treaty."' This
means that any treaty made in violation of international law would
itself raise the issue of treaty conflict. Some theorists have at-
tempted to cope with this problem without addressing the prob-
lem of treaty conflict generally; they have argued that those trea-
ties which are constitutive of international legal institutions have a
special priority.1 7 In any case, to the extent that such institutions
claim a transcendent legitimacy, they may view themselves as be-
ing in a position to define the rights created by conflicting treaties
and to create remedies for the infringement of those rights.
The twentieth century has seen the development of putatively
transcendent international legal institutions. Nevertheless, such
institutions have rarely been faced with the problem of treaty con-
flict and have been loath to confront it on those few occasions.
The first international tribunal, established in 1906 by the
136.
A treaty has been described, with some degree of exaggeration, as "the only
and sadly overworked instrument with which international society is equipped
for the purpose of carrying out its multifarious transactions"; for instance . . .
political agreements relating to peace, alliance, friendship, neutrality, guaran-
tee, commercearies and law-making treaties, particularly of a multi-partite char-
acter; treaties akin to charters of incorporation because they create interna-
tional unions or organizations; and so forth.
A. MCNAIR, supra note 26, at 5 (quoting 11 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 101 (1930)).
137. Kelsen is a leading exponent of this view. See Kelsen, Conflicts Between Obligations
Under the Charter of the United Nations and Obligations Under Other International Agreements,
10 U. PrTr. L. REV. 285 (1949). See also A. McNAIR, supra note 26, at 216-17. For a critique
of this view, see G. HARASZTI, supra note 28, at 297-301. In any case, the United Nations
Charter lays claim to priority over both prior and subsequent agreements: "In the event of
a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail." U. N. CHARTER art. 103. Similar language may be
found in Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations: "The members of the
League severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or under-
standings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake
they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof."
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 20.
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Treaty of Washington, was the Central American Court of Jus-
tice.1 8 This court, established to resolve disputes between the sig-
natories, considered one case involving treaty conflict in 1916.139
This case is particularly significant for our purposes because it has
been cited in support of the equal validity of two conflicting
treaties.
By the Cafias-Jerez Treaty of 1858, Nicaragua agreed to con-
sult the government of Costa Rica prior to permitting a foreign
government to construct a transcontinental canal on Nicaraguan
territory. In the event that Costa Rica's "natural" rights would be
effected, Costa Rica's opinion would be dispositive; otherwise it
would be merely advisory."" In 1888, in an arbitral award, Presi-
dent Cleveland reconfirmed Costa Rica's right to consultation and
interpreted her natural rights as including territorial rights in the
San Juan River and estuary, to which Costa Rica and Nicaragua
were co-riparians14 In 1914, however, Nicaragua concluded the
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty with the United States, granting the
United States the exclusive right to build a canal in the San Juan
River or elsewhere in Nicaragua. 2 Costa Rica, El Salvador and
Honduras protested the treaty and the United States Senate rati-
fied it "with the understanding. . . that nothing in said Conven-
tion is intended to affect any existing right of any of the said
138. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, established in 1899 at the Hague
was not a real court of justice as that term is ordinarily understood. For, in the
first place, it was not itself a deciding tribunal, but only a list of names, out of
which the parties in each case select, and thereby constitute, the court. Sec-
ondly, since in conflicts to be decided by arbitration the arbitrators are selected
by the parties on each occasion, there are in most cases different individuals
acting as arbitrators, with the result that there is no continuity in the adminis-
tration of justice.
2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 25ab, at 43. "In ...1907, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, and San Salvador established the 'Central American Court of Justice' at
Cartago, consisting of five judges . . . .This Court was never of more than local impor-
tance, and it came to an end in 1918; but it is of interest as having been the first of its
kind." Id. at 44 n.3. The Central American Court of Justice was a model for the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice. Id. at 36. See 2 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 231
(1908); Scott, Editorial Comment, The Closing of the Central American Court ofJustice, 12 AM.
J. INT'L L. 380 (1918); See generally Hudson, The Central American Court ofJustice, 26 AM. J.
INT'L L. 759 (1932).
139. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, Central American Court of Justice, September 30, 1916
(translated and reported in full in 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 181 (1917)).
140. Id. at 193.
141. Id. at 193-94.
142. Id. at 190-91.
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named states."'  This proviso was not entirely cyni-
cal-apparently the American government had no intention of
building a canal in Nicaragua, but sought, by means of the Bryan-
Chamorro Treaty, to prevent any other power from constucting a
competitor to the Panama Canal.1 " Nevertheless, Costa Rica
brought suit before the Central American Court of Justice, re-
questing that it declare the treaty void. The court found the
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty to be a violation of Costa Rica's rights
under the Cafias-Jerez Treaty, notwithstanding Nicaragua's argu-
ment that a conflict would not arise unless the United States and
Nicaragua actually agreed to the construction of the contemplated
canal.145 Yet the court declined to declare the subsequent treaty
void because the United States was not a signatory to the Treaty
of Washington and a treaty between Nicaragua and the United
States was beyond the jurisdiction of the court .1 4 The court sug-
gested, however, that with the aforementioned Senate proviso,
the United States might have voluntarily assumed liability for the
resulting violation of Costa Rica's rights.1 47
If the elaboration of a remedy for treaty conflict requires that
an institution accord itself a transcendent legitimacy, the Central
American court's response to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty case
betrays a lack of confidence on the part of the court in its own
legitimacy. The court recognized the existence of treaty conflict
in this case, but reached no decision as to the international legal
consequences. It is possible that the court would have declared the
treaty void if it had perceived itself as having the authority to do
so, but jurisdictionally circumscribed by the Treaty of Washing-
ton, the court would not do so. Thus the case has no precedential
implication for the validity of treaties concluded in violation of
pre-existing treaty rights of third parties. 48
The court's perceptions of its own illegitimacy were con-
143. Id. at 192.
144. Finch, Editorial Comment, The Treaty with Nicaragua Granting Canal and Other
Rights to the United States, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 344, 346 (1916).
145. Costa Rica, 11 AM. J. INT'L L., at 217-26.
146. Id. at 227-29.
147. Id. at 226-27.
148. Cf. G. HARASZTI, supra note 28, at 305, citing Costa Rica v. Nicaragua for the
following proposition: "[S]poradically developed international practice recognizes the va-
lidity of both treaties, although obviously [the signatory to both treaties] can perform only
one of the treaties."
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firmed by events: Nicaragua and the United States neither aban-
doned their treaty nor compensated Costa Rica, effectively ignor-
ing the ruling of the court. The court, as a consequence, was
discredited as ineffectual, and was dissolved in 1918.149
Shortly thereafter, an international court was established that
lacked the jurisdictional deficiency of the Central American Court
of Justice. The Permanent Court of International Justice
(P.C.I.J.), established under the auspices of the League of Nations,
was the first world court capable of elaborating legal norms for
the entire international system.150 Yet despite the new court's
broad jurisdiction and association with an international institution
which claimed transcendent legitimacy, the P.C.I.J. was reluctant
to explore the legal ramifications of treaty conflict. Twice it faced
instances of treaty conflict, and both times it blinked.
In the case of the Austro-German Customs regime, the court
was asked to express an advisory opinion as to the compatibility of
149. The Convention of 1907, establishing the Central American Court of Justice ac-
companied a General Treaty of Peace and Amity which provided for unilateral termination
on the part of any party after ten years. In 1917, the government of Nicaragua, apparently
incensed by the Central American court's interference with Nicaraguan sovereignty in the
case of Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, indicated its intention to terminate the convention estab-
lishing the court (which it may not have had the power to do, as the termination power
governed the accompanying treaty). This convention contained a mandate for a congress
of the parties in the event that the court came to be suspended. The other four Central
American nations attempted to hold such a congress and invited the attendance of the
United States. The United States declined because it did not recognize the government of
Costa Rica. The proposed congress was never held, and the court lapsed into nonexistence.
See generally Hudson, The Central American Court of Justice, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 781-82
(1932).
Of the five so-called cases in which only states were parties, three were under-
taken on the court's own initiative and were of no jurisprudential importance;
two of these cases were very properly before the court and presented problems
of a legal nature which might have given tests of its usefulness except for the
fact that in both the ambitions of an overshadowing outside state deprived the
action of the court of reality.
Id. at 785.
150. Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided that: "The Coun-
cil shall formulate and submit to the members of the League for adoption plans for the
Establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVE-
NANT art. 14. Pursuant to this mandate, a statute establishing such a court was approved by
the assembly and ratified by the member states in 1920. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26,
at 45. The Permanent Court heard 61 cases from 1922 to 1939. A very concise procedural
summary of the court's docket may be found in C. JENCKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ADJUDICATION 69-76 (1964). Useful summaries and comments upon the enormous
volume of written opinions produced in these cases may be found in I J. VERMZL, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WORLD COURT (1965).
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the Austro-German Customs Protocol signed in 1931 with two
previous agreements between Austria and several other nations.151
The court found the Austro-German treaty inconsistent with the
Geneva Protocol of 1922.152 Having identified an instance of
treaty conflict, however, the court considered its task
completed." 3
More significant for our inquiry is the Oscar Chinn Case,
which has been cited in support of the validity of subsequent con-
flicting treaties. This case, decided in 1934, concerned the com-
patibility of Belgian regulations concerning trade in the Congo ba-
sin and existing international conventions to which Belgium was
signatory. 154 The Congo Act, signed by fifteen European nations
at the Berlin Congress of 1885, mandated free trade in the Congo
basin. A new convention regulating trade in this region, however,
was signed by the belligerents of World War I at Saint-Germain in
1919. This convention covered trade involving the neutral signa-
tories 55 only to the extent these nations voluntarily acceded to it
(which none did).156 It permitted somewhat greater restriction of
trade in the Congo basin than had the Berlin Act.15 In 1931,
Belgium drastically reduced tariffs on trade carried by govern-
151. See I J. VERZIJL, supra note 150, at 257-70.
152. The result is anomalous in that fourteen of the fifteen judges viewed the relation-
ship between the Austro-German Customs Protocol and the two previous treaties as identi-
cal; seven viewed the Austro-German treaty as consistent with both, and seven viewed the
Austro-German treaty as inconsistent with both. Only the Cuban judge, De Bustamante,
subscribed to the view which ultimately prevailed. See id.
153. A. McNAIR, supra note 26, at 223.
154. Oscar Chinn Case (U.K., Ir. v. BeIg.), 1934 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63, at 61
(Judgment of Dec. 12).
155. The neutral signatories were Denmark, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and
Norway. Unlike these five, the Soviet Union was unable to join the convention of Saint-
Germain until it became a member of the League of Nations in 1935-after this case was
decided. I J. VFRZIJL, supra note 150, at 397.
156. Id.
157. Article 1 of the General Act of Berlin of 1885 specifies that: "The trade of all
nations shall enjoy complete freedom: 1) in all the regions forming the basin of the Congo
and its outlets." See The Congo Act, Feb. 26, 1885, 10 Martens Nouveau Recueil (2d ser.)
414, 165 Parry's T.S. 485 (also known as the "General Act of Berlin"). Article I of the
Convention of Saint-Germain, by contrast, calls for "commercial equality" among the "sig-
natory powers," "within the area defined by Article 1 of the General Act of Berlin .... .
Id. In addition "[t]he Convention of Saint-Germain, by Article 13 . . . has abolished the
regime of freedom of trade so far as concerns the exemption from customs duties stipu-
lated in Article 4 of the Berlin Act." Id. at 20. Nevertheless, the court implied that these
slight departures from the broad mandate for free trade in the Congo basin of the Berlin
Act made no difference in the case. See generally id. at 18-20.
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ment-operated transport services in the Congo. Chinn, a British
national, had operated his own transport business in the Congo
since 1929. As the tariff reduction did not apply to this service, it
forced Chinn out of business. The British challenged the validity
of the allegedly discriminatory tariff reduction before the P.C.I.J.
The majority determined that the applicable law was pro-
vided by the Convention of Saint-Germain, as it had been ac-
cepted by both Britain and Belgium, and that the Belgian action
was consistent with this treaty. Two of the fifteen justices, how-
ever, argued that the Belgian action was a violation of the Berlin
Act and that the Convention of Saint-Germain, to the extent that
it was inconsistent with the earlier treaty, was null and void ab
initio. 158 Some scholars have argued that the majority's rejection
158.
The General Act of Berlin does not create a number of contractual relations
between a number of States, relations which may be replaced as regards some
of these States by other contractual relations; it does not constitute ajus disposi-
tivum, but it provides the Congo Basin with a regime, a statute, a constitution.
This regime, which forms an indivisible whole, may be modified, but for this
the agreement of all contracting Powers is required. . . . In 1919, some of the
Powers parties to the General Act of Berlin, including the two States which
have submitted the present case to the Court, acted in an entirely different
manner. Without inviting the other contracting Parties to take part in the Con-
ference which they held, they thought themselves entitled at that Conference to
modify the General Act of Berlin inter se. It seems clear that in proceeding thus
they acted contrary not only to an essential principle of international law, but
also to Article 36 of the General Act of Berlin, which expressly provides that
modifications may only be made in the General Act by agreement. This is a
legal situation of such importance that a tribunal should reckon with it ex officio.
The only convention which the Court could apply is the Act of Berlin. . . . It
should be observed here that the validity of the Convention of Saint-Germain
cannot, as the Court seems to hold, be dependent on the question whether or
not any government has disputed its validity.
Id. at 72-74 (individual opinion of Van Eysinga).
It is beyond doubt that the signatory States of the Congo Act desired to make it
absolutely impossible, in the future, for some of their number only to amend
the Congo Act, seeing that any modifications thus introduced would have been
a danger to their vested rights in that vast region. Accordingly, in my view, the
nullity comtemplated by the Congo Act is an absolute nullity, that is to say, a
nullity ex tunc, which the signatory States may invoke at any moment, and the
convention concluded in violation of the prohibition is automatically null and
void . ..
I think that the case in which a convention has to be regarded as automati-
cally null and void is not an entirely isolated case in international law. The Cov-
enant of the League of Nations, as a whole, and more particularly its Article
20, in which the Members undertake not to enter into obligations or under-
standings inter se inconsistent with its provisions, would possess little value un-
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of this position indicated a repudiation of the view that the latter
of two conflicting treaties is void.lBO To the extent that the major-
ity addressed the issue, however, they were noncommittal; thus,
most scholars have considered the case inconclusive. 160
less treaties concluded in violation of that undertaking were to be regarded as
absolutely null and void, that is to say, as being automatically void.
Id. at 88 (individual opinion of Schucking).
159. Herbert Waldock, Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission on
the Law of Treaties, enunciated this position in his second report, in which he wrote:
Admittedly, the question of the legality of the Convention of St. Germain had
not been raised by either party. But the question was dealt with at length by
Judges Van Eysinga and Schricking in dissenting judgments and had, therefore,
evidently been debated within the Court. Moreover, these Judges had expressly
taken the position that the question of the validity or invalidity of the treaty was
not one which could depend on whether any Government had challenged its
legality, but was a question of public order which the Court was bound itself to
examine ex officio. In these circumstances, it is difficult to interpret the Court's
acceptance of the Convention of St. Germain as the treaty which it must apply,
as anything other than a rejection of the doctrine of the absolute invalidity of a
treaty which infringes the rights of Third States under a prior treaty.
Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 56-57, U.N. Doc. A/
CN. 4/SER. A/1963/ADD.I.
A similar conclusion is drawn by Schwarzenberger. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 485 (3d ed. 1957). The
idea here is that the position taken by Schucking and Van Eysinga involves seeing the for-
mation of a conflicting treaty as the violation of a peremptory norm of international law,
rather than a consensual norm. The interest protected by the sanction of invalidity is
therefore a public interest, rather than the interests of the parties. Accordingly, reasons
Waldock, the court may apply this sanction whether or not it is requested by any of the
parties. Waldock assumes that because the court declined to do so, it recognized that it
lacked the capacity to do so, and that its incapacity reflected the irrelevance of considera-
tions of public order to the problem of treaty conflict, rather than the jurisdictional limita-
tions of the court. His position was ultimately belied by the International Law Commission
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides for International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.) determination of the compatability of treaties with peremptory norms of interna-
tional law only if (a) the invalidity of a treaty on grounds of violation of a peremptory norm
is invoked as a ground for nonperformance, (b) other signatories to the treaty object, and
(c) one of the parties to such a dispute requests I.C.J. adjudication. See S. ROSENNE, supra
note 26, at 336. For a fuller discussion of the idea of peremptory norms of international
law, see infra notes 258-88 and accompanying text.
160. The majority's treatment of this issue is colored by a particular conception of the
Court's legitimate role. The Court's jurisdiction is limited to those disputes brought before
it by consent of all parties. From this, the majority concluded that it lacked the capacity to
consider the validity of the Convention of Saint-Germain unless one of the parties ques-
tioned it:
No matter what interest may in other respects attach to these Acts-the Berlin
Act and the Act and Declaration of Brussels-in the present case the Conven-
tion of St. Germain of 1919, which both Parties have relied on as the immedi-
ate source of their respective contractual rights and obligations, must be re-
1985] DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY
Since World War II, the United Nations has replaced the
League of Nations as the principal institutional framework for in-
ternational law. 61 The International Court of Justice, functioning
under United Nations auspices, has replaced the P.C.I.J.16 2 No
case involving treaty conflict has come before this tribunal.
C. Extrajudicial Responses to Treaty Conflict in the Twentieth Century
Few other instances of treaty conflict have engaged the atten-
tion of western commentators since the close of World War I."3
garded by the Court as the Act which it is asked to apply; the validity of this
Act has not so far, to the knowledge of the Court, been challenged by any
government.
1934 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, no. 63, at 19. In an opinion dissenting on other grounds, the
British judge, for similar reasons, declined to opine whether the two treaties in fact con-
flicted, and, if they did, "whether a new treaty made in violation of [the Berlin Act] would
be devoid of juridical effect, or whether it would merely be a wrongful act entitling a State
which was not a party to the Convention of St.-Germain, but was a party to the Berlin Act,
to demand reparation." Id. at 62 (dissenting opinion of Sir Cecil Hurst). Hersch Lauter-
pacht, a proponent of invalidating the latter of two conflicting treaties, was able to distin-
guish the Oscar Chinn Case as follows:
The rigid application of [this] principle may lead to difficulties in cases in which
the modification of a general convention by a new treaty is obstructed by a
small number of the signatories of the former treaty. However, as every legal
principle must be applied reasonably, it is submitted that the second treaty, al-
though inconsistent with the first, would not be held by an international court
to be invalid if it could be shown that the interests of the complaining State are
not affected at all or that the degree to which they are affected is slight when
related to the general advantage accruing from a new treaty.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 503, at 895. Lauterpacht limits application of the sanc-
tion of invalidity to those instances in which it will make a difference to somebody. Never-
theless, this qualification opened the way for Waldock's wholesale assault on Lauterpacht's
position. For more on Lauterpacht's position, see infra notes 298-303 and accompanying
text. For more on Waldock's attack on this position, see infra notes 317-48. For another
instance of the World Court's restriction of its attention to instruments recognized by the
parties before the Court, see Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube be-
tween Galatz and Braila, 1927 P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 14 at 23. For a typical treatment of the
Oscar Chinn Case as inconclusive, see A. McNAiR, supra note 26, at 223-24.
161. On the transition from the League to the United Nations, see LEAGUE OF NA-
TIONs, THE LEAGUE HANDS OvER (1946); see atso.Brierly, The Covenant and the Charter, 1946
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 83; Myers, Liquidation of League of Nation Functions, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 320
(1948); Wood, Dissolution of the League of Nations, 1946 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 317.
162. The International Court of Justice came into existence in 1946; its statute is es-
sentially similar to that of the P.C.I.J. For a useful introduction to the structure and func-
tioning of the International Court of Justice, see INT'L COURT OF JUsTIcE, THE INT'L COURT
OF JUSTICE (1976).
163. Of necessity, such a claim can hardly be made with complete confidence. I note
only that one controversial instance of apparent treaty conflict, the American recognition
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Soviet commentators, by contrast, have expressed great concern
about such incidents. The aftermath of World War I entailed the
revision of many international conventions initially ratified by
Czarist Russia. Excluded from the League of Nations and unrec-
ognized by many Western powers, however, the Soviet Union was
not consulted.6 4 Vigorous protests were of no avail, as the West
refused to recognize the new regime as a successor to Russian
treaty rights. The Soviet Union's concern over treaty conflict con-
tinued even after its admission to the League of Nations in 1935.
Soviet leaders have condemned multipartite defensive alliances as
violative of nonaggression and friendship treaties that had been
formed with the Soviet Union."6 5 Most vigorously condemned
of the People's Republic of China, posed no such problem in fact.
At the time of recognition, the United States maintained almost sixty treaties with Tai-
wan. V. Li, DERECOGNIZING TAIWAN 31, 32 (1978). It recognized the government of Taiwan
as the sole legitimate government of China, while denying that Taiwan itself was Chinese
territory. See Cohen, Recognizing China, 50 FOREIGN AFF. 30, 36 (1971). One treaty with
Taiwan, known as the Mutual Defense Treaty, called for the United States to aid in Tai-
wan's defense against the People's Republic of China only at Taiwan's request. At least one
scholar has argued that in recognizing the People's Republic as the sole legitimate repre-
sentative of China, the United States recognized it as the successor state of the Republic of
China, and as sovereign over Taiwan. Id. at 30-43. This would make such recognition in-
consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty, but it would also, Cohen argues, automatically
invalidate this treaty. The United States could hardly defend Taiwan against its own gov-
ernment, at the request of that same government. Others have taken the view that the
People's Republic and Taiwan are separate sovereign states with no legitimate claims to
territory in common, so that no conflict was occasioned by American recognition of China.
See Scheffer, Law of Treaty Terminations Applied to the United States Derecognition of the Repub-
lic of China, 19 HARV. IN 'L L. J. 946 (1978). The United States adopted the latter posture.
The Mutual Defense Treaty was the only treaty of which the People's Republic demanded
revocation. This treaty had a termination clause permitting either party to end the agree-
ment unilaterally with one year's notice. The United States did so, while agreeing to the
continued validity of its other agreements with Taiwan. Christopher, Relations with Taiwan,
80 DEPT. STATE Bum. 10 (Jan. 1980).
164. The Soviet Union was recognized by Germany in 1922, Italy, France, and the
United Kingdom in 1924, Japan in 1925, and the United States in 1933. 22 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 521 (1968). For a partial list of treaties protested by the Soviet Union during
this period on grounds of conflict with prior obligations, see J. TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, THE
THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF SovIET TREAIEs 119-20 (1962).
165. See J. TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, supra note 164, at 120. "Iran's adherence to the
Baghdad Pact, according to Preterskii, was a violation of its obligations under Article 3 of
the Soviet-Persian Treaty of Nonaggression and Neutrality of October 1, 1927. Similarly
Italy's action in joining NATO was, according to Preterskii, a 'crude violation' of the terms
of its peace treaty." Id.
"Preterskii cited also the adherence of Italy on November 6, 1937 to the Anticomin-
tern Pact concluded by Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936, as a violation of an
existing treaty with the U.S.S.R., in this case the Soviet-Italian Treaty of Friendship,
DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY
were the Paris agreements of 1954, whereby the Western allies,
without Soviet consent, provided for the rearmament of West
Germany and her accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO). 16 6 Western commentators have dismissed such
Soviet claims as reflecting expansive interpretations if not expan-
sionist aims. 61 7
While Western scholars have displayed little interest in con-
crete instances of treaty conflict, their interest in the abstract
problem has grown in recent decades as a result of the United
Nations codification of the law of treaties.6 8 In the course of
drafting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Western
commentators expressed vastly divergent views on the problem of
treaty conflict, and were forced to confront Third World and So-
viet views as well. This resulted in an ambiguous treatment of the
problem in the final document." 9
The traditional reticence of authoritative institutions of inter-
national law on the problem of treaty conflict is understandable.
Prudential considerations dictate that institutions engaged in a
struggle for legitimacy not render judgments that they cannot en-
force. Academic equivocation on this issue is less easily explained:
scholars of international law are not similarly constrained and this
license has sometimes encouraged extravagant attributions of au-
thority to a largely mythic world public order. When the Amer-
Nonaggression, and Neutrality of September 2, 1933." Id. (quoting Preterskii, Znachenie
mezhdunarodnogo dogovora dlia tret'ego (ne zakliuchivshego etot dogovor) gosudastVa, SOVmESKOE
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 71-80 (1957) no. 4).
166. The Soviets viewed various aspects of these agreements as violative of the Yalta
and Potsdam agreements. See H. OHIt, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF
TREAIES 56 (1972); J. TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, supra note 164, at 120.
167. "[Alny international treaty concluded by the non-Soviet powers for the purpose
of strengthening their defenses against Soviet imperialist expansion may be interpreted in
the Soviet view as a violation of Soviet rights under existing treaties." J. TRISKA & P,.
SLUSSER, supra note 164, at 120-21.
168. In 1947, the United Nations established the International Law Commission and
commissioned it to survey "the whole field of international law with a view to selecting
topics for codification." Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 18, (1) U.N.
Doc. A/CN. 4/4/Rev. 1. From 1950 to 1966, the Commission issued a series of 17 reports
on the law of treaties under the successive leadership of Special Rapporteurs Brierly, Lau-
terpacht, Fitzmaurice and Waldock. The final codification was adopted in 1969. This con-
vention, as well as the final draft produced by the Vienna Conference in 1966 is reprinted
in S. ROSENNE, supra note 26, at 96-411. For a history of the process of codification, see id.
at 29-91.
169. See infra notes 344-48 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 233-94 and accompanying text.
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ican, Egyptian and Israeli negotiators turned to the academy for
guidance on the problem of treaty conflict, however, they found
themselves in a doctrinal morass; and now it is time for us, too, to
don galoshes and mackintoshes and march off into the bog.
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IV. THE PARADOX OF TREATY CONFLICT
International legal institutions have been reluctant to con-
front the problem of treaty conflict, because it raises deep ques-
tions about their own legitimacy.171 Academic theorists have only
been slightly more forthcoming. Most have agreed that the forma-
tion of conflicting treaties violates international law; yet they have
often been reluctant to explore its consequences. Concerning
themselves largely with the line between the legal and the illegal,
they have paid little attention to the range of remedies available
to states injured by acts illegal under international law.
Some of this antipathy toward the specification of remedies
may be ascribed to the relative weakness of international legal in-
stitutions of enforcement. 172 International law's apparent impo-
tence has given it a peculiarly fictional sort of existence, and, con-
sistent therewith, a rather literary tradition of scholarship.13
Because international law has often existed more as a gleam in the
eyes of visionary legal theorists than as an obligatory code for the
behavior of nations, the question of remedies has seemed aca-
demic. Yet even as an academic exercise, attributions of legality
can acquire meaning only with a definition of the rights thereby
created; attributions of illegality can acquire meaning only with an
elaboration of the sanctions they entail. In interrogating interna-
tional legal authorities as to the legal status of conflicting treaties,
we must be careful to elicit specific information on the rights of
the injured parties. When we do so, we shall see that academic
opinion resolves itself into two competing views of the treaty con-
flicts problem, resting on two different conceptions of the entitle-
ments created by treaty. Some authors view the latter of two con-
flicting treaties as void because they view treaty expectations as
property entitlements. Others view such treaties as valid because
171. Indeed, these institutions have seemed reluctant to engage in any review of trea-
ties. "So far, it is believed, no international tribunal has been directly compelled to pass
upon the question of the effect of conflicts or incompatibility [with international law] upon
the validity of a treaty." A. McNAIR, supra note 26, at 214.
172. See generally W. REISMAN, NuLLrrY AND REVIsION. THE REvIEW AND ENFORCEMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS (1971).
173. "A literary approach to the presentation of international law persists. There have
been marginal changes of tone and vocabulary, but there has been preserved an underlying
structure of thought and argument which is more literary than scientific... (and charac-
terized by] the tone of the inspired dilettante." Allot, Language, Method and the Nature of
International Law, 1971 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 79. My Article is, of course, no exception.
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they view treaty expectations as no more than liability
entitlements.
A. The Illegality of Treaty Conflict
It follows from the definition of treaties offered above 174 that
obligations undertaken in treaties may not be violated without vio-
lating international law. In determining the legal consequences of
treaty conflict, however, we have to know something more about
the scope of such obligations. Specifically, we have to know
whether or not international law contains a doctrine of anticipa-
tory breach.175 In other words, we must know whether a state can
violate a treaty simply by creating a conflicting obligation, or
whether it must actually fail to perform. An answer to this ques-
tion requires an explication of the concept of good faith in inter-
national law.
Most commentators identify the requirement that treaties be
observed with a requirement that they be performed in good
faith.176 This dual obligation is embodied in the traditional princi-
ple of pacta sunt servanda as formulated by the United Nations
International Law Commission: "Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith. ' 177 The American Law Institute Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law also acknowledges a legal duty under international
law to perform international treaty obligations in good faith.7 8
Lord McNair, the leading British authority on treaty law, suggests
174. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
175. By anticipatory breach, I mean the doctrine that the formation of a contract obli-
gating one to violate an earlier contract under some future circumstance is a wrong, man-
dating imposition of whatever sanctions ordinarily attend breach. For references and fur-
ther discussion of this doctrine in American contract law, see infra note 196.
176. Lauterpacht is an exception. He does recognize a general "obligation of States to
act in good faith." I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 155a, at 346. However, he does not
mention this obligation in his discussion of the obligation to observe treaties. Id. §§ 491-
493, at 877-81. Moreover, he rejects the principle of pacta sunt servanda as the basis for
that obligation, preferring instead to base it on "a customary rule of International Law
that treaties are binding. The binding effect of that rule," he adds, "rests in the last resort
on the fundamental assumption, which is neither consensual nor necessarily legal, of the
objectively binding force of International Law." Id. § 493, at 881. See infra notes 262-69
and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of Lauterpacht's views on sources of
international law.
177. Art. 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, reprinted in S. RosENE,
supra note 26, at 196.
178. RSrTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 138 comment a (1965),
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that this requirement of good faith performance is analytically re-
lated to the concept of a treaty; the applicability of this concept is,
in turn, one of his criteria for the existence of an international
legal system.179 Brierly actually roots the binding force of treaties
in the obligation to act in good faith. "It is a truism," he writes,
"that no international interest is more vital than the observance
of good faith between states, and the 'sanctity' of treaties is a nec-
essary corollary."180
For all of these commentators, the obligation to perform trea-
ties is governed by the requirement of good faith. What is meant
by this ubiquitous requirement? According to McNair, "[a] state
may take certain action or be responsible for certain inaction,
which, though not in form a breach of a treaty, is such that its
effect will be equivalent to a breach of treaty; in such cases a tri-
bunal demands good faith and seeks for the reality rather than
the appearance." ' Commenting on the North Atlantic Fisheries
Case,82 he concludes: "In short, the making of regulations by one
party which in substance destroyed or frustrated the right of the
other party would be a breach of good faith and of the treaty."' 3
Thus, any act which destroys the value of a treaty right is a breach
of the obligation to perform a treaty in good faith. This obviously
applies to legislation which reduces the value of the promised per-
formance, and especially to legislation which prohibits perform-
ance outright. The next question for us to consider is whether the
acts giving rise to a breach of good faith in the performance of a
treaty may include the formation of new treaties.
This question is more complicated than may at first appear,
because of the dual nature of treaties as sources of both municipal
and international law.
To the extent that treaties are binding under domestic law
they are analogous to statutes. As noted in Chapter II, most na-
179. A. McNArR, supra note 26, at 465-66, 549-50.
180. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 120, at 331.
181, A. McNAIR, supra note 26, at 540. See id. at 465 for the role of the principle of
good faith in treaty interpretation.
182. See J. Scorr, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 141 (1916).
183. A. McNAIR, supra note 26, at 550. McNair also discusses a communication from
the British government to the American government concerning the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty in which the British ambassador wrote: "International law does not support the
doctrine that the passing of a statute in contravention of a treaty right affords no ground
of complaint for the infraction of that right." Id. at 548.
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tions view so-called self-executing treaties as binding law; other
treaties may become binding through enabling legislation.8 4 In
this country, legally binding treaties are on par with acts of Con-
gress. In the event of a conflict between an act of Congress and a
self-executing treaty, the later document supersedes the earlier
one.8 5 This would suggest that the formation of a subsequent
treaty inconsistent with performance of an earlier treaty would be
as much a breach of good faith as the passage of a legislative act
prohibiting performance of the earlier treaty.
Surprisingly though, McNair expresses reservations about the
applicability of the doctrine of good faith to treaty conflict. If the
first treaty is between A and B and the second is between A and C,
McNair argues that "A does not ipso facto commit a wrongful act
against B by making the second treaty, and does not do so unless
and until A actually violates the treaty with B."'' 8 For this conclu-
sion, McNair offers two principal arguments: First, A may decide
to break the second treaty rather than the first; and second, per-
formance of both treaties may become consistent before the need
to choose arises.8 7 Recall, however, that the standard for breach
184. See supra note 29.
185. Id.
186. A. McNAnt, supra note 26, at 222.
187. Id. McNair in fact offers two additional arguments at this point which I will not
treat in the text because they add little to our understanding of the problem.
The first such argument is the possibility that A will obtain C's consent to the dissolu-
tion of the second treaty, or its offensive part. The rendering of this argument into a con-
crete context immediately displays its triviality: Israel will surely not consent to the dissolu-
tion of the peace treaty, nor will Egypt request it. If Egypt were prepared to dissolve the
treaty it would never have incurred the diplomatic cost involved in making it in the first
place-and this would be true of any state that would knowingly create a treaty conflict.
The second such argument is that A may not be capable of performing the offending
treaty. Working out the implications of this argument requires that we distinguish different
situations on the basis of which parties know that A cannot perform the second treaty. In
the first place, we may exclude all situations in which one of the two parties to the second
treaty knows that A cannot perform, but the other does not; if such is the case, the second
treaty is void on grounds of fraud. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 49,
reprinted in S. ROSENNE, supra note 26, at 278; 1 L. OPPENHFIM, supra note 26, § 500, at
892. If the second treaty is void, no treaty conflict is actually created, although interna-
tional law is still violated. This leaves four cases to consider: (i) All three parties know that
A cannot perform the second treaty. In this case there is no reason for C to form the
treaty; (2) None of the parties know that A cannot perform. In this case, the possibility that
A cannot perform has the same significance as the possibility that A will decide not to per-
form, which is analyzed in the text; (3) A and C know, but B does not. In this case, their
only possible motive in making such a treaty is the desire to convince B that it cannot rely
on its treaty with A. If this ambition succeeds, however, B has been dealt an injury which it
388 [Vol. 34
DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY
of good faith that McNair attributes to the International Court of
Justice is the "destruction" or "frustration" of the victim's
rights.18 8 Let us consider each of his arguments from the stand-
point of this criterion, by applying them in a concrete context.1, 9
McNair's first argument is that A may prefer to breach the of-
fending treaty. In the Egyptian-Israeli context, this might entail
Egypt deciding to intervene in a war between Israel and Syria on
the Syrian side. While such a result is conceivable, it is made con-
siderably less likely by the peace treaty, for three reasons.
First, to the extent that Egypt's treaties are binding as munici-
pal law, the peace treaty both eliminates a compelling reason for
Egypt's leaders to intervene on Syria's behalf in such a situation,
and creates a compelling reason for them not to. Prior to the
peace treaty, failure to intervene might have violated Egyptian
law; but after ratification of the treaty, intervention on Syria's be-
half would violate Egyptian law.
Second, the peace treaty eliminates whatever security Egypt's
Arab League partners might have derived from the assumption
that Egypt would be reluctant to violate international law. Assum-
ing the validity of both treaties, Egypt would have to violate one
or the other in the event of a conflict. Whatever disincentives
against breach the international legal system may provide, those
disincentives no longer secure the Arab League treaties in particu-
lar. From the standpoint of those disincentives alone, Egypt will
now be indifferent as between breaching the earlier treaties and
the later treaties. This means (assuming, again, the validity of the
second treaty) that from the standpoint of international law,
Egypt's treaty partners are no better off than they would be if
has no protection against unless the formation of such a conflicting treaty is viewed as a
violation of good faith; and (4) B knows, but arguably B suffers no injury from A's forma-
tion of a conflicting treaty because damage to B's rights is bound to be exceedingly rare.
Even in this situation, however, B may suffer injury to the security of its expectation of
performance. Merely by making a conflicting treaty, A indicates its willingness to breach
the earlier treaty. The mere fact that it may not be able to perform the second treaty
doesn't insure that it will perform the first.
188. A. MCNAIR, supra note 26, at 550; see also supra note 183 and accompanying text.
189. The context is the instances of treaty conflict with which we are most famil-
iar-those created by the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. For purposes of this discussion, of
course, we need only consider those aspects of the treaty which, at the time of the signing,
could produce conflicts contingent upon future circumstances. This is not meant to suggest
that there were no aspects of the treaty that in and of themselves violated Egypt's previous
treaty obligations, regardless of future events.
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they had never made a treaty at all. Even if their treaty rights
have not yet been violated, the value of those rights has certainly
been destroyed.
Third, the erosion of the Arab League's confidence in
Egypt's future performance renders that performance even more
unlikely. If, for example, Syria could not rely on the assistance of
Egypt in the event of hostilities with Israel, it might take greater
pains to avoid such hostilities. This might mean avoiding an attack
that its government feels is justified under international law, or
avoiding policies that might bring it into aggressive confrontation
with Israel. In this way, the erosion of security in future perform-
ance may preclude the very conditions in which performance
would become obligatory. The mere threat of non-performance,
therefore, may burden a treaty partner even if actual breach
never ensues.
McNair's second argument is that the treaties could become con-
sistent before performance was required. In the context of the Middle
East conflict, this could happen in two ways. First, it could happen
de jure, that is, the Arab League could join in the Camp David
peace process. Second, it could happen de facto, that is, circum-
stances calling for performance might never arise. The Arab
League, for example, might never actually find itself in what it
would view as a defensive war with Israel. In either case, however,
the result would be the same: the Arab League would have failed
to receive whatever security it had contracted for. I have already
noted that the League's inability to rely on Egyptian performance
might discourage them from provoking the conditions which
would call for the performance of their treaty. This argument ap-
plies as well to the possibility that the League might join in the
Camp David peace process. The departure of Egypt from the
League's ranks considerably weakened the League's strategic posi-
tion vis-a-vis Israel. This would surely have been a factor in any
reevaluation of negotiation as a strategy.190 It is virtually impossi-
ble to conclude, even after the fact, that an anticipatory breach
was costless. To the extent that the cost involved is the sort that B
may have sought to prevent by making a treaty with A, B's treaty
190. In fact, it was the hope of President Carter, and perhaps of President Sadat as
well, that Egypt's unilateral decision would force the other Arab disputants to the confer-
ence table. See J. CARTER, KEEPING FArH 349, 384 (1982).
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rights may be said to have been destroyed or frustrated by A's
anticipatory breach.
Placing McNair's arguments in a concrete context thus
reveals two deficiencies: they rely on dubious counterfactual hy-
potheses and they ignore an important function fulfilled by
treaties.
McNair's strategy is to suggest that treaty conflict should not
give rise to a remedy if it does not create any injury that would
not have otherwise occurred. The difficulty with this approach is
that it presumes that we can know what would have occurred had
there been no anticipatory breach. Even if an anticipatory breach
never results in nonperformance of a conditional obligation, it is
impossible to know how many additional conditions mandating
performance would have arisen but for the anticipatory breach.
But the more egregious presumption made by McNair is that
only nonperformance can constitute the frustration of a treaty
right. A number of circumstances may indeed result in A meeting
its treaty commitment to B, notwithstanding a second treaty com-
mitment to do otherwise. It is similarly possible, however, that A
would have satisfied B in such a situation without ever having en-
tered into a treaty. The reason why B has entered into a treaty
with A is to increase its certainty that A will perform. In order to
achieve that increased certainty, B was willing to make promises in
return. As a result, it may have foregone some opportunities and
made some enemies.191 B was willing to accept these costs because
it gained something in return that it would not otherwise have
gotten-security. Uncertainty is a calculable CoSt 19 2 which treaties
operate to decrease.193 Controlling this cost is the economic ra-
tionale for contract."9 In the realm of politics and war, uncer-
tainty is more prevalent than in most other kinds of activity, and
its costs may be higher. Nevertheless, treaties may operate like
191. As, for example, Egypt did when it signed its treaty of peace with Israel.
192. W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIc THEORY 193-231 0985). This has been noted in
the context of contract law, see THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 4 (A. Kronman & R.
Posner eds. 1979), and property law, Note, Uncertainty Over Adverse Government Action and
the Law of Just Compensation, 90 YALE L. J. 1670 (1981), as well as in the sphere of interna-
tional relations. See R. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREFEMENT 6-18
(1981).
193. K BILDER, supra note 192, at 6-7.
194. THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 192, at 1-9; C. HARDY, RISK AND
RISK-BEARING 1-5 (1923); &. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65-100 (1977).
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other agreements to provide a measure of diplomatic and military
security.19 5 When this security no longer exists, however, it makes
little sense to say that treaty rights still exist. For this reason, in
the realm of contract, it is often considered unlawful to make a
private contract that conflicts with a prior agreement with an-
other party, and it may be considered a breach of contract.196 The
same rationale holds for extending the notion of anticipatory
breach to treaty conflict; for if B does not know which of two
competing obligations A will perform, B has gained no security by
means of its treaty. It is as if B had made a unilateral promise.
Under these circumstances, B has already lost whatever compara-
tive advantage it gained by making the treaty.
In distinguishing treaty conflict from breach of good faith,
195. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1 (1967). The close analogy between treaty and contract law is
examined in detail in H. LAuTERPAcHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1927). See also J. BRIERLY, supra note 120, at 317; A. MCNAIR, supra note 26,
at 6; C. RoZAtis, supra note 85, at 1. Cf. Waldock, General Course on Public International
Law, 2 RECUEIL DES CouRs 75-76 (1962) (the legal nature of treaties is analogous but not
identical to contract). Of course, international agreements are not without their own risk.
R. BILDER, supra note 192, at 14-15. However, they may be artfully constructed to minimize
those risks. Id. at 23-194. In general, these risks will only preclude agreement if they out-
weigh the risks of proceeding without agreement, and thereby leave one of the parties
worse off as a result of agreement. Id. at 12-13.
196. The Restatement of Torts argues that "intentionally and improperly interfer[ing]
with another's prospective contractual relation . . . [by] inducing or otherwise causing a
third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation" is a tort against the
promisee. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977).
The Restatement of Contracts argues on this basis that a contract inducing nonperform-
ance on another contract should be unenforceable on grounds of public policy. It cites
Corbin and Williston for support. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 365 (1979).
However, the cited sections of Corbin's treatise concern bargains involving breach of fidu-
ciary relationships and breach of relationships of agency, respectively. 6A A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1456-1457 (1962). Section 1470, however, is explicitly devoted to
contractual conflicts and indicates that there are many circumstances under which conflict-
ing contracts should in fact be considered valid. Id. at § 1470. In addition, Corbin points
out that the illegality of a contract need not mean voidness. Id. at §§ 1373-74. Gilmore
argues that Corbin's view is more true to the original spirit of contract because it involves
offering the injured party only damages rather than specific performance. G. GILORE,
DEATH OF CONTRACT 14 (1974). The death of the special category of contract represents
the decline of liability as the dominant interpretation of contract rights.
Regardless of the status of the later contract, however, Corbin clearly states that the
making of a conflicting contract is a repudiation of the infringed-upon prior contract, and
that such a repudiation constitutes anticipatory breach and should not be considered elec-
tive. 4 A. CORBIN, supra, at §§ 959, 981; see also 11 S. WILLISTON, §§ 1301, 1320 (3d ed.
1968). Williston recognizes that there are objections to the doctrine of anticipatory breach,
but admits its authority. Id. § 1312.
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McNair contradicts himself. The implication of his argument is
that A must actually violate B's treaty rights in order to commit a
breach of good faith. While this view is not without precedent, 197
it contradicts McNair's own view that any act which frustrates or
destroys a treaty right violates good faith.
The International Law Commission, however, has sided with
the latter of these two contradicting views. Article 34 of the Vi-
enna Convention provides that "[a] treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent."1 8 In
its commentaries on the draft articles, the commission said that in
the event of treaty conflict, the rule now embodied in article 34
"precludes the parties to the later treaty from depriving the other
parties to the earlier treaty of their rights under that treaty with-
out their consent."199 It is not performance that is thus protected,
but the right to expect it. Treaties are formed by the mutual ex-
pression of an intention to be bound by international law; the cre-
ation of treaty conflict repudiates that intention. They are gener-
ally formed for the purpose of securing performance; the creation
of treaty conflict destroys that security. In so doing, it deprives
the parties to the earlier treaty of their rights.
To summarize, then, the following five principles, taken to-
gether, imply that the making of conflicting treaties is itself a vio-
lation of international law: (1) Breach of treaty is a violation of
international law; (2) Breach of good faith in implementing a
treaty is equivalent to breach of treaty; (3) The creation of a do-
mestic legal obligation to breach a treaty is a breach of good faith;
(4) This applies as well to obligations to breach which are condi-
tioned on future circumstances; and (5) The making of a second
treaty is, in these respects, like the creation of any other domestic
legal obligation.
197. Roxburgh took the position that "whenever a state concludes a treaty which vio-
lates the existing rights of a third state, ... the latter is entitled to intervene." R. Rox-
BURGH, supra note 33, at 33. Of course intervention is both a severe and an archaic rem-
edy, although one which was sometimes employed in response to breach of treaty. Thus it
is difficult to infer whether Roxburgh would now consider mere frustration (rather than
violation) of the existing rights of a third state grounds for some lesser remedy.
198. S. RosFlNa, supra note 26, at 224.
199. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 346 (1967) [hereinafter cited




B. The Ambiguity of Illegality
That treaty conflict violates international law tells us little,
however. Corbin points out that illegality may mean many things
where a contract is concerned. 20 0 The same holds true for trea-
ties. To say that the creation of a treaty conflict is a violation of
international law is to say no more than that it is like any other
breach. While the illegality of treaty conflict may provide grounds
for invalidating the second treaty, it may simply justify awarding
reparations to the injured party. 20 1
Any further refinement of the claim that the making of a con-
flicting treaty is contrary to international law requires the con-
frontation of a jurisprudential paradox. This paradox stems from
the fact that the making of a treaty is the creation of a legal obli-
gation.2 2 In order for there to be an act of treatymaking denomi-
nated illegal, there must be a treaty created; but such a treaty is a
legal obligation. If the act is illegal, the treaty produced thereby
must nevertheless have some legal force; if it creates no legal obli-
gation, no act, illegal or otherwise, has taken place. This paradox,
an illegal creation of a legal entity, renders discussion of treaty
conflict exceedingly difficult. The categorical scheme employed by
most international law scholars simply does not admit of the possi-
bility that international law may speak with two voices.
Fitzmaurice, for example, complacently observes that:
The supremacy of international law in the international field simply means
that if nothing can be or is done, the State will, on the international plane,
have committed a breach of its international law obligations, for which it will
be internationally responsible, and in respect of which it cannot plead the
condition of its domestic law by way of absolution. International law does
not therefore in any way purport to govern the content of national law in
the national field-nor does it need to. It simply says-and this is all it needs
to say-that certain things are not valid according to international law, and
that if a State, in the application of its domestic law acts contrary to interna-
tional law in these respects, it will commit a breach of its international
obligations.20 3
This passage is more consistent than it is informative. Domes-
200. 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 196, §§ 1373-74.
201. See A. McNAnR, supra note 26, at 553-86 for a review of remedies for breach.
202. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.




tic legislative acts which require the violation of international law,
we are told, are invalid as international law. Implementation of
such acts violates international law. But why are such acts invalid
as international law? Is it because they conflict with international
law, or because they are not sources of international obligation in
the first place? If the act consists of the ratification of a treaty, is it
still invalid? If the legislation is invalid, presumably its mere pas-
sage would not constitute a violation of international law, since
from the standpoint of international law, nothing would yet have
happened; only implementation of the legislation would violate in-
ternational law. But what if the legislation is a valid source of in-
ternational obligation-is its mere ratification sufficient to consti-
tute breach of an international obligation, or must it be
implemented? In describing all acts violating international law as
invalid from the standpoint of international law, Fitzmaurice con-
jures up a world without treaty conflict. The question raised by
treaty conflict is whether an act can simultaneously violate and
create international law. Fitzmaurice begs the question by assum-
ing that acts violating international law may create only domestic
law; nor is such myopia uncommon.2
This stress on the rigid separation of the spheres of interna-
tional and domestic law obscures the fact that international legal
obligations are created by operation of domestic law. Hence, con-
flict between international and domestic legal obligations may also
be a conflict between two international legal obligations. If such a
conflict cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of a clash be-
tween international law and domestic law, it may result from a
conflict between two different types of international law.
204. Hackworth comments that
[w]here a treaty and an act of Congress are wholly inconsistent with each other
and the two cannot be reconciled, the courts have held that the one later in
point of time must prevail. While this is necessarily true as a matter of munici-
pal law, it does not follow, as has sometimes been said, that a treaty is repealed
or abrogated by a later inconsistent statute. The treaty still subsists as an inter-
national obligation although it may not be enforceable by the courts or admin-
istrative authorities.
5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1943).
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law is similarly noncommittal: "The duty of a state
to give effect to the terms of an international agreement to which it is party . . . is not
affected by a provision of its domestic law that is in conflict with the agreement or by the
absence of domestic law necessary for it to give effect to the term of the agreement."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 140 (1965).
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An examination of the International Law Commission's Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties confirms this suspicion.
This convention treats the problem of treaty conflict as a conflict
within international law; yet its language seems as equivocal as
that of the passage by Fitzmaurice discussed above. Draft Article
26(4) says of conflicting treaties:
When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the
earlier one: ... as between a State party to the earlier one, and the State
party to both, the earlier treaty governs their mutual rights and obligations;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only the
later treaty, the later treaty governs their mutual rights and obligations.2"'
Lest we leap too quickly to the conclusion that this text estab-
lishes the validity of the conflicting, or subsequent, treaty, we are
warned by the official commentaries to the draft articles, that the
rules in paragraph 4 of Section 26 should not be "interpreted as
sanctioning the conclusion of a treaty incompatible with its obliga-
tions towards another state under another treaty. '208 It seems as
though the second treaty is at once legal and illegal: valid as be-
tween the parties, even though its formation violates international
law.
The implication is that there are two types of legal norms co-
existing within the same system: relational norms creating obliga-
tions toward specific participants in the system, and general norms
creating obligations toward the system as a whole. The question
posed by treaty conflict is what happens when these two types of
norms come into conflict. Fitzmaurice suggests that a relational
norm violating a systemic norm might be invalid. The Vienna
Convention implies the reverse. The simple assertion that treaty
conflict is illegal does not serve as a basis for choosing between
these two views. Indeed, as many theorists have noted, legal
norms are meaningless without the specification of sanctions for
205. Draft Articles, supra note 199, at 341.
206. Id. at 347. Paragraph 5 of Article 30 provides that:
Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to .. .any question of the termination or
suspension of the operation of a treaty under Article 60 [i.e., for breach] or to
any question of responsibility which may arise for a state from the conclusion or
application of a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obliga-
tions towards another state under another treaty.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 63 Am. J. Ifrr'L L. 875, 885
(1969).
396 [Vol. 34
1985] DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY 397
their breach.20 7 Thus a meaningful account of the illegality of
treaty conflict will elude us until we can say something about the
sanctions it entails. Determining these sanctions will in turn re-
quire a clarification of the conflict between systemic and relational
norms in international law. These tasks may be facilitated by the
elaboration of two related frameworks: one concerned with the
nature of the legal norm violated, the other concerned with the
sanction for violation.
C. Objective Right and Subjective Rights
The first framework involves a distinction between acts violat-
ing the "objective right" and acts violating "subjective rights."
This distinction, though mystifying to English-speaking lawyers, is
207. Kelsen argues that unless a sanction and a means of redress are specified, no legal
right follows from another party's duty. H. KEISEN, GENaERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE
STATE 81-83 (1961). When sanctions are specified, however, he argues that the notion of
an "illegal" act becomes meaningless. Thus he writes:
The delict, i.e., the fact that one party has not fulfilled the contract, is not
sufficiently characterized by saying that it is "a condition of the sanction." The
making of the contract and the suit of the other party are also such conditions.
What then is the distinctive characteristic of that condition which is called the
"delict"? Could no other criterion be found than the supposed fact that the
legislator desires conduct contrary to that which is characterized as "delict,"
then the concept of delict would be incapable of a juristic definition. The con-
cept of delict defined simply as socially undesired behavior is a moral or a politi-
cal, in short, not juristic but a metajuristic, concept. Definitions characterizing
the delict as a "violation of law," as an act which is contrary to law, "illegal" or
"unlawful," as a "negation of law"-in German, "un-law" (Unrecht)-all are
of this kind. All such explanations only amount to saying that the delict is
against the purpose of law. But that is irrelevant to the legal concept of delict.
From a merely juristic point of view, the delict is no "violation'of law"-the
specific mode of existence of the legal norm, its validity, is in no way endan-
gered by the delict. Nor is the delict, from a juristic point of view, "contrary to
law" or a "negation" of law; for the jurist, the delict is a condition determined
by law as much as, in our example above, are the making of the contract and
the action.
Id. at 53. H.L.A. Hart argues a similar point. H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSmILrrY 6-7
(1968). A further requirement of specificity is stressed in A. Ross, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 24 (1947): "A legal rule which implied certain duties but did not state on
when those duties bear would only be a meaningless fragment." In the absence of specific
plans for enforcing a norm, its role becomes merely mythic. Such myths legitimate a legal
order that permits their violation. See T. ARNoLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937); M.
EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-43 (1977); W. REISMAN, FOLDED LiES 15-36
(1979). "My colleagues and I have urged scholars to reserve the term law for those
processes of decision which are both authoritative and controlling." W. REISMAN, supra, at
17.
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basic to civil law jurisprudence. 208 As a consequence, it has had a
major structuring influence in international legal theory.209
In civil law systems, the "objective right" consists of those
conditions required by law. Objective right may be a source of
"subjective rights" which are private claims against particular per-
sons. Private entitlements are always subjective; such subjective
claims will be enforced, however, only if they are consistent with
objective right.210 Only the implementation of objective right jus-
208. Gutteridge characterized this distinction as "difficult to explain to the English
lawyer." Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22, 24 (1935). Pound noted that
"[c]riticism of the term 'subjective right' becomes common in the present century. The
terms [of civil law] are awkward and happily are not needed in English, since we have
distinct words for right (what is just), a right, and law." 4 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 65
(1959). The easy distinguishability of these terms in English is viewed by Fletcher as a
buttress to a regrettable positivism less prevalent on the continent. Fletcher, supra note 23,
at 970, 980-87.
209. The jurisprudence of international law has been dominated by the civil law tradi-
tion since its inception.
It was only natural to carry over Roman pronouncements on municipal law to
international law, viz., on ownership to territorial sovereignty; on contracts to
treaties; on agency (mandatum) to diplomatic missions, etc. Not only did the
Corpus Juris enjoy the highest authority in the atmosphere of humanism as ra-
tio scripta, it was the law of the land within the Holy Roman Empire and an
important influence in other European territories. Moreover, it was at the bot-
tom of powerful canon law.
Nussbaum, The Significance of Roman Law in the History of International Law, 100 U. PA. L.
REv. 678, 681-82 (1952). Nussbaum goes on to point out that England, far from resisting
this development in favor of its own common law, facilitated it enormously. Id. at 683-85.
He also suggests that the influence of Roman law was ultimately replaced by that of first,
natural law, and then the civil codifications of the nineteenth century. Id. at 685-86.
Rozakis has suggested that the idea of objective right (and objective wrong) in interna-
tional law is increasingly being realized through the development of international legal
institutions. C. ROZAKIS, supra note 85, at 24-30. Duguit suggested the applicability of such
a notion to international law:
The international norm, being thus understood as founded on the conditions of
international solidarity and on the sentiment, ofjustice, and as applying, not to
imaginary entities which would be nations and States, but to individuals, gover-
nors and governed, who compose them, avoids the objection which, under dif-
ferent forms, has always been made to international law and which can be for-
mulated thus: there can be no international law because there is no
commanding power imposing an international norm upon the different states.
Duguit, Objective Law IV, 21 CoLUM. L. REv. 242, 253 (1921). In taking this position, Duguit
anticipates the views of the influential legal realist scholars of international law, Harold
Lasswell and Myres McDougal. For elaboration of their views and his, see infra text accom-
panying notes 281-94.
210. According to Pound, private rights were first distinguished from "what is right
backed by the state" by Donellus in 1 DE rURE cdiUI 2-4 (1589):
Donellus had distinguished ius as law from ius as a right. But the word we trans-
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tifies the coercive force of the state. Objective right represents a
late as "law" meant what is right backed by the state. Thus an ethical idea was
made to stand out both in ius, law, and in ius, a right [in the nineteenth cen-
tury]. The latter was taken to be the former put subjectively. /us as "law" was
objective right (droit objectif, objektives Recht).
4 R. POUND, supra note 208, at 61. Fichte saw legal rights (as guaranteed by the legal order)
as the embodiment of reason, which in turn was the source of freedom exercised through
the use of legal rights. Chroust, Some German Definitions of Law and Legal Philosophy from
Kant to Kelsen, 22 NOTRE DAME LAW. 365, 368 (1947). Hegel developed this idea with spe-
cific reference to his dialectic of subjectivity and objectivity. Thus he defined right as fol-
lows: "An existent of any sort embodying the free will, this is what right is. Right therefore
is by definition freedom as Idea." G. HEGEL, HE.L's PMLOSOPHY OF RIGHr 33 (T. Knox
trans. 1952). Taken out of context, this definition might be understood to justify un-
restricted license. By the "embodiment of the free will," however, Hegel refers exclusively
to the product of the will acting rationally, which means in such a way as to maximize its
own freedom. For the will to maximize its own freedom, however, requires that it act in
such a way as to maximize the freedom of all, by conforming to just laws. This conclusion
follows from a claim about the nature of the will: "The will's activity consists in annulling
the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity and giving its aims an objective in-
stead of a subjective character .... " Id. at 32. The will seeks to objectify itself, that is,
have a real effect on the world. Yet packed into Hegel's concept of objectivity is a second
connotation beyond that of reality. Objectivity also connotes universality. Thus, "[t]he ab-
solute goal, or, if you like, the absolute impulse, of free mind is to make its freedom its
object, i.e., to make freedom objective as much in the sense that freedom shall be the
rational system of mind, as in the sense that this system shall be the world of-immediate
actuality." Id. at 32. For Hegel it is the natural function of the will to realize the ambitions
of mind or spirit; and it is the natural ambition of mind to become objective, that is to
perceive and reason from a universal rather than merely individual perspective. Thus the
genuinely free will of any individual will seek to maximize freedom of mind generally,
rather than freedom for the individual. Objective right would therefore consist of those
actual conditions which maximized freedom for all; subjective rights would consist of those
acts or expectations which conform to objective right.
This formulation had a structuring influence on the scholarship of the Pandectists,
which ultimately shaped the German Civil Code. See, e.g., 1 B. WINDscMna, LEHRBUCH DES
PANDEKTENRECHTS § 37 (5th ed. 1882). "Right (right in the subjective sense, subjective
right) is the concrete content of a power or authority of the will granted by the legal order
(right in the objective sense, objective right.)" For translation of the rest of this paragraph,
from a later edition, see R. POUND, supra note 208, at 65 n.43. The distinction between
objective right and subjective rights is also crucial for understanding the jurisprudence of
the West German Constitution or Basic Law. This point is helpfully, although somewhat
confusingly, developed in Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (1980):
To understand the value orientation of the West German legal system, it is
helpful to realize that German constitutional jurisprudence distinguishes be-
tween basic rights as subjective rights and basic rights as objective value decisions
of the constitutional order .... Subjective rights, often termed "defense" or
"negative" rights, are claims that the individual has against the state.. .. Basic
rights as objective value decisions are viewed as charging the state, in the words
of the President of the Federal Constitutional Court, "with an affirmative duty to
implement programs to secure and protect these values." They seem to oblige
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public interest, to which individual interests may legitimately be
subordinated. 211 Acts contrary to objective right, sometimes re-
ferred to in European legal systems as acts contrary to good
morals, therefore, can not give rise to subjective rights, and may
be criminally punished.21 2 This entails, of course, that the vindica-
the state actively to create and safeguard a sociopolitical context that will be
conducive to the vigorous exercise of subjective rights. The exercise of these
subjective rights is in turn the principal means for realizing the values of the
political system.
Id. at 675-76.
The distinction between subjective and objective rights has also been influential in
French jurisprudence. See generally Duguit, Objective Law, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 817 (1920);
Duguit, supra note 209. Duguit views subjective rights as entirely derivative from and
subordinate to objective right; what is noteworthy, however, is his sense of the universality
of the distinction:
In asking whether law exists and what it is, we may have two questions in mind:
The first is to know whether a man living in a given society is by that very
fact subject to a rule of conduct whose violation involves a social reaction which
can be organized. The rule of conduct so defined. . . is. . . objective law....
[W]ithout indeed dismissing the problem of objective law, man has for cen-
turies made it of secondary importance and wished to solve first the whole insol-
uble problem of subjective law. . . . [A]re there certain wills which have, per-
manently or temporarily, a quality of their own which gives them the power to
impose themselves as such upon other wills? If this power exists, there is a sub-
jective law ....
Duguit, supra, at 818-19. See also Gutteridge, supra note 208, at 24, 27-28, for a discussion
of the similar views of Josserand.
211. Gutteridge writes of Josserand, Duguit, and G6ny, three proponents of "objec-
tive right":
[Josserand] advances the view that the exercise of a right must be governed by
its conformity to the social purpose of the rule of law which creates the right.
Law is brought into being for the benefit of the community and not for the
advantage of the individual. M. Josserand cites with approval the statement of
Duguit that man, as an isolated being, cannot have any rights so that it is only
as a member of an organized community that it is possible for him to acquire a
legal personality. The extent of the exercise of a right must, therefore, be
fixed, not by reference to the benefit which is conferred on the individual, but
in its relation to the social complex as a whole. G~ny expresses very much the
same idea when he says that it is necessary to weigh individual interests in the
scales of justice, and to secure the preponderance of those which are the most
important when judged by the criterion of the interests of society.
Gutteridge, supra note 208, at 27-28. Kommers writes of the German basic law: "While the
state must provide a system in which subjective rights can be exercised, those rights must
be exercised in conformity with certain principles of political obligation and ethical
norms." Kommers, supra note 210, at 657.
212. These two claims are related: because an act contrary to good morals has no legal
force, it cannot be justified even if it is performed under color of law. The West German
Civil Code decrees that "a juridical act contra bonos mores is void." BORGERLICHES
GEsarzauc [BGB] art. 138 (W. Ger.). Another article creates civil liability for intentional
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tion of objective right justifies burdening an offender more than
necessary to compensate a victim; it may even justify sanctions
which further burden the victim 213 or innocent third parties.2 14
Subjective rights always derive from juridical acts, that is, acts
consistent with objective right-but objective right will not always
enforce subjective rights thus created. This is because subjective
rights are relational.215 If, for example, A is obligated to B, B then
has a subjective right against A. Such relationships are governed
by a requirement of good faith.216 Indeed, the violation of good
faith may itself be conceived as the violation of a subjective right.
Since the right violated is relational, the appropriate response is
to compensate the victim in order to bring the relationship back
into equilibrium. If the enforcement of a subjective right would
involve a breach of the good faith requirement governing the re-
lations between the parties, the subjective right will not be en-
forced. The right has been "abused" and is therefore forfeit, al-
though it was validly created. What counts as such an "abuse of
right" is generally an effort to enforce a right when the cost to
the obligor would be disproportionate to the obligee's benefit.
Such disproportionality undermines the enforceability of the right
because no party other than the obligor and the obligee has an
"interest" in the vindication of a subjective right as such.21 Once
injury contra bonos mores. Id. art. 826. Pursuant to this section, West German courts have
awarded civil damages for the-consequences of turning people in to the Gestapo during the
Nazi regime. 2 Monatsschriflfur Deutsches Recht 174, 174-76 (1948). More significantly, in a
controversial series of cases, they have prosecuted such acts of grudge informing as "un-
lawful imprisonment" under the German Criminal Code of 1871. STRAFGESErzBUCH [STGB]
§ 239. That the act is contra bonos mores strips it of lawfulness. See Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 618 (1958).
213. Some German criminal theorists recognize no right of self defense against the
blackmail of criminals, on the ground that the legal interest threatened by such conduct is
the state's interest in the enforcement of the criminal law, rather than the property of the
victim. See Arzt, Notwehr gegen Erpressung, 19 MONATSCHRIFT FBiR DEUtrscHEs RE cHT 344
(1965); cf Haug, Notwehr gegen Erpressung, 18 MONATSSCHRIFT F&R DEUTSCHES R crr 548
(1964).
214. The sanction of imprisonment, for example, burdens a defendant's dependents.
215. This view is particularly associated with Savigny and the historical school in Ger-
man jurisprudence. See 4 R. POUND, supra note 208, at 65-66.
216. See Matter of Rogenmoser v. Tiefengrund A.G., 59 BG II 372 (1933), reprinted
in R. SCHLESINGER, COmPARATrVE LAW 505 (1970); German cases on contractual impossibil-
ity are collected in A. VON MEmiE & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SysTm 1073-99 (2d ed.
1977); Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CURENr LEGAL PaoB. 16 (1956).
217. Because the doctrine of abuse of right is predominantly concerned with the exer-
cise of "subjective rights," many English speaking commentators assume that it must be
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a court dictates a remedy for the violation of such a right, how-
ever, it invests the right with a public interest. The enforcement of
the remedy is now the vindication of objective right, and this is
what justifies the state in employing coercive sanctions toward that
end.
D. Property Entitlements and Liability Entitlements
The distinction between objective right and subjective rights
interacts in important ways with a taxonomy of entitlements de-
veloped by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed.218 Calabresi
and Melamed distinguish three types of entitlements in terms of
the conditions under which they may be legally infringed: prop-
erty entitlements, liability entitlements, and inalienable entitle-
ments. A property entitlement is one that cannot be infringed
governed by a subjective standard. Thus they distinguish between exercising a right in
situations in which it is inapplicable and exercising a right with an evil motive, holding that
only the latter should genuinely be considered abuse of right. See Crabb, The French Concept
of Abuse of Right, 6 IrTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 12-15 (1964); Devine, Some Comparative Aspects of the
Doctrine of Abuse of Rights, 1964 AcrA JURIDICA 148, 149, 154-55; Johnson, Abuse of Right in
Soviet Civil Law, I SoUc. Q. 320 (1962) (arguing that the Soviet doctrine of abuse of right
does not really qualify as such, because it employs objective criteria). Each of these authors
seems to be straining against the very doctrine they are attempting to explain, however.
They are constrained to admit that French and Soviet courts in fact employ objective crite-
ria for the identification of an abuse of right. In French law, the creation of a nuisance is
held to be an abuse of property rights. See Devine, supra, at 154. In Soviet law, the mainte-
nance of rental property has been viewed as an abuse of the right to possess property. See
Johnson, supra, at 324-34. In Germany, the concept of abuse of right has been invoked to
deny a claim of self defense where the interest defended (the right to a parking space) was
outweighed by the interest attacked (life). 16 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 824,
825 (Bayerischen Obersten Landesgerichts [Bay ObLG], Miinchen 1963); see also G.
FLTcrcn.R, RErmNING CRIMINAL LAW 873 (1978). The Swiss Civil Code explicitly links the
doctrine of abuse of right to the obligation to deal in good faith (Section 2). This provision
may be used by Swiss courts to strike down or modify contracts on grounds of equity alone.
Gutteridge, supra note 208, at 39, 40. The reason for the widespread use of what a com-
mon lawyer would consider an "objective" criterion for the review of what a civil lawyer
would consider a "subjective right" is easily explained: the judgment that a right has been
abused entails a moral judgment which must be referenced to some moral criterion-good
faith in Germany, or the absence of antisocial motives in Russia. Each of these standards
implies judgments of substantive fairness or exploitation in relations between people. Mak-
ing these judgments, in turn, requires objective criteria of fairness. In general, one cannot
condemn behavior as exploitative without maintaining substantive expectations about peo-
ple's obligations to one another. Id. at 26-29.
For a useful discussion of the doctrine of abuse of right in international law, see H.
LAUTERPACHT THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 286-307 (1933).
218. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1989 (1972).
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upon without the holder's consent; a liability entitlement is one
that cannot be infringed upon without compensation to the
holder; and an inalienable entitlement is one that cannot be in-
fringed upon under any circumstances. 19
Just as the distinction between violations of objective right
and the violation of subjective rights has remedial implications, so
does the distinction among property, liability, and inalienable enti-
tlements. Consider expectations created by an agreement. In the
first place, such expectations are not generally regarded as inalien-
able entitlements, for otherwise they would have pre-existed the
agreement. 220 Agreements may, however, be viewed as sources of
either property or liability entitlements.
If agreements are viewed as sources of property entitlements,
219. Id. at 1092-93.
220. If we say that someone acquires an entitlement by means of a contractual agree-
ment, we suggest that the entitlement can be held by others and disposed of (i.e., alienated)
by them. Of course, it need not follow that, once acquired by contract, a right may be
disposed of by contract. Consider entitlements to liberty and life, which are often consid-
ered inalienable. One could imagine a society in which a slave could purchase his freedom
from a master but not sell it. Similarly, one could imagine a society in which one could
purchase one's life, for example, by selling oneself into slavery, but that having done so,
one could not dispose of one's life. Rousseau argues, however, that in selling oneself into
slavery, one alienates all of one's rights. J. RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr 53-58 (M.
Cranston trans. 1968) (1st ed. Amsterdam 1762). If a slave cannot dispose of her own life,
in other words, it is because of her master's property right, rather than her own inalienable
right. Hobbes would permit both the purchase and sale of life by contract. The right to
resist death, however, is inalienable and may be neither purchased nor sold. T. HOBBES, DE
CIvE 39 (S. Lamprecht ed. 1949) (1st ed. London 1651). Locke apparently views the right
to life as natural and inalienable, but forfeited "by some act that deserves death." One
whose life is forfeit may be held in slavery, but not by contract. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, §§ 22, 23 (J. Gough ed. 1948) (1st ed. London 1690).
Sovereignty, often viewed as an inalienable entitlement, has sometimes been treated as the
product of a contract. Hobbes, for example, advocated that authority be inalienably vested
in a sovereign by the agreement of its subjects. Yet the sovereign who receives the inaliena-
ble entitlement is not a party to this agreement. In Hobbes' view, to be bound by such an
agreement would be inconsistent with sovereignty. See infra text accompanying notes 434-
40. Rousseau also characterized sovereignty as inalienable and described the creation of
the sovereign as a social contract. Unlike Hobbes, he advocated that sovereignty be re-
tained by the parties to the social contract; but he conceived of the social contract as an
enduring community rather than an agreement. See infra text accompanying notes 396-
407. An agreement between sovereign and subject that conferred a right to perpetual obe-
dience on the sovereign, and that conferred on the subjects an expectation that the sover-
eign's right would never be assigned or dissolved, would be a counter example to the pro-
position in the text-provided that both parties also alienated the right to renegotiate their
agreement. This last condition could only be met if there were some power capable of
enforcing the sovereign's obligation not to negotiate. The existence of such a superior
authority, however, is commonly thought to preclude sovereignty.
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the appropriate remedy for breach is specific performance, since
only actual performance of the agreement would insure that the
promisee's expectations would not be violated without his or her
consent.221 Such a remedy would prevent the promisor from con-
veying the interest promised to a third party. This means that an
agreement conflicting with an earlier agreement would not be
specifically enforceable. A further implication of this remedy is
that the second conflicting agreement cannot function as a source
of property entitlements. If entitlements created by agreements
are viewed as property, the second of two conflicting agreements
cannot be valid.
If agreements are viewed as a source of liability entitlements,
on the other hand, the appropriate remedy for breach is obviously
damages. The treatment of expectations grounded in agreements
as mere liability entitlements reserves to the promisor a right to
pay damages rather than perform. Implicit in this right is a right
to convey the interests promised to a different promisee, provided
the promisor pays the first promisee reparations. This does not
deny the fact that the promisee has a right as well-a right to
receive either performance or damages. The second promisee,
however, is equipped with the same rights as the first. If agree-
ments are viewed as sources of liability entitlements, in other
words, conflicting obligations are both equally valid.
The remedial consequences of infringing a property entitle-
ment include compulsory performance and the invalidation of
conflicting agreements, both remedies associated with the viola-
tion of objective right. By contrast, the remedial consequence of
infringing a liability entitlement is compensation, a remedy associ-
ated with the violation of subjective rights. There is a reason for
this convergence; our taxonomies of illegality are analytically
linked.
E. The Relationship Between the Two Distinctions
One may distinguish the three types of entitlements described
by Calabresi and Melamed in terms of the relationship between
221. See generally Kronman, Specific Performance, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRAcr LAW
181-94 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979) (arguing that contractual expectations should
be specifically enforced, because they share characteristics with property entitlements iden-
tified by Calabresi and Melamed).
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two factors: the consent of the holder of the entitlement and the
consent of the state to the infringement of the entitlement. In the
instance of liability entitlements, the state consents to infringe-
ment, whether or not the individual entitlement holder consents.
Of course, if a liability entitlement is infringed, the state will re-
quire that the holder be compensated. The state's consent to in-
fringement is conditional, but it is not conditioned upon the con-
sent of the entitlement holder. In the case of property
entitlements, by contrast, the state consents to infringement if and
only if the individual does.222 In the case of inalienable entitle-
ments, of course, the state never consents to infringement, re-
gardless of the will of the entitlement holder.
In all of these contexts, violation of the will of the state vio-
lates objective right and justifies the use of coercive or punitive
sanctions. Inalienable entitlements such as life may be protected
by means of coercive force, even against the holder of the entitle-
ment. Thus euthanasia is generally criminally punishable and the
prevention of suicide may justify the use of force. 223 Where per-
sonal liberty has been viewed as an inalienable entitlement, coer-
cive contracts have not only been viewed as void ab initio,224 but
sometimes as cause for criminal liability as well. 225 This has meant
that most Western legal systems have been unwilling to specifically
enforce contracts for personal service.226 Doing so would identify
222. The obvious exception is the power of eminent domain. For Hobbes, this power
was implicit in the social nature of property. "Seeing therefore the introduction of propriety
is an effect of the commonwealth, which can do nothing but by the person that represents
it, it is the act only of the sovereign; . . .[f]rom whence we may collect, that the propriety
which a subject hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the
use of them; and not to exclude their sovereign ... ." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 161, 163 (M.
Oakeshott ed. 1960) (1st ed. London 1651). C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF
POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 96 (1961). For Locke, however, who derives the
legitimacy of government from a desire to protect property rights, the power of eminent
domain (as distinguished from the power of taxation) would annihilate the right of prop-
erty. J. LOCKE, supra note 220, at §§ 123, 124, 138-39. For Blackstone, who attempts to
reconcile the postures of Hobbes and Locke with respect to property, the doctrine of emi-
nent domain is a pragmatic (if problematic) compromise. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at
261-64. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135.
223. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW, §§ 125.15(3), 35.10(4) (McKinney 1975).
224. See Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041
("shackling" contracts void under BGB § 138(1) for offense to good morals).
225. See, e.g., Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
226. See The Case of Mary Clark, a Woman of Color, 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821) (spe-
cific enforcement of 20 year indentured servitude analogous to slavery); Dawson, Specific
Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REv. 495 (1959) (hostility toward specific
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objective right with the subjective right to personal service,
thereby creating a property right in another's labor. Enforcing
the right in this way would permit an abuse, i.e., the infringement
of an inalienable entitlement.
As a result, European legal systems tend to recognize only a
liability right to promised service. These legal systems have been
willing, however, to specifically enforce other kinds of contract
obligations, thereby recognizing them as property entitlements.
France enforces such obligations by means of punitive fines,
whereas Germany enforces them by means of imprisonment. 22
Even common law jurisdictions which generally recognize con-
tracts as creating only liability rights, are willing to employ coer-
cive sanctions to enforce those liability rights."' Each of the three
types of entitlement involves a different relationship between the
will of the holder and the will of the state; but for each type of
entitlement, it is the frustration of the will of the state that vio-
lates objective right and inspires a coercive response.
The infringement of an entitlement without the consent of
the owner, however, is the violation of a subjective right. By this,
I do not mean that the frustration of any person's will is the viola-
tion of a subjective right. If one has no entitlement protected by
objective right, one has no subjective right. If, however, the legal
system provides any protection for an interest that can be identi-
fied as being held by a particular person, against infringement by
others, that person has a subjective right against those others.
The subjective right remains valid even on those occasions where
it is not enforced-but it must be enforceable under some condi-
tions, else it is merely an interest or desire, not a right. Subjective
rights are dependent on objective right even when they are not
coextensive with its prescriptions. Only in the instance of property
entitlements are objective right and subjective rights coextensive.
The treatment of an entitlement as a property entitlement there-
fore necessarily identifies it with the interests of the state and in-
vests it with the state's authority. Indeed, the protection of prop-
erty has long been identified with the vindication of state power.
Hobbes argued that neither crime nor property would be possible
enforcement of contracts for personal service traced back to Roman Law).
227. See generally Dawson, supra note 224.
228. See generally M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 69-112 (1982).
406 [Vol. 34
DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY
without sovereignty; Locke, by contrast, derived the sovereignty
of government from its function of protecting property. 29 Doug-
las Hay has suggested that the legitimation of the authority of
property holders was the chief function of the criminal law in
Locke's England.2 30 In other contexts, property seems to have
functioned as an important symbol of sovereignty, so that attacks
on property were construed as a kind of violent insurrection.2 31
F. Two Types of Illegality
We have now explicated two frameworks for analyzing the il-
legality of treaty conflict and explored the relationship between
them. By combining these two analytic schemes we can sketch the
jurisprudential implications of two different approaches to the
problem of treaty conflict. Treaty conflict may be viewed as a vio-
lation of one of two types of standards: good faith or good
morals.232 Good faith standards govern subjective rights; a viola-
tion of good faith is the violation of a subjective right. If treaty
conflict is viewed as a violation only of good faith, treaties are lia-
bility entitlements, in which case the appropriate remedy for
breach is damages. The implication of this view is that both con-
flicting treaties are valid. If, however, treaty conflict is viewed as a
violation of good morals, it violates objective right as well as the
subjective rights of the promisees. In this case, treaties must be
viewed as sources of property rights, and the appropriate remedy
for breach should be specific performance. The implication of this
view is that the second of two conflicting treaties is void.
We have already noted that most commentators view treaty
conflict as a violation of at least good faith. This would imply that
the appropriate response of the international legal order to treaty
conflict would be to recognize both treaties and require that the
first promisee be compensated. Yet, as we shall see, many com-
mentators view the second of two conflicting treaties as void ab
initio. The above analysis would suggest that the voiding of the
later treaty reflects a view of treating entitlements as property,
and a view of treaty enforcement as the vindication of "objective
229. See supra note 222.
230. Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION's FATAL TREE. CRIME AND
SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTuRY ENGLAND 17-63 (1975).
231. See infra note 246.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 211-16.
1985] 407
408 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
right." In the next Chapter, we shall analyze the arguments of-
fered by several supporters of voiding the second treaty, in light
of this hypothesis.
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V. TREATIES AS PROPERTY ENTITLEMENTS
This Chapter shall trace the development of the view that the
second of two conflicting treaties is void ab initio. This view ap-
pears to have originated with the natural law theorists of the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. The arguments offered for
this position by the natural law theorists turned on an explicit
identification of treaty rights as property. With the rise of legal
positivism 2 s3 in the nineteenth century, however, these arguments
were transposed into new rhetorical settings. The idiom of prop-
erty rights gave way to such new formulations as "the public or-
der" and the "interests of the international community." While
the terminology shifted over time, the basic structure of argument
has remained the same: whether couched in the terminology of
enlightenment rationalism or modern instrumentalism, arguments
for voiding conflicting treaties identify treaty entitlements with
some notion of "objective right." If this claim is roughly accurate,
it follows that a preference for voiding conflicting treaties implies
a commitment to the supremacy of the international legal order
over national sovereignty.
Recall that a treaty is an agreement between two nations cre-
ating obligations in international law.2 " The more binding trea-
ties are understood to be, the more authority is accorded interna-
tional law. As a practical matter, nations have rarely accorded
much authority to international law. Prior to the establishment of
international tribunals in this century, the principle remedy availa-
ble to victims of treaty breach was unilateral termination of the
treaty.235 While more vigorous responses were not scorned, they
were recognized as infringements-however justified-upon the
sovereignty of the promisor.3 6 International law might justify the
233. See supra note 135 for a discussion of positivist accounts of international law.
234. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
235. Indeed, it remains the principle remedy for breach. A great number of notable
instances of unilateral renunciation in response to breach are collected in B. SINHA, UNILAT-
ERAL DENUNCIATION OF TREATY BECAUSE OF PRIOR VIOLATIONS OF OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER
PARTY 104-93 (1966).
236. The strategy referred to is intervention, which was considered a permissible rem-
edy for breach of treaty prior to the formation of the League of Nations. See H. HODGES,
THE DOCTRINE OF INTERVENTION 36-37 (1915); R. ROXBURGH, supra note 33, at 20. Hodges
defines intervention as "an interference by a state or states in the external affairs of another states
[sic] without its consent, or in its internal affairs with or without its consent." H. HoDGEs, supra,
at 1 (emphasis original). "Intervention is in the first instance a hostile act, because it consti-
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use of force, but could not obviate it.
A property right is one that cannot be infringed without the
consent of the holder.237 If treaties are understood to establish
property rights, they are very binding indeed. Specific enforce-
ment of such rights would require extensive intrusion upon na-
tional sovereignty. Thus the transformation of international
promises into property presupposes an especially potent interna-
tional legal order.
A. Natural Law Arguments
Arguments that the latter of two conflicting treaties is void ab
initio rely upon the claim that treaty rights are property. Not sur-
prisingly, they invoke the image of a transcendent legal order to
explain the limitation on national sovereignty that this claim im-
plies. Prior to the development of recognized international legal
institutions, natural law was invoked as a transcendent legal order;
subsequently, natural law principles were presented as implicit in
the positive legal institutions of the emerging international order.
Natural law scholarship of international relations was a form
of advocacy. It envisioned a nonexistent legal order and at-
tempted to establish its authority by argument. The less natural
law theorists could rely on the actual practice of states for author-
ity, the more compelling their normative arguments had to be.
On the other hand, the less they conformed their doctrines to
state practice, the less compromised their conclusions had to be.
Largely unrecognized and unenforceable, natural law entitlements
tended to be absolute and unqualified. Grotius argued that a
promise accompanied by
an intention to convey a special right to another.... is a perfect promise,
and has an effect similar to an alienation of ownership. It is a first step to the
alienation of an object or of some portion of our liberty. . . . God himself,
who can be limited by no established law, would act contrary to his own
nature if he did not fulfill his promises. . . . Whence it follows that the obli-
gation to keep a promise springs from the nature of that unchangeable jus-
tice which is, in its own way, an attribute common to God and to all who
tutes an attack upon the independence of the state subjected to it .... [I]t is regarded by
the state intruded upon, if not previously agreed to, as an act of war in that its sovereignty
is impaired." Id. at 5.




Though in itself unenforceable, natural law justified the au-
thority of positive law to interfere with "natural" liberty. "Obliga-
tion," argued Pufendorf, "places, as it were, a kind of bridle upon
our liberty of action, so that we are unable rightly to turn in a
direction different from that to which obligation leads."' 3 9 Mere
acceptance of a promise created a "perfect obligation" and a cor-
relative "perfect right. ' 240 For Pufendorf, as for Grotius, a per-
fect right was an absolute right to the thing promised:
[If]. . . the will to accept on the part of the second party. . . has concurred
with the will of the one who makes the promise, . . then it is understood
that at this same moment the right to the thing promised has passed from
the latter to the former, and therefore the promisor has no longer the right
not to fulfill his promise to the promisee against the will of the latter.
24
'
Such perfect rights, argued Wolff, arise from treaties,
[for] treaties . . . contain promises made by one party, accepted by the
other. Therefore, since a promisor binds himself absolutely to the promisee,
and a perfect right belongs to the promisee to that which has been prom-
ised; from treaties a perfect obligation arises and a perfect right is
acquired.242
"[A] perfect right," Wolff continued, "involves the right to com-
pel one to perform . . . what has been agreed upon."2 4 Vattel
also concluded that "the engagements of a treaty . . . produce
* . . a perfect right."' 2" He reasoned:
238. H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 137 (L. Loomis trans. 1949) (1st ed.
Paris 1625).
239. 2 S. PUFENDORF, ELEmENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIs LIBRI Duo 72 (W.
Oldfather trans. 1964) (1st ed. Hagae-Comitis 1660).
240. Id. at 81; see also H. GROTUS, supra note 238, at 142.
241. S. PUFENDORF, supra note 239, at 81. Hobbes takes a similar view of the effect of
an agreement on the state of nature:
Whosoever shall contract with one to do or omit somewhat, and shall after cov-
enant the contrary with another, he maketh not the former, but the latter con-
tract unlawful. For he hath no larger right to do, or to omit aught, who by
former contracts hath conveyed it to another. Wherefore he can convey no
right by latter contracts, and what is promised, is promised without right. He is
therefore tied only to his first contract, to break which is unlawful.
T. HOBBES, supra note 220, at 39.
242. 2 C. WOLFF, Jus GEimuM MrraoDo ScmarmricA PERTRACTATUM § 377 (. Drake
trans. 1934) (Ist ed. Halle im Magdeburgischen 1749).
243. Id. § 390; see also H. GRoTMus, supra note 238, at 175.




It is a settled point in natural law, that he who has made a promise to any
one has conferred upon him a real right to require the thing prom-
ised,-and consequently, that the breach of a perfect promise is a violation
of another person's right, and as evidently an act of injustice as it would be
to rob a man of his property.2
For these natural law theorists, the power to void a broken
treaty was an inadequate remedy for breach. As a practical mat-
ter, it offered no solace to the recipient of a unilateral promise;
conceptually, it was inadequate because it took into account only
the interests of the parties involved. Treaty rights were analogized
to property precisely because they implicated interests beyond
those of their holders. Breach of treaty threatened the natural or-
der in the same way that burglary threatened the integrity of the
community and violated the sovereignty of the king.24' Thus Vat-
tel continued:
The tranquillity, the happiness, the security of the human race, wholly de-
pend on justice. . . . [The] obligation [to perform promises] is, then, as nec-
essary as it is natural and indubitable, between nations that live together in a
state of nature and acknowledge no superior upon earth, to maintain order
and peace in their society.24'
For the natural law theorists it was crucial that treaty rights be
treated as property, so that international law could substitute for
sovereignty. Wolff accordingly argued that:
All nations are understood to have come together into a state, whose sepa-
rate members are separate nations, or individual states. For nature herself
has established society among all nations and compels them to preserve it
... . In the supreme state the nations as a whole have a right to coerce the
individual nations, if they should be unwilling to perform their obligation.2 48
This right derives not from the rights of the individual nations,
but from the prerogatives of sovereignty:
The law of nations as a whole with reference to individual nations in the
supreme state must be measured by the purpose of the supreme state ...
Some sovereignty over individual nations belongs to nations as a whole. For
245. Id. at 195.
246. For the proposition that crime in the eighteenth century was perceived as a viola-
tion of royal sovereignty, see Hay, supra note 230, at 17. For its significance as the viola-
tion of community boundaries, see D. ROTHMAN, THE DiscovERY OF THE ASYLUM 3-30
(1972); Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REv. 469 (1976).
247. E. DE VATrEL, supra note 244, at 195.
248. C. WOLFF, supra note 242, at §§ 9, 13.
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a certain sovereignty over individuals belongs to the whole in a state.1' 9
The rights of nations, in other words, were dependent upon the
authority of natural law and not the other way around.
While natural law could transform promises into property,
therefore, it could also invalidate them entirely. "The clearest evi-
dence of incompatibility of a promise with the intention of the
promiser," argued Grotius, "is when a literal following of his
words would involve something unlawful, that is, something con-
trary to natural or divine law. For such promises are incapable of
creating an obligation. '250 "We are unable," agreed Pufendorf,
"to contract an obligation about those things, over the disposal of
which we have lost the moral faculty or authority. Of this sort are
matters forbidden by the laws. '25 1 Vattel, too, concluded that "for
. ..want of sufficient powers . ..a treaty concluded for an un-
249. Id. at §§ 14, 15. Note that Vattel explicitly: rejected Wolff's notion of a supreme
state:
I differ entirely from Monsieur Wolff in the manner of establishing the founda-
tions of that species of the law of nations which we call voluntary. Monsieur
Wolff deduces it from the idea of a great republic (civitatis maximae) instituted
by nature herself, and of which all the nations of the world are members. . . .I
acknowledge no other natural society between nations other than that which
nature has established between mankind in general.
E. DE VATEL, supra note 244, at xiii. While Vattel substitutes nature for a civil society of
nations as the ultimate source of authority for international law, he purports to reach sub-
stantially the same conclusions as Wolff by similar reasoning. Id. at xiv-xv. Yet his argu-
ments against such a world-state turn on the claim that it is unnecessary in explaining the
"voluntary" law of nations, as opposed to the "necessary" law of nations. In other words, he
argues that one need invoke no higher authority to explain the validity of mutual promises
between states ("voluntary" law); yet he admits the need to invoke a higher authority in
order to explain the invalidity of "unjust" treaties ("necessary" law). Id. at 194-95. If, how-
ever, treaties contrary to the law of nature are beyond the power of sovereign nations,
then national sovereignty is ultimately dependent on a higher authority. Thus, Vattel is
simply inconsistent when, in his preface, he writes:
It is essential to every civil society (civitati) that each member have resigned a
part of his right to the body of the society. . . .Nothing of this kind can be
conceived or supposed to subsist between nations. Each sovereign state claims,
and actually possesses an absolute independence on all the others.
Id. at xiii. Like the later proponents of the jus cogens doctrine, who purported to give up
the natural law perspective altogether, Vattel was simply kidding himself.
250. H. GROTUS, supra note 238, at 184.
To render a promise valid, it must be one that is or can be in the power of the
promiser to perform. Hence, in the first place, no promises to perform an act in
itself illegal are valid, because no one has, or can have, a right to do such a
thing.
Id. at 140.
251. S. PUFENDORF, supra note 239, at 114.
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just or dishonest purpose is absolutely null and void,-nobody
having a right to engage to do things contrary to the law of na-
ture. '252 Treaty obligations were binding at the pleasure of "the
Supreme State;" they were creatures of international rather than
national sovereignty.
The violation of a treaty obligation was a violation of interna-
tional sovereignty; thus, treaties requiring the violation of prior
treaties were void by operation of natural law. "[W]hen several
states are at war with each other," Grotius asked himself, "to
which side ought one to give assistance if allied with both? ...
[I]f personal assistance, which cannot be divided, is required of us
who promised it," he answered, "reason requires that we give
preference to one with whom we have been longer allied. 25 3
Pufendorf gave a similar answer: "[T]he earlier alliance takes pre-
cedence, because in the later it is understood that only those ac-
tions which were free of the former obligation have been obli-
gated."'12 " "[T]he more ancient ally," Vattel agreed, "is entitled to
a preference; for the engagement was pure and absolute with re-
spect to him; whereas we could not contract with the more recent
ally, without a reservation of the rights of the former. 2 5 5 Philli-
more, a nineteenth century natural law theorist, concurred with
tradition: "[T]he more ancient one must be executed, because it
was not within the competence of the party promising, to act in
derogation of his antecedent engagements to another."2 6 Wolff
summarized the rationale for this result:
Later treaties contrary to earlier ones are illegal, and they are invalid
by the law of nature. For a perfect right is acquired from treaties. . . . And
if later treaties shall have been contrary to earlier ones, in them things are
promised which cannot be promised without impairing the earlier treaties,
252. E. DE VATrEL, supra note 244, at 194-95.
253. H. GROTtos, supra note 238, at 173.
254. S. PUFENDORF, supra note 239, at 118.
I cannot ...make a valid pact with a third person about my own things or
actions over which a second person has already acquired a right. . . .The lat-
ter pact is rendered invalid by the earlier, or rather, the earlier shows that a
later cannot exist. And in this sense is to be accepted the trite dictum, "the
prior in time is superior in right," namely, not that time in itself confers any
right, but because the prior in time has already acquired some right which pre-
vents the later in time from being able to acquire a right to the same thing.
Id. at 117.
255. E. DE VATrEL, supra note 244, at 197.
256. 2 R PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1854).
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consequently this would be just as if he who enters into the later treaty
should promise a thing which he no longer has. Therefore, since a promise
would be invalid, if anyone promises a thing which he knows he no longer
has, later treaties which are contrary to earlier ones are invalid by the law of
nature.
25 7
The natural law theorists gave pride of place to the prior treaty
because they viewed it as property, invested with the superior sov-
ereignty of the natural order, specifically performable in princi-
ple, if not in practice.
B. Modern Arguments from Customary Law
As an actual international legal order developed, the methods
and aims of international law scholarship began to change. Natu-
ral law scholarship had been visionary, deriving legal principles
from a natural order, purportedly by means of mathematical
logic.25 8 As the envisioned international legal system became in-
creasingly actual, however, it also became increasingly mundane.
Its sources were civil rather than natural or divine; its content was
contingent upon the customs and compromises of actual nations.
These developments occasioned a transformation of the role of
international law scholars; where formerly they had prescribed
norms for the behavior of sovereign states, now they merely de-
scribed their actual practices. 259 The doctrines they proposed
257. C. WOLFF, supra note 242, at § 383.
258. Pufendorf's Elementorim is structured as a series of deductions from definitions
and axioms. See generally S. PUFENDORF, supra note 239. Wolff, too, presented his Jus Gen-
tium as a deductive system. See generally C. WOLFF, supra note 242. Mathematics was chosen
as a metaphor within the rhetoric of natural law, argued Ernst Cassirer, because law was an
ideal rather than an empirical order:
Montesquieu declares: "Laws in their broadest sense are the necessary relations
which are derived from the nature of things." Such a "nature of things" exists
in the realm of the possible as well as that of the real, in the realm of the purely
conceptual as well as in that of the factually existent, in the physical as well as in
the moral world.
E. 0ASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 243 (F. Koelln & J. Pettegrove trans.
1951) (1 st ed. 1932). The study of human nature itself was described as a kind of deductive
logic: "[s]ome called this a political mathematics (Condillac) or geometry (Beccaria) or
calculus (Condorcet) or algebra (Hutcheson)." G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 95 (1978).
259.
The science of the Law of Nations, as left by the French Revolution, developed
progressively during the nineteenth century under the influence of three fac-
tors. The first factor was the endeavour, on the whole sincere, of the Powers
after the Congress of Vienna to submit to the rules of the Law of Nations. The
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were to be judged in terms of those practices, rather than vice
versa. In shifting their fealty from heaven to earth, the natural
lawyers established their claims on the firmer ground of custom-
ary law, but they gave up the Archimedean point from which cus-
tom had previously been criticized.
The collapse of natural law doctrine into customary law occa-
sioned a crisis for the property view of treaty entitlements. Recall
that this view invested treaty rights with the sovereignty of a natu-
ral order that transcended and preexisted the sovereignty of
states. If the sanctity of treaties were not guaranteed by some
higher authority, then states could simply violate treaties by the
same power which they could use to form treaties in the first
place. Accordingly, a treaty entailing violation of a previous treaty
would be no less valid than that earlier treaty. With the decline of
natural law as a source of international law, therefore, the sanctity
of treaties could no longer claim priority over the validity of any
particular treaty. The only possible source for a norm forbidding
breach was custom, and customary law ultimately rested on the
same authority as conventional law-consent. 260 If customary law
rested on no' higher authority than consent, there appeared to be
no reason why particular nations could not simply contract out of
any of their obligations under customary law, including their obli-
gation not to form agreements in violation of obligations previ-
ously undertaken by convention. Only if there were some norms
of customary law that could not be contracted out of, usually re-
ferred to as jus cogens, 21 could customary law impose limitations
on the power of states to make conflicting agreements. The view
of treaty entitlements as property paradoxically required the sub-
ordination of conventional law to customary law.
Modern scholars of international law have employed four dif-
second factor was the many law-making treaties which arose during this cen-
tury. And the last, but not indeed the least factor, was the rising predominance
of positivism over the theory of the Law of Nature. . . . [O]n the whole, posi-
tivism was victorious at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth. In denying the validity of sources of International Law other
than the will of States it constituted yet another manifestation of the extreme
doctrine of State sovereignty which, at that time, was typical of the science of
law and of politics.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 59.
260. Id. § 16.
261. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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ferent arguments to justify the subordination of conventional law
to customary law. Each of these arguments proceed from different
premises, though in practice they intertwine.
One argument, espoused by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, is con-
ceptual. Treaties, he admits, are sources of law;2 62 but they are
not wholly independent sources of law. By definition, they are
agreements to create obligations binding in international law.
This implies that conceptually, treaties are dependent for their va-
lidity on some other source of law. "Law," claims Lauterpacht, "is
a body of rules for human conduct within a community which by
common consent of this community shall be enforced by external
power. ' 263 The common consent of a community, in other words,
is what makes international law binding. Historically, Lauterpacht
asserts, custom preceded explicit convention as a means of expres-
sing that consent.264 Yet he feels that the priority of custom over
convention is ultimately logical rather than chronological; the
very existence of a community is dependent upon the presence of
ongoing patterns of intercourse,265 structured by rules command-
ing common consent.266 Common consent cannot mean the ex-
plicit consent of each member of the community, since the mem-
bership of the community is determined simply by participation in
patterned intercourse. "The question whether there be such a
common consent. . . is a matter of observation and appreciation,
and not of logical and mathematical decision. . . . It is for that
reason that custom is at the background of.all law, whether writ-
ten or unwritten. 2 67 Having thus established the authority of tra-
dition, Lauterpacht may reroot natural law doctrines in the new
262. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, §§ 16, 18.
263. Id. § 5.
264. Id. § 12.
265. "A community may be said to be the body of a number of individuals more or
less bound together through such common interests as create a constant and manifold in-
tercourse between the single individuals." Id. § 7.
266.
A rule is a rule of morality, if by common consent of the community it applies
to conscience and to conscience only; whereas, on the other hand, a rule is a
rule of law, if by common consent of the community it will eventually be en-
forced by external power. Without some kind both of morality and of law no
community has ever existed, or could possibly exist.
Id. § 4. Thus the existence of a community and the existence of rules of law and morality
are, by definition, mutually dependent.
267. Id. § 11.
19851 417
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
soil of customary law: "It is a recognized customary rule of Inter-
national Law that obligations which are at variance with univer-
sally recognized principles of International Law cannot be the ob-
ject of a treaty."' 8 These doctrines include the conception of
treaty entitlements as property, invested with the transcendent au-
thority of the international legal order. "Treaties . . . are part of
International Law. . . . This implies the duty not to conclude
treaties inconsistent with the obligations of former treaties. The
conclusion of such treaties is an illegal act which cannot produce
legal results beneficial to the law-breaker.12 6  Lauterpacht views
states as incapable of making conflicting treaties because
treatymaking is dependent on the existence of a supplementary
body of law; that body of law is custom, and customary law forbids
treaty conflict.
A second argument bases the authority of customary law on
conventional law itself. It begins with the same conceptual pre-
mise: that treaties are valid only with the support of a supplemen-
tary body of law. That supplementary body of law is supplied,
however, by conventional law rather than customary law. Some
scholars argue that, as an empirical matter, existing international
legal institutions are the product of convention. Such trea-
ties-the U.N. Charter, the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, the International Labor Conventions, for exam-
ple-create law.2 70 Because these treaties establish the interna-
tional legal order that makes treaties possible, they take prece-
dence over all other treaties.27 1 These treaties make customary
268. Id. § 506.
269. Id. § 503.
270. Id. § 492 for a discussion of law making treaties generally.
271. See supra note 137. See generally C. ROZAKIS, supra note 85, at 1-23. Rozakis dis-
putes the claim that customary law precedes conventional law historically or logically, id. at
21; in addition, he explicitly rejects Lauterpacht's assumption that international law can
take root in an international community of interest: "The world is no longer constituted of
a numerous clausus of national entities with the same or similar cultural, ethical and politi-
cal background where a kinship of interests determined the development of their rela-
tions." Id. at 15. As a consequence, he argues, state autonomy must be restrained by imper-
ative law. Id. The capacity of international law to enforce its norms is brought into
question, he feels, by its traditional reliance on the autonomous consent of states for valid-
ity. Id. at 1, 6-7 & 20. Nevertheless, the increasing development of recognized institutions
of international law gives it increasing validity. Id. at 1, 16. Because these institutions are
consensual in origin, their authority is valid. Id. at 23.
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law binding.27 2 Customary law, in turn, holds as void treaties
which conflict with peremptory norms of international law. In-
deed, the recent United Nations Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties may be viewed as a lawmaking treaty; it explicitly recognizes
the doctrine of jus cogens.17 3 It may be argued that the prohibi-
tion on making conflicting treaties is such a jus cogens, or pe-
remptory norm of customary law.27 4 By thus employing the dis-
tinction between lawmaking treaties and other treaties, one may
hold conflicting treaties void on the basis of conventional law
alone.
A third argument for the doctrine ofjus cogens, advanced by
Alfred Verdross, is based on instrumental considerations. 7 5 It be-
gins with the premise that the function of law is to effectuate the
interests of a community. Treaties, therefore, are valid law be-
cause they advance the mutual interests of the parties. A second
premise is that the nations of the world constitute a community
with its own set of interests. 76 Ordinarily, Verdross argues, trea-
ties implicate only the interests of the parties involved; however,
where they run afoul of the interests of the larger international
community, they must yield. 7T The implicit premise is that the
272. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes custom-
ary law as a valid source of international law. STAT. ICJ. art. 38 § l(b).
273.
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present convention,
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recog-
nized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of international law having the same character.
Id. art. 53.
274. Professor Tunkin of the Soviet Union took that position during the drafting of
the I.L.C. convention on the law of treaties. See C. RozAMs, supra note 85, at 47 n.3.
275. See Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 Am. J. INT'L L. 571
(1937); Verdross,Jus Dispositivum and jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55
(1966), [hereinafter cited'as Verdross II].
276.
[1]n the field of general international law there are rules having the character
ofjus cogens. The criterion for these rules consists in the fact that they do not
exist to satisfy the needs of the individual states but the higher interest of the
whole international community. Hence these rules are absolute. The others are
relative, because the rights and obligations created by them concern only indi-
vidual states inter se.
Verdross II, supra note 275, at 55, 58.
277. Id. at 55, 58.
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interests of the community are not easily defined. It is generally
agreed that they include prohibitions on war, piracy, slavery, and
perhaps other human rights violations.278 Whether the interna-
tional community has a sufficiently independent interest in the
sanctity of treaties to warrant application of the jus cogens doc-
trine to treaty conflict, however, is unclear. The argument that
the interests of an international community mandate the doctrine
of jus cogens was influential during the drafting of Article 53 of
the Vienna Convention;29 yet few Commission members assumed
that the doctrine would apply to treaty conflict. 210
A fourth approach to the problem of jus cogens, developed
by the neo-realists Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal, st inter-
weaves elements of the other three. Like Lauterpacht and Ver-
dross, Lasswell and McDougal see a relationship between the va-
lidity of a legal system and the existence of a community. But they
see this relationship as symbiotic: while the existence of such a
community can lend validity to legal institutions, effective legal in-
stitutions can foster the development of such a community. 28 2
278. Id. at 58-59.
279. Id. at 57-58.
280. See infra notes 295-351 and accompanying text. Verdross's view is ambiguous:
"At first glance all treaties encroaching upon the rights of third states seem to be contrary
tojus cogens. In fact such treaties are illegal if the third states do not give their consent, but
not all of them are prohibited by a rule ofjus cogens." Verdross II, supra note 275, at 58-
59.
281. Schlegel characterizes Lasswell and McDougal as refugees from legal realism:
Deprivation of the certainty of doctrine by the destruction of the formalist uni-
verse and of the certainty of fact by the failure of empirical social science pro-
vided the justification for seeking legitimacy in orderly process; for the las-
dougalians the same two deprivations provided the justification for seeking le-
gitimacy in a policy analysis based on assertedly democratic values and the soft
facts of experts' opinions.
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill
Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 195, 197-98 (1980).
282. Miller, Lasswell, and McDougal refer to this symbiotic relationship as a world
,.constitutive process."
It is by agreement most broadly conceived. . . that the effective participants in
earth-space power processes establish an overall "constitutive pro-
cess"-identifying authoritative decision-makers, projecting fundamental com-
munity objectives, affording structures of authority, providing bases of power in
authority and other values, legitimizing or condemning different strategies in
persuasion and coercion, and allocating competence among effective partici-
pants over different authority functions and value interactions-for the mainte-
nance of a modest minimum order.
M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUB-
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Like Verdross, Lasswell and McDougal perceive a relationship be-
tween the existence of an international community and the inter-
national protection of humanitarian concerns. Where Verdross
justifies the protection of humanitarian concerns in terms of the
interests of such a community, however, Lasswell and McDougal
urge the development of such a community in order to insure the
protection of these concerns.2 83 While such a community is not yet
fully realized, they argue, its development can be encouraged by
strengthening existing international legal institutions. Like propo-
nents of the second argument, in other words, Lasswell and Mc-
Dougal would accord priority to formal legal institutions. They
believe that in interpreting and enforcing international agree-
ments, these institutions should seek to strengthen themselves
wherever possible.28  This entails treating agreements as void
LIC ORDER 4 (1967) (citation omitted).
[D]ecision-makers often enjoy [opportunities] to give effect to the goals of a
public order of human dignity. At the level of verbal commitment many au-
thoritative decision-makers of the contemporary world community have associ-
ated themselves with the overriding objectives of such a public order system. In
concrete controversies such decision-makers may find themselves able to bring
the facts of life more into accord with their proclaimed purposes.
Id. at 40.
283. Miller, Lasswell, and McDougal refer to these concerns as "human dignity."
Human dignity is never defined in their work on treaty interpretation, but it seems to
encompass both deference to national sovereignty, id. at 6, and the protection of human
rights in violation of national sovereignty, id. at 108. The closest thing to a definition of
human dignity is offered as "[tihe goal which envisions world social processes ordered
more by persuasion than coercion." Id. at 6. This definition, of course, might be seen to
encompass both national rights and individual rights of self determination; it obscures the
possibility that these rights might be incompatible, however. Lasswell and McDougal else-
where define human dignity as the sharing of power, respect and knowledge. Shared power
seems to require broad political participation and extensive public regulation of economic
life. Shared respect seems to involve the protection of zones of privacy. See Lasswell &
McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52
YALE L. REV. 203, 217-26 (1943). It does not take much imagination to see how these pre-
scriptions might also conflict. In any case, deference to human dignity is the governing
principle of interpretation for Lasswell, McDougal, and Miller:
It is necessary . . . to appraise the compatibility of the different objectives of
the parties with the constitutive policies of the general community and the goal
values of a public order of human dignity. Asserted objectives contrary to con-
stitutive policies should of course be rejected. In cases of conflict between as-
serted objectives, or doubt about objectives, presume in favor of objectives most
in accord with human dignity goals.
M. McDOUGAt, H. LAsswELL & J. MiLLTER, supra note 282, at 52.
284. McDougal, Lasswell, and Miller identify as a controlling purpose of "authorita-
tive decision-maker[s],"
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when they violate "the goals of public order. '28 5 Among the
"overriding community policies" to be given effect in this way is
the principle of pacta sunt servanda, with the consequence that
subsequent conflicting treaties be held void.28 6
With this last approach, modern scholars of international law
have come full circle. Like the natural law theorists, McDougal
and Lasswell are ambitious partisans of international order. Their
position on treaty conflict, like that of the natural law theorists,
plays a rhetorical and strategic role in this larger project. Their
purpose in invalidating conflicting treaties is to dramatize the
claims of the international order to authority. Like the natural law
theorists, McDougal and Lasswell place the authority of this order
above that of discrete nations. Where, however, the natural law
theorists understood the international order's authority as a limi-
tation on the sovereignty of nations, Lasswell and McDougal dis-
pense with the language of sovereignty altogether. For them, in-
ternational law is a world "constitutive process," populated by a
variety of "participants," rather than states,87 functioning to im-
the aspiration to defend and expand a social system compatible with the over-
riding objectives of human dignity. . . . [A]n authoritative decisionmaker who
lives up to his full obligation must examine the significance of every specific
controversy for the entire range of policy purposes sought by the total system
to which he is responsible.
Id. at 41.
285. Id. at 44.
286.
The former rule, as Professor Garner's Harvard Research Draft observes, is
simply one application of the principle of pacta sunt servanda: "It affirms in ef-
fect the principle that when a State has bound itself by a treaty with another
State," it cannot thereafter relieve itself of the obligations it has thereby as-
sumed by concluding a later treaty with another State under which it assumes
obligations the performance of which would involve an impairment or repudia-
tion of the obligations which it has already assumed vis-a-vis the State with
which it concluded the earlier treaty. The clearest formulation of the latter rule
has been given by McNair: "A treaty between two states the execution of which
contemplates the infliction upon a third State of what customary international
law regards as a wrong is illegal and invalid ab initio." Thus, although two states
may legally contract to change the width of their territorial waters, or to elimi-
nate existing diplomatic immunities, or to change the present rights of their
respective nationals concerning military service, confiscation of property, and so
they are at the same time not free to apply these agreements in ways to injure
non-consenting third parties.
Id. at 109.
287. Id. at 14-15.
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plement "the goals of a public order of human dignity."28 8 Lass-
well and McDougal make their vision of an international commu-
nity plausible by deliberately keeping the idea of sovereignty in
soft focus.
C. The Subordination of Sovereignty
The subordination of national sovereignty to international le-
gal institutions is implicit in the very idea of a doctrine of jus
cogens. This is true, for one, because it presumes the legitimacy
of international legal institutions as a source of objective right. As
Rozakis points out, "a significant change brought about by the ac-
ceptance of the specific function ofjus cogens by the international
legal community is the introduction of the notion of objective ille-
gality in the domain of international law."289 "This concept," he
adds, "will successfully contribute to the protection of those rules
of law which are considered indispensable for the smooth function
of the international legal system and for the well-being of the in-
ternational society." 290 The well-being of that society, he argues,
calls for "a growing institutionalization of the world commu-
nity." 1 "The introduction of the jus cogens concept," he con-
cludes, "constitutes .. .a manifestation of that institutionaliza-
tion of the international community. It undoubtedly
represents .. .a step forward toward a more centralized world
order in which the predominant interests will no longer be the
individual, egocentric aspirations of particular states." 292 The doc-
trine of jus cogens, it seems, strengthens the international legal
order by presuming its strength. Such institutions cannot be
imagined, let alone built, in a political vacuum, however. The
strengthening of international institutions entails a correlative
weakening of national ones:
[T]he introduction of the jus cogens concept in the realm of international
relations entails a significant interference of law with a field that was previ-
ously dominated by the absolute will of states, namely the field of interna-
tional agreements. The jus cogens concept considerably limits the notion of
288. Id. at 40.
289. C. ROZAKIS, supra note 85, at 19, 24, 27.
290. Id. at 27.
291. Id. at 29.




Indeed, Duguit argued, on the eve of the formation of the League
of Nations, that the identification of international law with the ob-
jective notion of right would obviate national sovereignty entirely:
There is an objective law which imposes itself upon individuals and only
upon them in their social relations and in their international relations.
There is no legal right of individuals, a power belonging to their will. A
fortiori, there is no legal right of social groups . . . . This belief in the
rights of nations . . . is a fact which the observer cannot neglect, any more
than the belief in national sovereignty. But neither the one nor the other
corresponds to anything real; scientifically, the legal rights of peoples cannot
be spoken of, because neither their personality nor the existence of legal
right can be demonstrated.2
With the decline of natural law jurisprudence, the property
conception of treaty entitlements has taken refuge in the contro-
versial doctrine of jus cogens. That doctrine may be defended
through a variety of strategies-yet each of these strategies ulti-
mately rests on the same premise. Lauterpacht argues that cus-
tomary international law may constrain national sovereignty be-
cause it is conceptually prior to national sovereignty. Rozakis
argues that customary international law may constrain sovereignty
because sovereignty has consented that it do so. Verdross argues
that customary law may constrain sovereignty because this is in
the interest of an international community which transcends sov-
ereign nations. McDougal and Lasswell argue that customary law
may constrain sovereignty because that would advance the inter-
ests of international legal institutions. Whether national sover-
eignty is viewed as subordinate to international custom as a source
of law, or as a means to the erection of an international order, the
meaning is the same. In either case, the international legal order
is the source of legitimacy. The sovereignty of nations, whether
derived conceptually or teleologically, is nevertheless derivative.
If a view of treaty entitlements as property, invested with ob-
jective right, implies the subordination of national sovereignty to
international order, one might suppose that the view that treaties
establish mere subjective liability entitlements entails the con-
verse. The next two Chapters will be devoted to exploring this
conjecture.
293. Id. at 27.
294. Duguit, Objective Law IV, supra note 209, at 256.
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VI. THE EROSION OF A PROPERTY RULE
A. Treaty Conflict Before the International Law Commission
Over the next two Chapters, we will explore the sources and
implications of a view of treaty expectations as liability entitle-
ments rather than property entitlements. Even though this view
has, in recent years, gained more acceptance than the property
view, its rationale is harder to characterize. This is in part because
the liability view has only recently been articulated. The property
view, as we have seen, was developed in an era of systematic theo-
rizing about international law, in which jurists were inclined to
make explicit the links between their views on particular doctrinal
questions and a more general normative vision of the interna-
tional system. Within the normative framework developed by the
leading natural law theorists, treaty conflict was a violation of
good morals.295 That misgivings about this position developed
during the twentieth century is evident from the unwillingness of
international tribunals to enforce it.298 These misgivings were ar-
ticulated by members of the International Law Commission in the
course of their efforts to codify the law of treaties. While the al-
ternative developed by the International Law Commission is ar-
guably a liability rule, the legislative history of this rule offers only
the barest hints as to why members of the Commission might have
found a liability rule appealing. The rule ultimately preferred by
the Commission developed piecemeal, as a gradual accretion of
exceptions and qualifications to a property rule.297 The defenses
295. This is not to say that the idea of good faith had not been introduced-indeed, it
had been present in the natural law treatises of Wolff and Vattel. See, C. WoLFF, supra note
242, at §§ 376-380, 550, 559; E. DE VATrEL, supra note 244, at §§ 219-221.
296. Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Reporter to the International Law Commission
on the Law of Treaties, noted that in both the Oscar Chinn and European Commission of the
Danube cases, the Permanent Court of International Justice was unwilling to consider the
question of treaty conflict because it was not raised by a party to only the earlier treaty. See
text accompanying notes 150-62. Waldock concluded from this that the court considered
conflicting treaties sources of liability rather than viewing them as void. If, he reasoned,
treaty conflict was a violation of a peremptory norm of international law, it would have
been incumbent upon the court to raise the issue even if the parties did not. Second Report
on the Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COM'N 56-58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1963/Add.1-3. See supra notes 159-60.
297. Some would argue that greater consistency cannot be expected of a legislature:
[One] view of the legislative process that is realistic and individualistic, assumes
that the legislature is simply a "market-like" arena in which individuals and
special interest groups trade with each other through representatives to further
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for these changes offered by their authors seem disingenuous: the
author of each successive draft of the article on conflicting treaties
claimed merely to have better realized the intentions of his prede-
cessor. The statements offered by other members of the Commis-
sion in support of these changes were laconic and vague. Working
from this scanty data, we will try to triangulate the normative van-
tage point from which treaty expectations look like they ought to
be treated as liability entitlements.
This Chapter will focus on the efforts of Special Reporters to
the International Law Commission to draft an article on treaty
conflict. It will suggest that the arguments offered by these Special
Reporters, and accepted by the Commission, become intelligible
on two assumptions: first, that the Commission declined to attri-
bute to existing institutions of international law anything like the
authority attributed to such institutions by proponents of a view
of treaty expectations as property entitlements; and second, that
the Commission assumed that a liability rule for protecting treaty
expectations would be incompatible with the development of such
institutions. In Chapter VII, we will examine the sources of the
laconic arguments made by Commission members in support of
the Special Reporters, with the aim of explaining why support for
a liability rule implies antagonism towards international authority.
B. Lauterpacht
The deliberations of the International Law Commission in
codifying the law of treaties were shaped by a series of Special
Reporters, each of whom successively prepared and defended
drafts for a convention. The first Special Reporter to approach
the problem of treaty conflict was Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, the
principal modern exponent of the property view of treaty entitle-
their own private ends. There is no "public interest," no identifiable "social
good"; there are only bargains struck between those helped by legislation and
those who are harmed. Under this "public choice" model of the legislative pro-
cess. . . it makes no sense. . . to speak of "evaluating the rationality" of legis-
lative action.
Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19 (1980), citing
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of
Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L. J. 145, 148-57 (1978). In my view, this position is
more individualistic than realistic. If the search for legislative intent is inherently futile,
individual intent proves equally elusive. The discourse of both individuals and groups is
shaped by language and culture, however, and these may be described.
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ments. In 1953, he forwarded a report to the Commission recom-
mending a property rule.298 The rule prescribed that, in general,
the latter of two conflicting treaties would be considered inva-
lid.29 9 Nevertheless, Lauterpacht permitted two exceptions which
would eventually prove to swallow the rule.
First, citing McNair, Lauterpacht allowed that a state, party
to only the second of two conflicting treaties, might be entitled to
damages if it were unaware of the conflict.300 Yet he minimized
the importance of this exception by assuming that the League of
Nations' requirement of publicity for all treaties would prevent
innocent participation in the creation of treaty conflict. 01
The second exception to a general property rule carved out
by Lauterpacht simply exempted certain types of subsequent con-
flicting treaties from the sanction of nullity. These were "multilat-
eral treaties . . . partaking of a degree of generality which im-
parts to them the character of legislative enactments properly
affecting all members of the international community or which
. . . have been concluded in the international interest. 3 0 2 It will
be recalled that Lauterpacht's contemporaries justified the jus
cogens doctrine in instrumental terms, that is, as a means of ad-
vancing the interests of the international community and preserv-
ing the integrity of institutions which advanced those interests. 303
Hence, Lauterpacht carved out an exception to his general rule,
that the obligation to obey treaties should be treated as a peremp-
tory norm of international law, for cases in which that obligation
became inconsistent with the development of new peremptory
norms.
These two exceptions were to provide opponents of Lauter-
pacht's property approach with the requisite leverage to over-
throw it.
298. Law of Treaties, [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Come.'N 90, 156, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER
A/63/1953.
299. "A treaty is void if its performance involves a breach of a treaty obligation previ-
ously undertaken by one or more of the contracting parties." Id. (text of art. 16, para. 1).
300. "A party to a treaty which has been declared void by an international tribunal on
account of its inconsistency with a previous treaty may be entitled to damages for the re-
sulting loss if it was unaware of the existence of that treaty." Id. (text of art. 16, para. 2).
301. Id. (commentary para. 3 to art. 16).
302. Id. (text of art. 16, para. 4).




In 1958, Gerald Fitzmaurice replaced Lauterpacht's property
rule with a proposal to accord "priority" to the earlier of two con-
flicting treaties.3 04 This would involve an approach intermediate
between a property and a liability rule: the state party to both
treaties would be obligated to perform the earlier treaty and to
compensate other parties to the later treaty, provided they were
unaware of the conflict. 5 Nullity would be retained as a sanction
for two exceptional classes of treaties: (1) Those "necessarily" in-
volving "direct" conflict with a prior treaty, or involving conflict
with a prior multilateral treaty that explicitly prohibited "con-
tracting out;"30 and (2) those involving conflict with a prior mul-
tilateral treaty of an "interdependent" or "integral" nature.307 By
an "interdependent" treaty, Fitzmaurice meant a treaty in which
noncompliance by any one signatory would render the entire
treaty ineffectual, such as an arms control treaty.303 By an "inte-
gral" treaty, he meant one in which the obligation to perform
would be independent of the compliance of other parties, such as
a human rights treaty.309
Fitzmaurice's proposal appears substantially consistent with
Lauterpacht's in its effect, diverging only in its point of reference.
Fitzmaurice adopted, as his general rule, the procedure recom-
mended by Lauterpacht only for the exceptional case in which the
state party solely to the later treaty is ignorant of the conflict. He
304. Law of Treaties, [1958] 2 Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 41, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
115/1958 (commentary para. 83 to art. 18) (distinction between "priority" and
"invalidity").
305.
In so far as there is any conflict, the earlier treaty prevails in the relations be-
tween the party or parties to the later treaty who also participated in the earlier
one, and the remaining party or parties to that earlier one: but the later treaty
is not rendered invalid in se and if, on account of the conflict, it cannot be or is
not carried out by the party or parties also participating in the earlier treaty,
there will arise a liability to pay damages or make other suitable reparation to
the other party or parties to the later treaty not participating in the earlier,
provided the other party concerned was not aware of the earlier treaty and of
the conflict involved.
Id. at 27 (text of art. 18, para. 6).
306. Id. (text of art. 18, para. 8).
307. Id. at 27-28 (text of art. 19).




justified this change by disputing Lauterpacht's empirical assump-
tion that such cases would be exceptional. Due to the proliferation
of treaties, Fitzmaurice argued, the U.N. requirement of publicity
of treaties could not guarantee that all parties would be aware of
potential conflict.3 10 Lauterpacht, it would seem, placed too much
reliance on the effectiveness of international institutions and insuf-
ficient weight on the complexity of the international system to suit
Fitzmaurice. As a result, instances of treaty conflict in which all
parties to the later treaty are aware of the conflict were to be con-
sidered the exception rather than the rule. In those rare in-
stances, Fitzmaurice, like Lauterpacht, would have denied liability
for damages to the other signatories of the later treaty.3 11 While
he did not explicitly recommend that the later treaty be invali-
dated in such cases, the first class of conflicts for which Fitzmau-
rice reserved the sanction of nullity was probably designed to cap-
ture these cases, and was so interpreted by Fitzmaurice's
successor.
31 2
The second class of exceptions seems to have been aimed at
reproducing Lauterpacht's special solicitude for legislative trea-
ties. Lauterpacht's proposal to exempt such treaties from the sanc-
tion of nullity was obviated by Fitzmaurice's abandonment of nul-
lity as a regular sanction. But the result was that legislative treaties
would be left with less protection against future conflict. Thus,
Fitzmaurice retained the sanction of nullity for this class of cases.
In so doing, he arguably handled conflicts involving multilateral,
"legislative" treaties in the same way as Lauterpacht.
Yet a closer examination of this point reveals the extent of his
transformation of Lauterpacht's scheme. In Lauterpacht's view,
valid treaties had to be performed, and the decision to treat subse-
quent conflicting, multilateral treaties of a legislative character as
valid implies an obligation to perform them. Fitzmaurice's
scheme, on the other hand, while recognizing the later treaty as
valid, would require the performance of the earlier one. Thus, if
310. Id. at 41-42 (commentary para. 83 to art. 18).
311. See supra note 299-301.
312. Waldock, Fitzmaurice's successor as Special Reporter, made such an interpreta-
tion when this exception was reintroduced during the International Law Commission de-
bates, after he had excised the exception from his draft of the law on treaties. Law of
Treaties, [1963] 1 Y.B. Ir'L L. CoMM'WN 201-02 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963 & Ad-




we take Fitzmaurice's notion of priority seriously, we get a result
inconsistent with Lauterpacht's concern for the development of
international institutions. However, Fitzmaurice did not himself
take the idea of priority seriously, because of his skepticism about
existing international institutions. He admitted that:
In practice . . . there may be no way of preventing the State concerned
from electing to honour the later rather than the earlier obligation. If this
occurs, the other party to the later treaty must carry out its own obligations
under the treaty, while the other party to the earlier treaty will have a right
to damages or other due reparation. This does not mean that international
law confers a "right of election," but only that, in the existing state of inter-
national organization, it may not be possible to prevent a power of election
from being in fact exercised. In these circumstances, international law predi-
cates a right to reparation in favour of whichever of the other two parties
concerned fails to obtain performance of the obligation, provided that party
was itself acting innocently and in good faith.'"
The practical effect of Fitzmaurice's proposal, in other words,
would be to place the two conflicting treaties on par with one an-
other, and to allow the party responsible for creating conflict to
decide which treaty it would honor. This means that a party to a
multilateral, legislative treaty could perform an earlier conflicting
treaty instead, and it means that a party to an ordinary treaty con-
flicting with an earlier treaty could perform the later rather than
the earlier. The same skepticism about the effectiveness of inter-
national legal institutions that caused Fitzmaurice to view most
treaty conflicts as innocent, caused him to view sanctions against
treaty conflict as mostly unenforceable. The result was the substi-
tution of a liability rule for a property rule, except for a class of
particularly apparent conflicts. 14
Even this exception for obvious conflicts seems to have been
preserved without enthusiasm. In the context of Fitzmaurice's
overall proposal it seems at best incongruous and at worst irra-
tional. If the purpose of the exception was to punish states that
knowingly formed treaties in violation of the previous obligations
of other parties, it was overinclusive: the fact that a treaty creates
obligations explicitly or "directly" prohibited by a previous treaty
does not guarantee that parties to the later treaty will be aware of
the conflict. In fact, if Fitzmaurice's empirical assumptions were
313. Law of Treaties, supra note 304, at 42 (commentary para. 85 to art. 18).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 306, 310-12.
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correct, parties to the later treaty would not likely know that it is
in "direct" conflict with another party's previous treaty obliga-
tions because they would not likely know of the previous treaty.
If, on the other hand, the purpose of the exception was to punish
states that had knowingly undertaken conflicting obligations, the
exception was underinclusive: the state creating the conflict would
likely be aware of it even if it were indirect or implicit. If nullity
was the appropriate sanction for knowingly forming a conflicting
treaty, then there was no reason to abandon a property rule.
Thus, the first exception served no purpose consistent with Fitz-
maurice's overall plan. Fitzmaurice defended it, not with argu-
ment or explanation, but merely with citation of authority.,15 All
of his analysis on this point was directed against invalidating con-
flicting treaties in regular cases, rather than for invalidating them
in exceptional cases. 16 This suggests that the exception is mere
lip service-an atheist's oath of faith, sworn on a bible he doesn't
believe in.
D. Waldock
In his initial treatment of the treaty conflict problem,
Humphrey Waldock, Fiztmaurice's successor, simplified Fitzmau-
rice's proposal by excising the sanction of nullity altogether.
Waldock recommended that in instances of conflict, the earlier
treaty "prevail" as between parties to that treaty, but that normal
rules of state responsibility with respect to treaties apply between
parties to the later treaty. 1 The one exception to this rule was
reserved for constitutive treaties of international organizations
315. Law of Treaties, supra note 304, at 43 (commentary para. 88 to art. 18).
316. Id. at 43-44 (commentary para. 89 to art. 18).
317.
(a) Where one or a group of the parties to a treaty, either alone or in conjunc-
tion with third States, enters into a later treaty, the later treaty is not invali-
dated by the fact that some or all of its provisions are in conflict with those of
the earlier treaty.
(b) in any such case the conflict between the two treaties shall be resolved-
(i) if the effectiveness of the second treaty is contested by a State party to the
earlier treaty which is not a party to the later treaty, upon the basis that the
earlier treaty prevails;
(ii) if the effectiveness of the second treaty is contested by a State which is a
party to the second treaty, upon the basis of the principles governing the inter-
pretation and application of treaties, their amendment or termination.
Second Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 296, at 53-54 (text of art. 14, para. 2).
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which limit the treatymaking powers of the members. Waldock re-
served the question whether treaties conflicting with such multi-
lateral treaties could be invalidated,318 but argued vigorously
against such a result.319 Waldock's proposal reverted to the basic
structure of Lauterpacht's original proposal, but substituted Fitz-
maurice's ambiguous notion of "priority" for Lauterpacht's con-
ception of "validity. 3 20 Only those treaties to which Lauterpacht
was willing to accord validity would now be, in principle if not in
practice, specifically performable. In contrast to Lauterpacht and
Fitzmaurice, however, Waldock argued that all the treaties in
question should be viewed as valid.
Waldock defended this position by invoking the distinction
between jus cogens, or peremptory norms, and jus dispositivum,
or conventional norms.3 21 Treaties, he implied, may not be invali-
dated for violating a norm created by treaty, else it would be im-
possible to modify treaties.322 In reasoning thus, Waldock con-
fused a consensual revision of a treaty with a unilateral breach of
treaty effected by agreement with a third party.3 23 He did this by
318. Id. at 53 (text of art. 14, para. 1 (a)).
319. Id. at 58-60 (commentary paras. 23-30 to art. 14, especially para. 25). See text
accompanying notes 326-28 for a discussion of the nature of Waldock's argument against
invalidating such treaties.
320. See supra note 304.
321. "It is undeniable that the majority of the general rules of international law do
not have [the] character [of jus cogens] and that states may contract out of them by
treaty." Id. at 53.
322. Waldock did not make this point explicitly, but he suggests that an identification
of all legal norms as peremptory would prevent inter se modification of customary law:
Unless the concept of what is "illegal under international law" is narrowed
by reference to the concept ofjus cogens, it may be too wide. The general law
of diplomatic immunities makes it illegal to do certain acts with regard to diplo-
mats; but this does not preclude individual states from agreeing between them-
selves to curtail the immunities of their own diplomats.
Id. at 53. This choice of example suggests that he viewed most customary law as involving
consensual reciprocal obligations of the sort that would ordinarily arise as a result of the
formation of a treaty. Later he divided treaties into two types: those embodying jus cogens
and those embodyingjus dispositivum. See supra note 321. The implication was that multi-
lateral treaties not embodying a peremptory norm of international law could be considered
just so many bilateral treaties, and that prohibiting inter se modification of multilateral
treaties would, in effect, mean the prohibition of consensual modification of bilateral
treaties.
323. Thus Waldock argued that inter se modification of multilateral treaties should be
permitted, on the one hand because it would not effect obligations to third parties, and on
the other hand, because it would change those obligations in accordance with the demands
of progress. Interpreting Fitzmaurice's earlier report, he wrote:
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characterizing the norm violated in treaty conflict as the specific
obligations undertaken in a treaty rather than the obligation to
perform in good faith. He assumed, without attempting to demon-
strate, that the obligation to perform treaties cannot itself be a
peremptory norm of international law.32' The invalidity of a
treaty for violation of a peremptory norm, he asserted, implies the
"illegality of the object" of the treaty, not the want of capacity to
make the treaty. 25 In other words, the treaty can only be illegal
The second treaty is only binding upon the parties to it and does not in law
diminish or affect the rights of the other States' parties to the earlier treaty. It
may do so in fact by undermining the regime of the earlier treaty and this may
in some cases raise the question of thevalidity of the second treaty. But there is,
in his view, another important consideration pointing the other way: "The
right of some of the parties to a treaty to modify or supersede it in their rela-
tions inter se is one of the chief instruments, increasingly in use today, whereby
a given treaty situation can be changed in a desirable and perhaps necessary
manner, in circumstances in which it would not be possible or would be very
difficult to obtain-initially at any rate--the consent of all the States con-
cerned. To forbid this process-or render it unduly difficult-would be in
practice to place a veto in the hands of what might often be a small minority of
parties opposing change. In the case of many important groups of treaties in-
volving a "chain" series, such as the postal conventions,. . . and other techni-
cal conventions, it is precisely by such means that new conventions are floated.
In some cases the basic instruments of the constitutions of the organizations
concerned may make provision for changes by a majority rule, but in many
cases not, so that any new or modifying system can only be put into force ini-
tially as between such parties as subscribe to it.
Second Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 296, at 56 (citation omitted). He also
insisted that in cases of this kind "it is often quite possible for the second treaty to be
applied as between its parties without disturbing the application of the earlier treaty as
between them and the other States' parties to that treaty." Id. Waldock was trying to have
it both ways.
324.
It is to be emphasized that conflict with a rule ofjus cogens is a ground of inva-
lidity quite independent of any principle governing the legal effect of treaties
that conflict with prior treaties. True, the jus cogens rule may be one that has
been embodied in a prior general multilateral treaty. Under the present article,
however, the relevant point is not the conflict with the prior general treaty, but
the conflict with the rule having the character of jus cogens." The problem of
resolving conflicts between successive treaties dealing with the same matters
may sometimes overlap with the question of conflict with a jus cogens. rule; but
the rule in the present article is an overriding one of international public order,
which invalidates the later treaty independently of any conclusion that may be
reached concerning the relative priority to be given to treaties whose provisions
conflict.
Id. at 53.
325. Article 13 of Waldock's draft deals with treaties that are void for illegality. The
general principle of this article is that "[a] treaty is contrary to international law and void if
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because of the type of obligation it creates, not because of the
identity of the obligated state; for example, a separate peace
agreement could be invalidated for infringing a state's inalienable
right of collective self-defense, but could not be invalidated for
conflict with a particular mutual defense pact. Waldock's implicit
image of a peremptory norm was one that established an inaliena-
ble entitlement, not a property entitlement. In his view, the capac-
ity to make conflicting treaties could not be alienated; thus, a
treaty which purported to preclude future conflicting treaties
would itself presumably violate a peremptory norm.
Accordingly, Waldock was unwilling to give effect to the pro-
visions of multilateral, "legislative" treaties that would limit the
treatymaking capacities of such parties. 26 In his view, only when
international legislation embodied a peremptory norm could it be
protected by the sanction of nullity. Thus, Waldock thought that
the United Nations Charter, and some of the treaties referred to
by Fitzmaurice as "integral," might be protected by this sanction
if these treaties were viewed as embodying peremptory norms.3 27
The nullity of the conflicting treaties would, however, be pre-
mised on the violation of the norm, not on the violation of a
treaty.
Waldock apparently did not expect the type of treaty referred
to by Fitzmaurice as "interdependent" (e.g., arms control agree-
ments) to embody such peremptory norms. Nevertheless, he ex-
its object or its execution involves infringement of a general rule or principle of interna-
tional law having the character of jus cogens." Id. at 52-60. Article 14-3(a), which reserves
the question of the validity of treaties violating a provision of a legislative treaty that limits
the treaty making powers of the parties, does not refer to the ideas ofjus cogens, which is
instead discussed in Article 14-4. Id. at 54. Article 14-3(a), claimed Waldock, referred to "a
question of capacity, not invalidity." Id. at 60.
326. Id. at 60.
327. Waldock took the view that Article 103 of the Charter
does not pronounce the invalidity of treaties between Member States conflicting
with the Charter, but only that in the event of a conflict between the obliga-
tions of Members of the United Nations under the Charter and their obliga-
tions under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
Charter are to prevail. The rationale of Article 103 clearly is that priority is to
be given to the Charter, not that invalidity is to attach to a treaty which con-
flicts with it.
Id. at 55. Elsewhere, he suggested that some provisions of the Charter might embody pe-
remptory norms. Id. at 52. He acknowledged that Lord McNair viewed treaties conflicting
with the Charter as void for want of capacity, but declined to accept McNair's view. Id. at
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pressed the view that the recognition of conflicting treaties would
facilitate rather than retard such international legislation. 2 The
implicit assumption is that the formation of new treaties will be of
greater value to international order than the preservation of ex-
isting ones. This judgment seems consistent with Fitzmaurice's
skepticism about the effectiveness of international legal institu-
tions. If the international legal system has not yet developed
strong institutions, it may lack not only the requisite legitimacy to
preserve the status quo, but an incentive to do so.
Waldock rejected the first class of exceptions recognized by
Fitzmaurice on the ground that it was overinclusive 2 All treaties
forbid the formation of inconsistent treaties, he argued, whether
or not they do so explicitly. 330 Similarly, he argued, the terms
"necessary" and "direct" would not exclude any instance of treaty
conflict that was likely to become controversial.3 31 If, therefore,
one were to take seriously Fitzmaurice's proposal to nullify all
treaties violating an explicit prohibition in a previous treaty, or
otherwise conflicting "necessarily and directly" with a previous
treaty, the result would be the reintroduction of the sanction of
nullity for all instances of treaty conflict which might matter to
someone. While we have speculated that Fitzmaurice introduced
this exception in order to create the appearance of fidelity to Lau-
terpacht's property rule, Waldock rejected it for precisely this rea-
son. The retention of such an exception would have frustrated
Fitzmaurice's proposed substitution of remedial priority for Lau-
terpacht's attribution of exclusive validity to temporally prior
treaties. Waldock could therefore justify the excision of this ex-
ception from Fitzmaurice's plan on the principle of fidelity to his
predecessor's intention-the same principle that compelled Fitz-
maurice to insert the exception in the first place.3 2
328. See supra notes 307-08 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 305-06, 315-16 and accompanying text.
330. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 296, at 57-58 (commentary
para. 19 to art. 14).
331. Id.
332.
[I]f the general view be adopted-as it was by the previous special Rap-
porteur-that a later treaty concluded between a limited group of the parties to
a multilateral treaty is not normally rendered void by the fact that it conflicts
with the earlier treaty, his second tentative exception to the rule does not ap-
pear to justify itself.
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This maneuver of Waldock's met with resistance in the delib-
erations of the International Law Commission. The proposal that
treaties necessarily involving a direct conflict with a previous
treaty be nullified was reintroduced by Eduardo Jimines de
Ar~chaga of Uruguay and Rhadabinhod Pal of India, supported
by a citation to Lauterpacht.333 Waldock absorbed this proposal by
interpreting it as a device aimed at discouraging deliberate com-
plicity in the creation of treaty conflict, rather than an effort to
resuscitate a general conception of treaties as property entitle-
ments. 334 In his subsequent revision of the draft article on treaty
conflict, he reintroduced a special exception that appeared to be
responsive to this concern, but he did so in a context which de-
prived the exception of any consequence.
Waldock's revised position was that the earlier treaty "pre-
vailed" as between parties to the earlier treaty and that the later
treaty "prevailed" as between parties to the later treaty, unless the
party not party to the earlier treaty was aware of the earlier
treaty.33 5 This exception does not imply that the conflicting treaty
is void, but merely that it does not "prevail" between the parties.
Based on the usage established in previous drafts, this means that
the later treaty would not be even in principle specifically enforce-
able. Yet this interpretation does not distinguish such treaties
from any other treaties considered by Waldock. According to his
333. The amendment would have added the following sentence to 14-2(a):
Provided, however, that if the later treaty necessarily involves for the parties to
it action in direct breach of their obligations under the earlier treaty, of such a
kind as to frustrate the object and purpose of the earlier treaty, then any party
to it whose interests are seriously affected shall be entitled to invoke the nullity
of the second treaty.
Law of Treaties, [1963] 1 Y.B. INV'L L. COMM'N 196, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963 &
Addenda.
334. Id. at 201.
335. Article 65-4:
When two treaties are in conflict and the parties to the later treaty do not in-
clude all the parties to the earlier treaty -
(a) as between a state party to both treaties and a state party only to the
earlier treaty, the earlier treaty prevails;
(b) as between states parties to both treaties, the later treaty prevails;
(c) as between a state party to both treaties and a state party only to the later
treaty, the later treaty prevails unless the second state was aware of the exis-
tence of the earlier treaty and that it was still in force with respect to the first
state.
Law of Treaties, [1964] Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 35, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1964/Add.I.
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revised proposal, neither conflicting treaty can be specifically en-
forced because each "prevails" between the parties to it. If
"prevails" had continued to mean "specifically enforceable," then
Waldock's proposal would have required that both conflicting trea-
ties be specifically performed-a logical impossibility. Waldock ap-
parently abandoned the notion that any treaty could be specifically
enforced. Under these circumstances, it is hard to tell what the
difference is between treaties that "prevailed" and those that
didn't. Waldock's justification of this result was the principle, em-
bodied in Article 34 of the final draft of the Vienna Convention,
that "a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a
third state without its consent."3' On this basis, he argued, the
earlier treaty should not diminish the enforceability of the later
treaty.
In the Commission's deliberations, both supporters and oppo-
nents of a property rule pointed out that the result of Waldock's
proposed rule was that, in the event of conflict, neither treaty had
priority over the other, since the party obligated under both could
decide which treaty to perform and which to breach. 37 The con-
sensus arose that the rule could only be sensibly interpreted as a
general liability rule. On the basis of this consensus, the Drafting
Committee substituted the phrase "governs their mutual rights
and obligations" for "prevails" in the draft finally adopted by the
Commission. 8 Supporters of this result argued that it would fa-
cilitate state autonomy 39 and the "progressive development of in-
336. S. ROSFNNE, supra note 26, at 224.
337. Law of Treaties, [1964] 1 Y.B. Ir'L L. COMM'N 120, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/
186/1964 (Verdross of Austria, supporting Waldock); id. at 123, 130 (de Ar&haga of Uru-
guay, objecting to Waldock's proposal); id. at 127 (Reuter of France, supporting a simpli-
fied version of Waldock's proposal); id. at 128 (Yasseen of Iraq, supporting simplification);
id. at 131 (Ago of Italy, and Waldock himself, both supporting a simplification).
338. Law of Treaties, [1966] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMW'N (pt. 2) 212, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/
SER.A/186/1966 & Addenda. See Third Report on the Law of Treaties, [1964] 2 Y.B.
IN'L L. COMM'N 40, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/167/1964 & Add.1-3 (commentary para.
22 to art. 65) (defining "prevails" and "applies").
339. Barto of Yugoslavia commented that:
He had no wish to encourage States to act in bad faith, but he believed that in
order to meet the needs of ordinary political life and facilitate international
relations, States should not be obliged to remain bound by vestiges of treaties
that were still formally in force, but no longer corresponded to reality. A State
must be free to exercise its treaty-making capacity, subject only to the proviso
that in doing so it engaged its international responsibility.
Law of Treaties, [1964] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 126, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/167/1964
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ternational law."3 0 Some argued against any exception to this
rule for deliberately created treaty conflict, on the ground that
such an exception would undermine the rule. The basis of this
argument was an empirical assumption that the exception would
apply to most cases of treaty conflict-that the case it described,
in other words, was the rule and not the exception. 41 This empir-
ical assumption, which they used to justify the expulsion of the
last vestiges of a property rule from the regulation of treaty con-
flict, was the assumption which Lauterpacht had originally used to
justify a property rule. 42 It was by means of the rejection of this
assumption that Fitzmaurice had justified the rejection of Lauter-
pacht's proposed property rule.343
Yet Fitzmaurice's rejection of Lauterpacht's assumption had
been based on a skepticism about international institutions which
the Commission retained. This skepticism had in fact blossomed
from a belief that these institutions could not prevent inadvertent
conflict to a belief that they could not prevent deliberate conflict.
Where Fitzmaurice merely questioned the efficacy of international
law, Waldock and his supporters seemed to question its legitimacy.
This increased skepticism explains the shift in attitude towards
Lauterpacht's empirical assumption that most treaty conflict was
deliberate. For Lauterpacht, treaty conflict was deviant and will-
ful, but infrequent and preventable. For Fitzmaurice, by contrast,
treaty conflict was deviant but inadvertent, frequent, and unpre-
ventable. Both thinkers, however, viewed damages as only appro-
priate to compensate innocent third parties-victims of bad faith.
Their disagreement concerned how often the occasion for dam-
ages was likely to arise. In Waldock's view, however, treaty con-
flict was frequent and generally willful, but normal and not in
need of prevention. His defense of a liability rule, therefore, fo-
[hereinafter cited as Law of Treaties, [1964]]. For similar statement by Barto, see Law of
Treaties, [1963] 1 Y.B. IiNr'L L. COMM'N 200, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/156/1963. Such a
sentiment was expressed by de Luna of Spain in Law of Treaties, [1966] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N (pt. 2) 98, 102, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/186/1966 & Addenda.
340. Law of Treaties, [1964] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 126, 128, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/
SER.A/167/1964 (comment of de Luna of Spain at para. 26). See also Law of Treaties ,
[1963] 1 Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 88, 199, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/156/1963 & Addenda (com-
ments of Yasseen of Iraq).
341. Law of Treaties, [1964], supra note 339, at 129 (comment of Liu of Taiwan at
para. 34); id. at 130 (comment of Rosenne of Israel at para. 41).
342. See supra text accompanying notes 300-01.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 310-11.
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cused on a different feature of such a rule than did Fitzmaurice's.
For Waldock, the key advantage of a liability rule lay not with its
capacity to compensate innocent victims of treaty conflict, but in
its capacity to empower the perpetrators of treaty conflict. Thus,
Waldock and his supporters defended a liability rule on the
grounds that it would facilitate state autonomy and systemic flexi-
bility, but not on grounds of equity.
The approach to treaty conflict ultimately chosen by the
Commission leaves the rights of potential victims of treaty conflict
unclear. While Waldock argued patiently that the second of two
conflicting treaties should receive as much protection as the first,
he was careful never to specify what sort of protection that might
be. Fitzmaurice had assumed that reparation was the appropriate
remedy for treaty breach; Waldock, however, avoided mention of
any specific remedy, referring only to "liability" or "state respon-
sibility for breach."13 4 This approach was ultimately followed by
the International Law Commission in its treatment of treaty con-
flict. The specification of remedies was left to other sections of the
Convention.34 5 These sections establish a procedure for non-bind-
ing conciliation for disputes arising from breach. Assuming that
this procedure was invoked and that its results were abided by, it
could generate any remedy for breach, including damages or spe-
cific performance. 48 Moreover, if a dispute over breach involves a
344. Third Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 338, at 40 (comment at para.
22); Law of Treaties, [1964] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 126, 132, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/
167/1964 (comment at para. 64).
345. The article ultimately adopted by the Commission read in pertinent part as
follows:
4. (b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party only to the
earlier treaty, the earlier treaty governs their mutual rights and obligations.
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to... any question of the termination or
suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 57 or to any question of
responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of
a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards
another State under another treaty.
S. RosauNE, supra note 26, at 208-10.
346. Article 66(b) provides that either of the parties to a dispute concerning the ter-
mination of a treaty may set in motion a formal procedure for conciliation, described in an
Annex to Article 66. See id. at 336-42. Paragraphs 4 through 6 of this Annex set forth the
powers of the conciliating body so established:
4. The Commission may draw the attention of the parties to the dispute to
any measures which might facilitate an amicable settlement.
5. The Commission shall hear the parties, examine the claims and objec-
tions, and make proposals to the parties with a view to reaching an amicable
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peremptory norm, it may be brought before the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.) by any of the parties. It is conceivable,
though unlikely, that this court could declare the good faith ob-
servance of treaties a peremptory norm in a dispute involving
treaty conflict.3 47
Assuming that the scheme set forth in the convention would
provide some protection for treaty entitlements, it is not clear that
it would be in the form of liability rather than property entitle-
ments. In fact, it is unlikely that this scheme would provide any
protection at all against treaty conflict. Under this plan, neither
informal conciliation nor I.C.J. adjudication could be initiated un-
less one party announces its intention to terminate a treaty, and
the other party objects.3' This means that if the breaching party
settlement of the dispute.
6. The Commission shall report within twelve months of its constitution. Its
report shall be deposited with the Secretary General and transmitted to the
parties to the dispute. The report of the Commission, including any conclusions
stated therein regarding the facts or questions of law, shall not be binding upon
the parties and it shall have no other character than that of recommendations
submitted for the consideration of the parties in order to facilitate an amicable
settlement of the dispute.
Id. at 342.
347. Article 66(a) provides for I.C.J. adjudication of disputes involving jus cogens at
the request of either one of the parties. Such a dispute could arise in the context of treaty
conflict in one of two ways: A party could announce an intention to terminate the latter of
two conflicting treaties on the ground that it was invalidated by a "peremptory norm" of
good faith performance of treaties. If the other party objected, either could bring it before
the I.C.J. On the other hand, a party to conflicting treaties could announce an intention to
terminate the first in order to permit performance on the second; if another party to the
first objected on the ground that performance of the first would violate a peremptory
norm, either party to that treaty could bring the dispute before the I.C.J. Article 53 de-
fines a peremptory norm as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international commu-
nity as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted." Id. at 290. Presumably,
th* fact that Article 30 treats subsequent conflicting treaties as valid implies that the princi-
ple of good faith observance of treaties was not viewed as a peremptory norm of interna-
tional law by the International Law Commission. Nevertheless, Article 64 provides that
"[i]f a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty
which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates." Id. at 330. Of course,
given the I.L.C.'s criterion for a peremptory norm, as long as the scholarly and diplomatic
community remains divided over the question of treaty conflict, it would be inappropriate
for the I.C.J. to recognize the obligation to perform treaties as a peremptory norm.
348. Article 60, cited in paragraph 5 of Article 30, provides only that in the event of
breach, an injured party may unilaterally terminate or suspend the treaty. Id. at 314-16.
Article 65-3 and Article 66 together provide for formal conciliation of a dispute, according
to the procedure described in the Annex to Article 66, only if one party objects to an-
other's proposed termination or suspension of a treaty. Id. at 334-36.
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does not acknowledge its intention to breach, an injured party's
only remedy is unilateral termination of the treaty-a result to
which a breaching party may well be indifferent. Under such cir-
cumstances there is effectively no sanction for breach.
The effect of Waldock's attack on the property conception of
treaty entitlements was to undermine their status as entitlements
altogether, reopening the question as to whether treaty conflict is
in fact illegal at all. While attributing the purpose of establishing a
general liability rule to Fitzmaurice, Waldock abandoned the fea-
ture of such a rule-compensation of victims-that originally rec-
ommended it to Fitzmaurice.
E. Patterns of Interpretation in the International Law Commission
Debates
Waldock's misreading of Fitzmaurice's position reenacts Fitz-
maurice's earlier misreading of Lauterpacht's position. In each
case, recognition of treaties as liability entitlements was inter-
preted as reflecting an intention to recognize the validity of a con-
flicting treaty.
Lauterpacht's position attributes exclusive validity to the ear-
lier of two conflicting treaties. The damages he would allow an
innocent party to a conflicting treaty are based on a breach of
good faith, not based on the existence of a second valid treaty, for
a valid treaty would be specifically enforceable. Lauterpacht, in
short, proposed a liability rule for the purpose of occasionally pro-
tecting reliance, as a supplement to a property rule which would
protect treaty entitlements; but he did not propose that the later
treaty be recognized as valid.
Fitzmaurice, however, interpreted this proposal as reflecting
an intention to recognize conflicting treaties as valid, but
subordinate to earlier treaties. This entailed a view of treaty enti-
tlements as being sometimes property entitlements and sometimes
liability entitlements, depending on the circumstances; thus, if a
treaty could not be specifically enforced for any reason, it could
be enforced by a damage remedy. Fitzmaurice gave what he called
"priority" to the earlier of two treaties, but seemed to view the
property and liability conceptions of treaty entitlements as equally
valid.
Waldock in turn interpreted Fitzmaurice's proposal as reflect-
ing an intention to accord equal validity to each of the two con-
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flicting treaties, which meant that treaty entitlements could at best
be protected by only a liability rule. There are two ways of under-
standing this result: We may understand it as a preference in prin-
ciple for a liability rule, rarely enforceable in practice; alterna-
tively, we may understand it as a rejection of both rules in favor of
an approach affording treaty expectations no protection.
Let us assume that Waldock interprets his predecessors as
favoring a liability rule. In this case, the liability rule, originally
introduced as a supplement to a property rule, has replaced it en-
tirely. The mechanism for effecting this change was a process of
identifying a contradiction within an existing position and inter-
preting it as a frustrated intention. The choice between a view of
treaty expectations as property entitlements and a view of treaty
expectations as liability entitlements involves a choice between the
exclusive validity of the first treaty and the equal validity of both.
In their reports to the International Law Commission, Waldock
and Fitzmaurice identified ambivalence between the property view
(which attributes validity to the first treaty) and the liability view
(which attributes validity to the second treaty) with indifference as
to which of the two treaties should be performed. As a result, am-
bivalence between the property and liability views has been inter-
preted as an attribution of equal validity to both treaties; yet the
equal validity of both treaties would entail a view of treaty expec-
tations as liability entitlements. As a consequence, the very pres-
ence of disagreement between proponents of the property and lia-
bility views has been offered as an argument in support of the
liability view. Accordingly, Waldock interpreted the international
court's evasion of the treaty conflict problem as a rejection of the
property view.3 9 Doctrinal conflict has thus been marshalled to
legitimate treaty conflict.3 50
Why was such an argument persuasive to the International
Law Commission? We can see the appeal of this argument if we
assume that the success of the property view requires that it com-
349. See supra notes 159, 160 & 296.
350. A connection between doctrinal conflict (scholarly disagreement between the
property and liability views of treaty entitlements) and the encouragement of treaty conflict
(the triumph of the liability view) is built into the International Law Commission's criterion
for recognition of a peremptory norm of international law. Since the I.L.C. requires that
such norms be recognized as such "by the international community for states as a whole,"
see supra note 347, disagreement over whether the obligation to perform treaties is a pe-
remptory norm of international law precludes it from being accepted as such.
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mand nearly universal support. Such a constraint was foisted upon
proponents of the property view as a result of the ambivalent atti-
tude the International Law Commission had adopted toward the
doctrine of jus cogens.
Recall that enthusiasts of this doctrine ground it in the
supremacy of international law. National sovereignty, they claim,
is conditioned upon compliance with international law. The legiti-
macy of international law is rooted in the will of an international
community characterized by common interests and shared values.
On controversial questions of international law, such a community
has no voice. Norms commanding wide support, however, reflect
the will of this community. Acts violating such norms are, in turn,
invalid. Enthusiasts of the doctrine of jus cogens have often
viewed the obligation to perform treaties as a peremptory norm,
because it commands such wide support.
The International Law Commission did not reject the possi-
bility of peremptory norms in principle, but it rejected the notion
that the values of an international community place any limitation
on the sovereignty of states. Accordingly, it refused to recognize
as peremptory those norms generally adhered to by the interna-
tional community. Instead, it decided to recognize as peremptory
only those norms adhered to and recognized as peremptory by "the
international community of states." '51 This means that the
treatymaking capacities of a state may not be limited unless virtu-
ally all states agree to be so limited. The validity of peremptory
norms is dependent upon convention, rather than the other way
around; similarly, the authority of international law is dependent
upon the sovereignty of states rather than vice versa.
Given this criterion for the recognition of peremptory norms,
it is easy to see why ambivalence as between the property and lia-
bility views could be interpreted in favor of the liability view. The
property view is dependent upon the claim that performance of
treaties is a peremptory norm of international law. Ambivalence
about the property view in the reports to the International Law
Commission reflected disagreement within the Commission as to
whether the obligation to perform treaties was a peremptory
norm. According to the Commission's criteria for the recognition
of peremptory norms, therefore, the obligation to observe treaties
351. See supra note 347 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
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could not be a peremptory norm. On the assumption that strong
institutions of international law were lacking, the presence of sub-
stantial support for the liability view seemed to disqualify the
property view in favor of the liability view.
Yet Waldock's final proposal may be understood as not so
much a rejection of a property rule in favor of a liability rule as a
decision not to protect treaty entitlements at all. Such a result
could be defended as a synthesis of both positions. This argument
would involve identifying the property view with support for
strong institutions of international law. Proceeding from such an
assumption, Waldock and Fitzmaurice interpreted the proscrip-
tion of treaties conflicting with prior treaties as reflecting an in-
tention to render unenforceable treaties conflicting with legisla-
tive treaties establishing international institutions. The choice of a
property rule for effectuating this purpose, however, reflects an
empirical assumption: only if such institutions have already been
formed by treaty will a property rule protect them. This assump-
tion-that strong institutions of international law already ex-
ist-is one that we have already identified with the property view;
it is also one that the International Law Commission rejected. Ac-
cordingly, Fitzmaurice rejected a property rule, but accepted the
principle that any treaty conflicting with a legislative
treaty-whether a prior one or a subsequent one-should not be
enforced. Waldock retained this principle, but synthesized it with
a principle supported by proponents of a liability rule: that two
conflicting treaties should both be equally enforceable. The result
was a scheme which arguably equalized conflicting treaties by ren-
dering all treaties unenforceable. The goal of establishing strong
institutions of international law would seem to preclude liability
for breach of treaty.
In Chapter V, we saw that a view of treaties as property enti-
tlements seemed to rest upon an assumption that national sover-
eignty was a creature of international law. In this Chapter, we saw
that the International Law Commission seemed to reject this as-
sumption. Given that international law could not dictate the will
of states, the presence of substantial support for a liability rule
seemed to discredit the view of treaty expectations as property en-
titlements. Yet the rejection of a property rule does not automati-
cally entail the acceptance of a liability rule, and it is not clear that
a liability rule is what the International Law Commission adopted.
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The normative case for a liability rule must involve something
more than the claim that the institutions of international law are
not sufficiently potent to enforce a property rule, since such an
argument could be turned against a liability rule with equal effect.
Thus the International Law Commission's rejection of the prem-
ises of the property view does not really tell us that much about
the premises of the liability view. More intriguing is the fact that
they seemed willing to accept the assumption that a liability rule
would be inconsistent with the project of developing potent insti-
tutions of international law. In the next Chapter, we will explore
the normative vision which apparently inspires support for a liabil-
ity rule, and sketch the social conditions under which that vision is
incompatible with potent institutions of international law.
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VII. THE NATIONALIST DILEMMA: LIABILITY RULE OR LAISSEZ
FAIRE?
A. Rationalizing Breach
We have seen that a venerable tradition of academic writers
on international law has viewed the treaty to break a treaty as
void ab initio, and has based this conclusion on the assumption
that international law was the ultimate source of municipal law.
We have also seen the International Law Commission reject this
view. The rule adopted by the Commission, however, is ambigu-
ous: it may be understood either to recognize treaty expectations
as liability entitlements, or to deny them recognition as entitle-
ments in any form. Moreover, the Commission members seemed
to assume that the latter interpretation was more compatible with
the development of vital international institutions. In this Chap-
ter, we will explore the origins of the arguments given by Com-
mission members in support of the Commission's solution to the
treaty conflict problem, with a view to accomplishing two objec-
tives: first, to distinguish which arguments support the recognition
of treaty expectations as liability entitlements and which do not;
second, to determine in what sense the view of treaty expectations
as liability entitlements is antagonistic to the development of in-
ternational institutions.
Whether the solution adopted by the Commission is con-
strued as a liability rule or a regime of laissez faire in treaty rela-
tions, it faces one crucial difficulty: it implicitly condones breach.
A regime of laissez faire would mean that breaches would not be
punished; but even a liability rule means more breaches than a
property rule, since it gives promisors the option to perform or
pay damages. Thus, supporters of the Commission's approach had
to counter the argument that it would undermine the order, sta-
bility, and predictability of international relations sought by pro-
ponents of a property rule. They did so by identifying three types
of values maintained by breach: (1) the interests of the breaching
promisor, generally referred to in terms of the principle of "state
autonomy"; (2) the relationship embodied in the latter of two con-
flicting treaties, generally referred to in terms of the principle of
"good faith"; and (3) the development of new international insti-
tutions, generally referred to in terms of the "progressive devel-
opment of international law."
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Members of the International Law Commission did not ex-
plain these principles or the relationship among them. In this
Chapter, I will show that these three principles can be understood
as different aspects of a tradition of political theory associated
with European nationalism. Seen from this standpoint, the princi-
ple of state autonomy involves the rejection of international au-
thority, but can be viewed as consistent with either a liability rule
or a regime of laissez faire governing treaty relations. The princi-
ple of good faith mandates a liability rule, while the principle of
progressive development mandates a regime of laissez faire. I will
argue that within the world view of European nationalism, inter-
national relations based on good faith are possible, but can not be
universalized. From such a perspective, international relations
may be divided into relations of mutuality based on good faith,
and unregulated relations of exploitation. As a result, the appar-
ent ambivalence of the International Law Commission between a
liability rule and a regime of laissez faire can be explained as a
reflection of a nationalist perspective on international relations.
B. State Autonomy: An Inalienable Entitlement
Solicitude for the interests of breaching promisors expressed
itself in the Commission's deliberations as a commitment to state
autonomy. 52 The term "autonomy," closely identified with the
concept of sovereignty, might be taken to mean that a state may
do whatever is in its power and need answer to no one. Given the
purpose of Commission members in using the term, however,
such an interpretation will not do. Commission -members invoked
this term in support of a liability rule, and against a property rule.
A liability rule restricts a state's actions in ways that a property
rule does not. Let us imagine that two states wish to enter an
agreement enforceable by money damages (assuming that an insti-
tution exists which could enforce such a sanction). They could do
so under a property rule by drafting a treaty requiring each party
either to perform certain actions or to pay the other a specified
fee. Now, let us suppose instead that they wish to enter an agree-
ment that is specifically enforceable; that is, they wish to alienate
their capacities to breach or to enter conflicting treaties. Under a
liability rule, they may not do this; such a rule requires that the
352. See supra note 339.
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capacity to make and break treaties be inalienable. When invoked
in support of a liability rule, a term like "state autonomy" or
"state sovereignty" represents an inalienable entitlement.
The function of "state autonomy" in a defense of a liability
rule can be understood by analogizing it to the value of personal
liberty in the jurisprudence of contract law. While contracts for
the disposition of real property have been the paradigmatic con-
texts for specific enforcement in all legal systems, contracts for
personal service have been the least controversial arena for the
substitution of money damages as a remedy.30 The practice of ex-
empting such contracts from specific performance can be traced
to Roman law, but was only rediscovered with the ultimate repu-
diation of feudalism in the nineteenth century. In France, the Ro-
man law doctrine was dusted off by scholars and inserted into the
Code Civil.35' In America, a similar doctrine was identified with
the natural law tradition of antipathy toward contracts of enslave-
ment.3 55 In each case, the rationale for barring specific enforce-
ment of a personal service contract was the protection of personal
liberty, even against consensual alienation.
Within the natural law tradition, liberty of person was viewed
as an inalienable entitlement having priority over liberty of con-
tract. Defining liberty of person largely in terms of bodily integ-
rity and personal mobility, Locke and Blackstone viewed it as a
fundamental natural right.356 Liberty of contract, by contrast, rep-
resented a distinct and even antithetical principle. For Locke, the
natural liberty to dispose of one's property and person was con-
strained by a natural obligation to preserve that same liberty
which proscribed its permanent alienation. 57 For Blackstone, the
353. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 495 (1959).
354. Id.
355. The Case of Mary Clark, a Woman of Color, I Blackf. 122, 139 (Ind. 1821).
356. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130-34; J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
CIWL GOVERNMENT paras. 22, 23 (1948) (Ist ed. London 1690).
357. "But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man
in that state has an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has
not liberty to destroy himself .... " J. LOCKE, supra note 356, at para. 6.
This freedom from absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to, and closely
joined with, a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it but by what for-
feits his preservation and life together. For a man not having the power of his
own life cannot by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to anyone, nor
put himself under the absolute arbitrary power of another to take away his life
when he pleases.
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right of contract was a civil right, derivative from the institutions
of civil society. These institutions, established to protect property,
implied a partial alienation of personal liberty.358
Charles Beitz has argued that defenses of state autonomy in
modern international legal discourse have been based on an anal-
ogy between states and individuals. States are viewed as having an
inalienable right to protect their own national interests, he has ar-
gued, in an analogy to the individual rights of life and personal
liberty recognized by the natural law tradition.35 9 Gary Wills
would reverse this analogy:
A human right is now most often thought of as a power the individual re-
tains over-against the state. But its earlier use was a power exercised in the
name of the state. "Right" was right order, the rectum or directum. It was the
power of dominion or position ....
Insofar as a sovereign had right or rule over something, it was properly
his (proprium), an alienum to others. To transfer, he must "alien" it-and
the juridical literature first used "alienable" about the power to surrender
territory or peoples while retaining rule over the proprium. Fiefs and do-
mains were defined in terms of their alienability from the prince or crown.
The same legal language was used for any title-transfer over an estate or
property. . .. Whatever subsidiary holdings might be disposed of, the sov-
ereign could never alien the realm's very substance.360
Regardless of which came first, the recognition of state au-
tonomy and personal liberty as inalienable have a common heri-
Id. at para. 23.
358.
The original of private property is probably founded in nature, as will be more
fully explained in the second book of the ensuing commentaries: but certainly
the modifications under which we at present find it, the method of conserving it
in the present owner, and of translating it from man to man, are entirely de-
rived from society; and are some of those civil advantages, in exchange for
which every individual has resigned a part of his natural liberty.
W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 356, at 134.
359.
Perceptions of international relations have been more thoroughly influenced by
the analogy of states and persons than by any other device. The conception of
international relations as a state of nature could be viewed as an application of
this analogy. Another application is the idea that states, like persons, have a
right to be respected as autonomous entities. This idea, which dates from the
writings of Wolff, Pufendorf, and Vattel, is a main element of the morality of
states and is appealed to in a variety of controversies in international politics.
C. BErrz, supra note 135, at 69.
360. G. WILLS, INVENTING AmucA: JEFFERsoN's DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 213
(1979).
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tage in the Aristotelian conception of nature. For Aristotle, the
life of an organism consisted of a patterned activity that was char-
acteristic of its species, but peculiar to itself. Preserving life meant
preserving this characteristic activity. Thus, nature endowed all
living organisms with an imperative not only to preserve them-
selves, but to preserve their identities. All subsequent invocations
of inalienable "natural" right have drawn on this conception of
nature. Natural "rights" are inalienable because natural "right"
imposes a duty on all beings to keep whatever they need in order
to remain what they are. These needs define an organism's ina-
lienable natural rights. For Aristotle, it was the nature of human
beings to live politically. Human beings could not achieve their
full nature outside of a political community and such a commu-
nity-a state-was a living organism with its own particular na-
ture."'1 Both state and individual were equally under obligation to
nature to preserve their own identities, and for Aristotle (though
not necessarily for subsequent thinkers) these two projects mutu-
ally implicated one another. Human beings were trustees of na-
ture's bounty, and their self-dominion, whether individual or col-
lective, was inalienable for that reason. If autonomy consists of the
fulfillment of one's nature, it entails responsibilities. Aristotle's
conception of autonomy as a duty rather than a license explains its
inalienability.
Aristotle's image of the state as an organism was modeled on
the Greek polis, an intimate republic characterized by broad citi-
zen involvement in political and cultural life. The notion that the
state was an organism, obliged to fulfill its own nature as well as
that of its citizens, reflected a belief that the virtue of a state
rested upon the integrity of its particular culture. Political wisdom
in the wake of the Peloponnesian War counseled insularity, as
Athenian imperialism had recently brought disaster not only on
Athens, but on all of Greece. James B. White recounts that:
Thucydides explains ... [the] wave of civil war [that followed the Pelopon-
nesian War] . . . [as] the direct result of the war between Athens and
Sparta, because without such a war the factions within a city would have no
pretext for calling in outsiders, nor were outsiders necessarily ready to act;
but the disaffected party could always appeal to the power with whom their
city was not allied, who would always intervene.3 8 2
361. G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 119-22 (1961).
362. J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 81 (1984).
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Treatymaking not only increased a republic's dependence on its
friends, it invited intervention by their enemies. Moreover, the
possibility of treaty conflict-alliance with two states whose inter-
ests come into conflict-threatened the republic with internal
conflict. The republic's obligation to maintain its integrity re-
stricted its authority to make treaties.
Aristotle's conception of the state as an organism was inappli-
cable to an empire governing many peoples. As a consequence,
the stoic philosophers of the Hellenistic empires abandoned his
conception of human nature as communal in favor of a concep-
tion of human nature at once more universal and individual.
6
For the Romans of the Empire, human nature was realized
through introspection, asceticism, and obedience to authority; Ro-
man virtue was stoic rather than civic, individual rather than col-
lective.' The role of the state could still be conceived as the real-
ization of human nature, but that nature required the
demarcation of a realm of privacy. Hence Roman law introduced
the distinction between public law and private law, and erected
within the latter category an elaborate system for the protection
and transfer of property. The empire was conceived of, like other
corporate bodies in Roman law, as an artificial person, rather than
an organism.36 5 It was distinct from its citizens and exercised un-
reviewable discretion to legislate their behavior: "[T]hat which
seems good to the Emperor has also the force of law." Neverthe-
less, it legislated on behalf of the people; it represented them:
"For the people, by the Lex Regia, which is passed to confer on
him his power, make over to him their whole power and author-
ity."3 6 As a result of this concession, the emperor ruled the em-
363. See G. SABINE, supra note 361, at 141 (rise of conceptions of individual and of
universal brotherhood in Hellenistic period); id. at 146-47 (Emperor the only unifying
force in the Hellenistic states); id. at 148-49 (stoicism valued individual self-sufficiency, but
also devotion to duty); id. at 153 (Roman adaptation of stoicism promoted notion of univer-
sal human rights).
364. Id. at 149 (description of stoic virtues); id. at 153 (description of corresponding
Roman values); id. at 155-63 (stoic influence on Roman law).
365. Id. at 166 (the empire as a corporation); Heiman, Introduction to 0. GIEKE, Asso-
CIATION AND LAW: THE CLASSICAL AND EARLY CHRISTIAN STAGES at 27-31 (1977) (exposition
of ideas of corporation and artificial personality in Roman law); id. at 34 (Roman distinc-
tion between public and private law premised on belief that only individuals can have real
personality); id. at 39 (groups "can manifest themselves only through guardians and legally
appointed spokesmen" in Roman law).
366. THE INSTrruTEs OF JUSTINIAN 1.1.4 (T. Sanders trans. 1956) (1st ed. n.p. 533)
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pire as the Roman father ruled the household: with absolute do-
minion, but bound by fiduciary duty. 8 7 The content of that
fiduciary duty was expressed by natural law; Roman private law
was the product less of the will of the sovereign than of the opin-
ions of thoroughly Hellenizedjurists.3 68 The function of nature in
their view was not so much to provide goods as to articulate
human needs for which it was the function of the empire to pro-
vide. Thus the distinction between public and private in Roman
law reflected the coexistence of untrammeled legislative discretion
with subjection to natural law.3 9 While imperial "sovereignty"
(the power of legislation) was absolute, it was bound by a fiduciary
duty not only to preserve, but also to create, individual property
entitlements. Implicit in this conception of sovereignty as guard-
ian was an argument against its alienability; an argument that
would be developed by later thinkers.
Neither the term "state" nor the term "sovereign" was em-
ployed to designate legitimate power until the sixteenth cen-
tury.370 In fact it seems strange to apply the term sovereignty to
dominion over persons in medieval society because that dominion
was so thoroughly inalienable. Dominion over neither property
nor persons was unambiguously in the hands of any one individ-
ual. Dominion over both was coextensive: any feudal relationship
could be described either in terms of fealty or ownership. 1 Com-
merce took place within these hierarchical relationships. Weber
characterized medieval contracts as functioning to establish social
and political relationships rather than merely facilitating eco-
nomic exchange and risk distribution.3 71 Yet because each such
relationship was embedded in a feudal hierarchy, each fiefdom
had many masters. In this context, the formation of a contract was
less expressive of the will of an individual than of that person's
quoted in 0. GIERKE, supra note 365, at 31.
367. Id. See also G. SABINE, supra note 361, at 171.
368. See G. SABINE, supra note 361, at 165-72.
369. Id. at 155, 164-66, 170-71.
370. A. D'ENTREvEs, THE NOTION OF THE STATE 28-30 (1967) (introduction of "state"
generally attributed to Machiavelli); id. at 99 ("sovereign" introduced by Bodin).
371. M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 41-42 (1982).
372. 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SocamEY 668 (1968). "By means of such a contract a
person was to become somebody's child, father, wife, brother, master, slave, kin, comrade-




place in the hierarchy. To dispose of one's person or property
would be to infringe the sovereignty of everyone further up in the
hierarchy. In a sense, nothing was owned; all power represented a
concession or bailment by a higher authority. This applied even to
the possessions of the king: in medieval England, kings were not
entirely free to alienate royal property, for their sovereignty was
dependent upon it. That sovereignty, in turn, was merely a bail-
ment of divine authority, and was not the sovereign's to dispose
of.37 3 Divine authority, moreover, was implicit in every hierarchi-
cal relation throughout the feudal order, and universal through-
out the empire of Christendom.
The implicit presence of an eternal God in the temporal
world of medieval Christianity is one source of the valorization of
stability as a value in political thought.37 4 Medieval political
thought combined the Roman claim to universality with the Aris-
totelian imperative that political institutions foster and maintain
the virtue of their peoples.3 75 Yet the immanence of God376 meant
that the latter criterion was easily met. Christian virtue was stoic:
it consisted merely of fidelity to the divine plan (a fate which an
inhabitant of a harmonious world could-hardly avoid) completed
by grace (the prize for voluntary obedience). For sovereign and
citizen alike, the practice of virtue imposed little in the way of
individual responsibility-but neither did it offer much in the way
of individual opportunity.$77 Virtue was omnipresent in the feudal
373. E. KANTOROWiCZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES 143-92 (1958) (essay on Bracton).
374. J. POCOCK, PoLrrcs, LANGUAGE AND TIME 82-85 (1971). See also J. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 3-9 (1975).
375. "The revival of Aristotelian philosophy carried with it the problem of recon-
ciling the Hellenic view that man was formed to live in a city with the Christian view that
man was formed to live in a communion with God." J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MO-
MENT, supra note 374, at 84.
Dante. . . saw the delivery of Florence from faction rule as part of the restora-
tion of Italy to political and spiritual health within a universal empire ....
Because the hierarchy of the empire reflects that of the cosmos, it is the mani-
festation of principles that do not change.. . . He saw secular rule as the em-
pire in which the eternal order was repeated and restored, not as the republic
in which a particular group of men resolved what their particular destiny
should be.
Id. at 50.
376. For a provocative discussion of the tension between immanence and transcen-
dence in medieval Catholicism, see A. LovEJoY, THE GREAT CHAIN Or BEING 67-98 (1960).
377. J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 374, at 49-50 (conception of
secular rule described in passages quoted in note 375 does not encourage civic action).
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world and, since everything was virtuous, nothing could be
changed.
Against the backdrop of this static, universalistic world view,
the rise of autonomous, centralized states was deeply troubling.
The prospect of numerous autonomous sources of power frac-
tured the myth of monolithic necessity upon which the legitimacy
of power was based. If the world was composed of discrete partic-
ulars, rather than a harmonious whole, then God-who was a
unity-could not be immanent in this world. This in turn meant
that particular institutions were contingent rather than necessary
and could easily disappear.
Thus, proponents of the modern state faced a dual task: justi-
fying its legitimacy, and defending its capacity for survival. The
first task required that the autonomy of state power be restrained
by a link to some source of virtue. The second task involved con-
ceptualization of the state as a permanent entity. These two tasks
were connected: since medieval scholasticism identified the eternal
with the necessary, the durability of a state could testify to its vir-
tue. Conversely, the virtue of a state provided a compelling nor-
mative argument against permitting its dissolution. Accordingly,
proponents of autonomous, centralized state power did not con-
ceive it as unrestricted: possession of state power was conditioned
on its inalienability. In explaining the inalienability of state power
in the absence of an immanent God, political theorists reverted to
the two models of the state provided by classical antiquity: the re-
public and the empire.
C. The Republican Model
The republics of the Renaissance were descendants of urban
communes that here and there disrupted the hierarchical unity of
medieval society. These communes, organized by artisans, were
initially characterized by egalitarian, cooperative, and parochial
values. Soon, however, they attracted merchants, bent on acquisi-
tion and contact with other lands.37 They sometimes resolved the
tension between these goals by forming cooperative alliances with
378. The conflicting interests of artisans and merchants in the emergent communes
are described in M. TIGAR & M. LEvy, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 80-96, 131-43
(1977).
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a few other communes.'7 These themes-a conflict between the
parochial and the cosmopolitan, resolved by an extension of the
commune to include allies-shaped the republican vision of rela-
tions between states.
The first systematic use of the term "state" to refer to the
apparatus of government is generally ascribed to Machiavelli. 8 0
Because Machiavelli recognized no higher source of virtue, it has
generally been assumed that he recognized no international obli-
gations as binding. Accordingly, breach of treaty has ofteni been
viewed as paradigmatically Machiavellian behavior."" In fact, this
characterization is unfair: Machiavelli counsels the maintenance of
good faith with allies as both prudent and courageous.3 82 For a
379.
The urban conjuratio, founding pact of the commune and one of the nearest
actual historical approximations to a formal "social contract," embodied a new
principle altogether-a community of equals. . . . In practice the commune
was, of course, restricted to a narrow elite within the towns; while its example
inspired inter-city Leagues in North Italy and the Rhineland ...
P. ANDERSON, PASSAGES FROM ANTIQUrTY To FEUDALISM 194 (1978).
380. See supra note 370.
381. THE OXFORD ENGISH DIMTONARY (1971) defines Machiavellian as "practicing du-
plicity in statecraft," and offers as an example of its use: "the true way of treaties is with
Christian, not Machiavellian policy." Sabine described Machiavelli's prince as "little more
than an idealized picture of the Italian tyrant of the sixteenth century." G. SABINE, supra
note 361, at 346. "Never has the game of diplomacy been played more fiercely than in the
relations between the Italian states of Machiavelli's day. Never have the shifts and turns of
negotiations counted for more." Id. at 339. "Whether a policy is . . .faithless or lawless
[Machiavelli] treats as a matter of indifference...." Id. "He openly sanctioned the use of
...perfidy." Id. at 343. This reading is based on such passages as the following:
The experience of our times shows those princes to have done great things who
have had little regard for good faith. . .as [men] are bad and would not keep
their faith with you, so you are not bound to keep faith with them. Nor have
legitimate grounds ever failed a prince who wished to show colourable excuse
for the non-fulfillment of his promise. Of this one could. . show how many
times peace has been broken, and how many promises rendered worthless, by
the faithlessness of princes, and those that have been best able to imitate the
fox have succeeded best.
N. MACHIAVELu, THE PRINCE 92-93 (L. Ricci trans. 1952) (1st ed. Roma 1532).
382.
A prince is further esteemed when he is a true friend or a true enemy,
when, that is, he declares himself without reserve in favour of some one or
against another. This policy is always more useful than remaining neutral. For
if two neighbouring powers come to blows, they are either such that if one
wins, you will have to fear the victor, or else not. In either of these two cases it
will be better for you to declare yourself openly and make war, because in the
first case if you do not declare yourself, you will fall a prey to the victor, to the
pleasure and satisfaction of the one who has been defeated, and you will have
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civic humanist like Machiavelli, prudence and courage were essen-
tial components of virtue.
J.G.A. Pocock has sought to explain the Renaissance identifi-
cation of virtue with creative activity as part of an attempt to jus-
tify state autonomy in the face of the static and universalistic
world view of medieval Catholicism. He has argued that
Machiavelli and other civic humanists sought to detach Aristote-
lian political theory from the pious imagery of imperial Rome in
order to legitimize the political independence of the Italian repub-
lics from papal and imperial power .3 8 3 This required that God be
no reason nor anything to defend you and nobody to receive you. For, whoever
wins will not desire friends whom he suspects and who do not help him when in
trouble, and whoever loses will not receive you as you did not take up arms to
venture yourself in his cause ...
And it will always happen that the one who is not your friend will want you
to remain neutral, and the one who is your friend will require you to declare
yourself by taking arms. Irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, usually
follow the way of neutrality and are mostly ruined by it. But when the prince
declares himself frankly in favour of one side, if the one to whom you adhere
conquers, even if he is powerful and you remain at his discretion, he is under an
obligation to you and friendship has been established, and men are never so
dishonest as to oppress you with such a patent ingratitude. Moreover, victories
are never so prosperous that the victor does not need to have some scruples,
especially as to justice. But if your ally loses, you are sheltered by him, and so
long as he can, he will assist you; you become the companion of a fortune which
may rise again. In the second case, when those who fight are such that you have
nothing to fear from the victor, it is still more prudent on your part to adhere
to one; for you go to the ruin of one with the help of him who ought to save
him if he were wise, and if he conquers he rests at your discretion, and it is
impossible that he should not conquer with your help.
And here it should be noted that a prince ought never to make common
cause with one more powerful than himself to injure another. . . for if he wins
you rest in his power ...
N. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 381, at 111-12. Machiavelli's emphasis on state independence
paradoxically dictates that states show loyalty to their allies, even in defeat. Reliable alli-
ances with states of equal or lesser power represent an important check against the vagaries
of fortune. Only if an ally is more powerful does the alliance become a threat to national
independence. It is in light of this distinction that one should read Machiavelli's admoni-
tion that "a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be against his
interest, and when the reasons which made him bind himself no longer exist." Id. at 92. If
allies become too powerful, the justification for the alliance disappears; instead of support-
ing a state's independence, such an alliance threatens it. Flexibility is the price of maintain-
ing a balance of power, and Machiavelli seemed to urge breaking faith with the strong
rather than the weak.
383.
The whole image of human authority and its history to which Florentines were
supposed to look was being drastically reconstructed, deprived of its continuity
and-in a most important sense-increasingly secularized. In what may be
DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY 457
exorcised from the temporal world; that virtue, in short, become
contingent upon events. Civic humanists confronted the feudal or-
der with what Pocock has called an apocalyptic sense of time.384 In
their view divine will stood apart from the temporal world, and
did not inhabit it-divine intervention, in fact, signalled the end
of time. Rather than a static and orderly whole, history was a cha-
otic struggle ending in divine judgment. Virtue in an entropic
world involved prefiguring divine will by imposing order over the
maelstrom of fortune. 8
5
termed the imperialist vision of history, political society was envisaged as the
existence among men of the hierarchical order existing in heaven and in na-
ture; its legitimation and its organizing categories were alike timeless, and
change could exist in it only as degeneration or recovery. Affiliation with the
empire, then, like affiliation with monarchy generally, was affiliation with the
timeless. Those who sought, whether from a papalist point of view or one com-
mitted to political realism, to emphasize that empire or monarchy were of the
civitas terrena might indeed stress their secular character. But in the newer vi-
sion, the republic of Florence, stated as a high ideal but existing in the present
and in its own past, was affiliated only with other republics and with those mo-
ments in past time at which republics had existed. The republic was not time-
less, because it did not reflect by simply correspondence the eternal order of
nature; it was differently organized, and a mind which accepted republic and
citizenship as prime realities might be committed to implicitly separating the
political from the natural order. The republic was more political than it was
hierarchical; it was so organized as to assert its sovereignty and autonomy, and
therefore its individuality and particularity. . . . But to assert the particularity
of the republic to this extent was to assert that it existed in time, not eternity,
and was therefore transitory and doomed to impermanence, for this was the
condition of particular being. . . . The one thing most clearly known about
republics was that they came to an end in time, whereas a theocentric universe
perpetually affirmed monarchy, irrespective of the fate of particular monar-
chies.. . . To affirm the republic, then, was to break up the timeless continuity
of the hierarchic universe into particular moments: those periods of history at
which republics had existed and which were worthy of attention, and those at
which they had not and which consequently afforded nothing of value or au-
thority to the present. The idea of "renaissance" after an age of barbarism
would seem to owe something to a patriotic insistence on confronting the Flor-
entine with the Roman republic and dismissing the intervening centuries of Ro-
man and Germanic empire as an interlude of tyranny as well as barbarism.
J. PococK, supra note 374, at 53-54.
384. Id. at 34 (millenarism traditional Christian mode of justifying rebellion against
established church vested with secular power); id. at 44-45 (Augustinian defense of estab-
lished institutions of church and monarchy depended upon suppressing apocalyptic tradi-
tion in Christian thought); id. at 104-11 (apocalyptic preaching of Savonarola was an im-
portant source of Florentine nationalism and influence on contemporary republican
theorists, including Machiavelli).
385. Id. at 46-48 (providence identified as the divine will ordering fortune; human
virtue identified with divine providence); id. at 156-57 (republic as model of universe; civic
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It was in this conceptual context that civic humanism pointed
to the republic as an island of order in a turbulent sea. Yet the
republic's particularity provided a major liability in fulfilling this
function, for medieval scholasticism identified only the universal
as eternal. Civic humanism attempted to link the republic to uni-
versal values by uniting a host of particular values in a balanced
whole.33 8 Within the context of such a balanced whole, the pursuit
of particular values was virtuous. As a result, the civic humanists
understood civic virtue as the simultaneous pursuit of particular
values and the maintenance of that balance.8 Accordingly, the
virtuous citizen himself embodied a balance between private ambi-
tion and public commitment. This was the proverbial renaissance
man, a (male) citizen who would develop not only those talents
that would please himself, but also those that would be of service
to the republic.
Just as virtue served the republic, the republic facilitated the
exercise of virtue by creating a stable and predictable world. The
civic humanists conceived of virtue and fortune as agonistic
forces; each was prolific and each threatened the other with domi-
nation." 8 Order was virtue's weapon in this struggle and disorder
was fortune's weapon. Accordingly, fortune was more easily mas-
tered in a world already impregnated with order than in one cor-
rupted by disorder. The republic made individual virtue possible
by locating it in an orderly community of the virtuous."" The
main responsibility of the virtuous was therefore the preservation
of that community.
In this way, Renaissance political theory justified the auton-
omy of polities in terms of precisely the principle that, in medieval
political theory, had guaranteed their interdependence: the ina-
lienability of sovereignty. The Renaissance republic was an organ-
ism, and its essential activity consisted in the preservation of its
identity.
virtue as only defense against fortune in Machiavelli's thought).
386. Id. at 66-71 (Aristotelian view of the Polis as means of uniting particular goods);
id. at 156 (republic as model of the universe).
387. Id. at 74-75, 89 (citizenship as pursuit of particular goods and maintenance of the
republic); id. at 199-204 (Machiavelli's application of this idea in arguing that a citizen
militia is preferable to a standing army of professional mercenaries).
388. Id. at 31-48 (developing opposition between fortune and virtue in humanist
thought); id. at 80 (fortune threatening the republic).
389. Id. at 75, 157 (maintenance of republic necessary to individual virtue).
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In the turbulent world of Italian politics, the preservation of
the republic entailed purging it of all worldly corruption. In fact,
so threatening a force was fortune, that preservation of the repub-
lic seemed to require mastery of as much of that corruption as
possible. The search for stability in an entropic context seemed, in
a Pynchonesque paradox, to require constant war, and the God in
whose image the republic was created, brought the sword. 9
The inevitability of conflict rendered alliance-though dan-
gerous-necessary. Because some form of interaction with the
outside world was unavoidable, it was incumbent upon the repub-
lic to render that world as orderly and predictable as possible. Al-
liance at once reduced the threat of war from the republic's
neighbors, and increased the republic's military resources in the
event of conflict. Machiavelli shared with Thucydides the sense
that such dependence on a foreign power threatened the integrity
of the republic; but he also shared Thucydides' sense that once
conflict was abroad in the world, such threats were unavoidable.
The difference between the two lay in Thucydides' assumption
that international conflicts and resulting alliances were unnatural
aberrations. Machiavelli, by contrast, assumed that such conflict
was inevitable: the problem was not to avoid it, but to master it.
3 91
Why did Machiavelli and his contemporaries view conflict as
inevitable, where Thucydides and his contemporaries viewed it as
aberrant? Machiavelli viewed conflict as unavoidable because he
viewed international relations as unavoidable; and international
relations were increasingly unavoidable in the sixteenth century
because of the proliferation of trade.
Trade was a disruptive force because it was a system of distri-
bution at odds with the rhythms of communal life. Polanyi argued
that it was not until the nineteenth century that a single interna-
tional market for most goods was established. Before that time,
most distribution and production took place within close-knit, or-
ganic, cultural and economic units, and was regulated by ritual. 2
Contact between these units was infrequent in medieval times, and
when goods were needed from another community, it was custom-
390. Id. at 197-99 (Machiavelli's argument for imperialism combines a "concern, typi-
cal of his generation, with the republic's ability to control its external environment," with
an aim of "arming the people" in order more broadly to distribute civic virtue).
391. See supra notes 381-82.
392. K. POLANYI, supra note 117, at 56-67.
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ary to resort to war. Polanyi suggested that trade was developed as
a more reliable alternative to war; yet backed, as it was, by the
threat of war, it was not necessarily any less coercive.39 3 Nor was it
any more compatible with traditional modes of production and
distribution. The more a community traded, the more it produced
for export and the more dependent it became on foreign markets.
A threat to these markets could therefore embroil the community
in war.
Machiavelli viewed the world beyond the republic as danger-
ous because it was the domain of dependence and war; but it
could not be shunned because commerce beckoned from its
shadows. On the other hand, while commerce offered to enrich
the republic, it had a dark side as well: it threatened to undermine
the republic's integrity and independence.
While suspicion of commerce has been a persistent theme in
the republican tradition, it received its most explicit and influen-
tial expression in the republican theory of Rousseau. Rousseau,
generally acknowledged as the intellectual progenitor of nine-
teenth century nationalism,3 94 viewed commerce with utter
loathing:
It is the bustle of commerce and the crafts, it is the avid thirst for profit, it is
effeminacy and the love of comfort that commute personal service for
money. Men give up a part of their profits so as to increase the rest at their
ease. Use money thus, and you will soon have chains. The word "finance" is
the word of a slave; it is unknown in the true republic. In a genuinely free
state, the citizens do everything with their own hands and nothing with
money395
Rousseau's hostility to commerce stemmed from his concep-
tion of the republic as an organic association. Because the republic
was an organism, its chief concern was self-preservation.396 For
393. Id. at 58-59; for descriptions of the relationship between trade and warfare in
medieval Europe, see generally P. ANDERSON, supra note 379; G. DUBY, EARLY GROWTH OF
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY: WARRIORS AND PEASANTS FROM THE SEVENTH TO THE TWELFTH
CENTURY (1978).
394. See, e.g., G. SABINE, supra note 361, at 593-94; A. D'ENTREVES, supra note 370, at
178-79.
395. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 140 (M. Cranston trans. 1968) (1st ed. Am-
sterdam 1762).
396.
[Tihe state, or the nation, is nothing other than a legal person the life of which
consists in the union of its members and.., the most important of its cares is
its own preservation. . .. Just as nature gives each man an absolute power over
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Rousseau, as for Aristotle and Machiavelli, the preservation of the
republic required the maintenance of civic virtue among the citi-
zenry. For Rousseau, however, this was true by definition: the sov-
ereign-the body whose will was law-consisted of all citizens,
provided that all citizens were virtuous. Virtue consisted of the
subordination of a citizen's private interests to the interest of all
citizens.3 97 When citizens were virtuous in this sense, they collec-
tively composed the sovereign. Each citizen, in acting as a fiduci-
ary for all, participated in sovereignty. For Rousseau, all property
was owned by the community as a whole, and could legitimately
be held by individual citizens only as a public trust.3 98 When any
citizen pursued his private interest at the expense of his public
duties, 3"9 he withdrew his participation. Rousseau scorned com-
merce because commerce threatened to erode sovereignty by en-
couraging citizens to pursue their private interests.
The reason Rousseau was so concerned that sovereignty be
maintained is that he saw it as a prerequisite to freedom. By mak-
ing each citizen the agent for all, Rousseau thought he could in-
sure that no citizen would be subject to the will of another. While
the life of each citizen would be affected by collective decisions,
those collective decisions would not promote the interests of any
individual over those of any other. For such freedom to be pre-
served it was crucial that all citizens participate in decisionmaking.
If a citizen did not participate, he would be represented by other
citizens, and in Rousseau's eyes such representatives would be ei-
ther masters or slaves. They would be masters if they acted on
their own authority, slaves if they acted on the authority of
others.40 0 The only condition under which freedom could be
all his own limbs, the social pact gives the body politic an absolute power over
all its members; and it is this same power which, directed by the general will,
bears . . . the name of sovereignty.
Id. at 74.
397. Id. at 72 (definition of the general will); see also id. at 63-64.
398. Id. at 65-68.
399. Rousseau, like the Renaissance republicans, viewed women as a source of corrup-
tion, incapable of civic virtue. See generally S. OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 99-194 (1979); D. Silberstein, "A History of Pornography" (on file with the Buf-
falo Law Review).
400. See, e.g., J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 395, at 141.
Sovereignty cannot be represented, for the same reason that it cannot be alien-
ated .... Thus the people's deputies are not, and could not be, its representa-
tives; they are merely its agents; and they cannot decide anything finally. Any
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maintained is if sovereignty were inalienably vested in the
citizenry.
Rousseau saw representation as a form of slavery in part be-
cause he saw it as a form of commerce, a bargain between repre-
sentative and constituent."0 1 For Rousseau, the arms length bar-
gain was inherently coercive. His own social contract was not an
arms length bargain between distinct individuals, but the creation
of a new organism-an association.402 In becoming part of such
an organic association, however, an individual would not alienate
his liberty, because he would retain the power to exercise his will,
both as voter and as public official. Rousseau's criterion of free-
dom is the exercise of will in the public interest, not the pursuit of
self-interest.
One consequence of Rousseau's insistence upon universal par-
ticipation is a requirement that politics be practiced on an inti-
mate scale. Rousseau believed that states should be small in terms
of both population and territory; that the citizens should know
one another; and that they should have common customs and pos-
sibly common ancestry. 03 Because of its small size, Rousseau's re-
public would be beset by threats from abroad . 40 Like Machiavelli,
however, Rousseau did not shrink from armed conflict. 05 Also
like Machiavelli, Rousseau saw alliance with other small republics
as a prudent strategem for defense of the republic. 40  Rousseau
law which the people has not ratified in person is void; it is not law at all. The
English people believes itself to be free; it is gravely mistaken; it is free only
during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as the Members are
elected, the people is enslaved ...
Id.
401. Id. at 140.
402.
[T]he act of association consists of a reciprocal commitment between society
and the individual, so that each person, in making a contract, as it were, with
himself, finds himself doubly committed, first as a member of the sovereign
body in relation to individuals, and secondly as a state in relation to the
sovereign.
Id. at 62.
403. Id. at 89-93.
404. Id. at 138.
405. See, e.g., id. at 184. Rousseau's favorite ancient state was Sparta rather than Ath-
ens. Cranston, Introduction to J. RoussEAu, supra note 395, at 17.
406. Rousseau notes that an alliance of Greek republics defeated the Persian Empire,
and that the Swiss Cantons defeated the Habpsburg Empire. J. RoussEAu, supra note 395,
at 138. On the other hand, he views friendship between large and small states as dangerous
to the independence of the small states. Id. at 95.
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viewed treaties as binding as long as they did not involve aliena-
tion of sovereignty or diminution of independence.0 7
The French Revolution provided the inspiration for national-
ist movements in nineteenth century Europe. As a result of Rous-
seau's influence on the French Revolution, republicanism pro-
vided one of the intellectual underpinnings of nineteenth century
nationalism, and provided nineteenth century nationalists with a
normative rationale for viewing state autonomy as an inalienable
entitlement. Nevertheless, the republic was not the only model of
the nation-state provided by the French Revolution. The French
republic, like the Greek and Roman republics so admired by
Rousseau, was succeeded by an empire; and the actual nation-
states of nineteenth century Europe were more committed to im-
perialism than they were to republicanism. In pursuing empire,
however, the European powers embraced a tradition of govern-
ance which also provided a rationale for viewing state autonomy
as an inalienable entitlement.
D. The Imperial Model
Napoleon consciously identified his empire with that of an-
cient Rome; from his own viewpoint, his greatest achievement was
the enactment of a comprehensive civil code modeled on Roman
law. Yet Roman jurisprudence had already exerted a formative in-
fluence on European conceptions of the nation-state. The first Eu-
ropean countries to develop centralized nation-states were France
and England. In each country, this development was rationalized
by a skilled political theorist: Bodin in sixteenth century France,
407.
The sovereign, bearing only one single and identical aspect, is in the position of
a private person making a contract with himself, which shows that there neither
is, nor can be, any kind of fundamental law binding on the people as a body,
not even the social contract itself. This does not mean that the whole body
cannot incur obligations to other nations, so long as those obligations do not
infringe the contract; for in relation to foreign powers, the body politic is a
simple entity, an individual.
However, since the body politic, or sovereign, owes its being to the sanctity
of the contract alone, it cannot commit itself, even in treaties with foreign pow-
ers, to anything that would derogate from the original act of association; it
could not, for example, alienate a part of itself or submit to another sovereign.
To violate the act which has given it existence would be to annihilate itself; and




and Hobbes in seventeenth century England. Both theorists
looked to the Roman Empire, rather than ancient republics, to
provide a model for their emergent states. Nevertheless, both
viewed the sovereignty and autonomy of these states as
inalienable.
While Machiavelli introduced the term "state" into modern
political discourse, Bodin introduced the term "sovereignty" in
his influential Six Books of a Commonweale. 08 Like Machiavelli, Bo-
din sought to justify the independence of his government from
religious authority; yet he did so for a very different reason. Six-
teenth century France was riven by religious wars. In the face of
religious division, Bodin was convinced that only a centralized
monarchy, characterized by religious tolerance, could bring peace
and prosperity to France. °9 Since the function of Bodin's state
was to unify disparate groups with differing customs, Bodin had
little use for Aristotelian republicanism. Bodin's state could not be
an organism. Accordingly, he defined the state as a government of
many families. 10 What Bodin meant by a "family" was an associa-
tion possessed of common property, characterized by bonds of
mutual affection, and subject to the dominion of a patriarch.411
While the sovereign exercised a similar dominion over those fami-
lies,12 the sovereign was not a patriarch because the families gov-
erned by a single sovereign did not share property, and were not
bound by mutual affection. 13 The families subject to a single sov-
ereign need not be members of the same nation and need not be
subject to the same laws; they were unified only by being subject
to the same sovereign.'' Bodin's state, like the Roman Empire,
was a corporation, not an organism.
Bodin's sovereign had two crucial functions. The one which
408. J. BODIN, THE Six Boors OF A COMMONWEALE I (K. McRae ed. 1962) (1st ed. Paris
1576). See supra note 381-83 and accompanying text.
409. G. SABINE, supra note 361, at 399-400.
410. J. BODIN, supra note 408, at 1.
411. Id. at 8.
412. Id.
413. "[A] community of all things is impossible and incompassible with the right of
families: for if in the family and the city, that which is proper, and that which is common,
that which is public, and that which is private, be confounded; we shall have neither family
nor yet Commonwealth." Id. at 11 (converted to modern English). See also id. at 12.
414. Id. at 13 (different laws permissible for different families); id. at 9-10 (identity of
the commonwealth not dependent upon the identities of its members, but on that of the
sovereign).
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has elicited the most comment is the legislative function: the abso-
lute power to enact law, vested by the Roman people in their em-
peror. The other function, though articulated at the very outset
of the Six Books of a Commonweale, has been virtually ignored: the
sovereign as the administrator of public property.41 5 For Bodin,
the distinction between public property and private property is
the sine qua non of the state, and is decreed by the law of nature:
[Plato] understood not that by making all things thus common, a Common-
wealth must needs perish: for nothing can be public, where nothing is pri-
vate: neither can it be imagined there to be anything had in common, if
there be nothing to be kept in particular; no more than if all the citizens
were kings, they should at all have no king; neither any harmony, if the
diversity and dissimilitude of voices cunningly mixed together, which make
the sweet harmony, were all brought into one and the same tune. Albeit that
such a Commonwealth should be also against the law of God and nature,
which detest not only incests, adulteries, and inevitable murders, if all wo-
man should be common; but also expressly forbids us to steal, or so much as
to desire anything that another man's is.
4 16
If.private property was a necessary condition for the existence of
public property, public property was necessary for the preserva-
tion of private property. Public property served not only to sup-
port the common defense;4 17 it made possible (1) the indemnifica-
tion of property holders against losses from war and natural
disaster;""' and (2) the support of the poor by means of alms or
employment in public works.4 1 9 Bodin's commonwealth is a wel-
415. Id. at 11.
416. Id. at 11 (converted to modern English).
417. Id. at 677.
418. Id. at 109-10.
419.
[T]he surest preservation and defense of treasure, were Almes deeds, and liber-
ality to the needy. . .. And if the treasure be well furnished, a part would be
employed to repair towns, to fortify upon the frontiers, to furnish places of
strength, make the passages even, build bridges, fortify the ports, send ships to
sea, build public houses, beautify temples, erect colleges for honor, virtue, and
learning: for besides necessity of reparations, it brings great profit to the Com-
monwealth. For by this means arts and artificers are entertained, the poor peo-
ple are eased, the idle are set to work, cities are beautified and diseases ex-
pelled: finally hatred against princes (which does oftentimes stir up the subjects
to rebellion) is quite suppressed, when as the impositions which he had levied,
redounds not only to the general, but also to every private mans good....
This which I have said is more expedient [if] . . . the subjects being many, are
with more difficulty maintained in peace and union by few commanders: unless
the multitude being employed in public works, may make some gain. . ..
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fare state. Bodin vested legislative discretion solely in the sover-
eign; but Bodin's sovereign, as much as Rousseau's, was bound to
exercise that discretion in the interest of the subjects' welfare.
Bodin is typically criticized as being confused because he iden-
tifies the will of the sovereign as the sole source of law, yet sub-
jects the sovereign to natural law.420 Much of the confusion disap-
pears, however, once we understand that for Bodin, natural law
consisted chiefly in the injunction that the sovereign seek the wel-
fare of his people.421 Bodin interchangeably approved of corona-
tion oaths binding the sovereign either to obey the law of God, or
to care for the people God had placed in the sovereign's custody;
he viewed as invalid only those oaths which bound the sovereign
to maintain existing law or obey future law. 2 2 This distinction
makes perfect sense: to the extent that higher law recognizes the
sovereign as trustee of the welfare of his people, he could not ob-
ligate himself to maintain any law that might in time prove harm-
ful to that welfare. Similarly, the new sovereign was bound by his
predecessor's treaties only to the extent that they served the wel-
fare of his people, or were supported by the people. 23 The sover-
Id. at 676-77 (converted to modern English). Bodin proclaimed material inequality as a
necessary condition for prosperity, but viewed outright poverty as a threat to peace. Id. at
569-70.
420. See, e.g., G. SABINE, supra note 361, at 171.
421. Bodin viewed the sovereignty of queens as inconsistent with the patriarchy de-
creed by the law of nations. See J. BODIN, supra note 408, at 752.
422. Id. at 91-95.
423. Bodin believed that the prince was bound as a private individual-by the law of
nature to keep his covenants. Id. at 107. The law of nature similarly bound a prince's heirs
to keep their ancestors' covenants. But the prince was not so bound as sovereign. Thus
we must distinguish, whether the appointed heir will accept the state in the
quality of an heir by testament appointed; or renouncing the succession of the
testator, demand the crown by virtue of the custom and law of his country. For
in the former case the successor is bound unto all the hereditary obligations
and actions of his predecessors, as if he were a private inheritor; but in the
second case, he is not bound unto the dome of his predecessor, albeit that his
predecessors were thereto sworn. For neither the oath nor the obligation of the
dead predecessor, binds the successor in the law, more than so far as the obliga-
tion made by the testator tends to the good of the Commonwealth, and so far
he is bound. . . . [I]t is an old proverb with us, that the king never dies, but
that as soon as he is dead, the next male of his stock is seized of the kingdom,
and in possession thereof before he be crowned, which is not conferred unto
him by succession of his father, but by virtue of the law of the land . ...
Wherefore let us this hold, that the king which is by lawful right called unto his
kingdom, is so far bound unto the covenants and promises of the kings his
predecessors, as is for the good of the Commonwealth: and so much the more if
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eign power of legislation-which included the power to treat with
foreign states424 -was inalienable because Bodin's sovereign, like
the emperor in Roman law, was a trustee of the private interests
of his subjects.
In advocating the consolidation of English state power, Hob-
bes also invoked the imperial model of the state. Writing in the
wake of the Civil War in England and the Thirty Years War on
the Continent, Hobbes-like Bodin-saw religious dissension as a
major threat to tranquility.425 As a consequence, he opposed re-
publican efforts to link the legitimacy of government to the virtue
of the citizenry.428 Where citizens were as deeply divided on reli-
gion as were the seventeenth century English, no single concep-
tion of virtue could organically unify society. Accordingly, Hobbes
the contracts were made by the consent and good liking of the people in gen-
eral, or of the states, or high court or parliament: which is not only seemly for a
king to keep, but also necessary, although it be hurtful unto the Common-
wealth, considering that it concerns the faith and obligation of his subjects. But
if the sovereign prince had contracted either with strangers, or with his sub-
jects, for such things as concern the Commonwealth, without the consent of
them we have before said, if any great harm redound unto the Commonwealth
by such contract, it is not reason the lawful successor to be bound thereto ....
But by what right soever the prince shall have received his kingdom. . . . It is
reason that the successor should perform all such contracts of his predecessor
or, as redounded to the profit of the Commonwealth: for otherwise it should be
lawful for him contrary to the law of nature, by fraud and indirect means to
draw his own profit out of others harms; but it much concerns a Common-
wealth, so much as in it lies, to preserve and keep that public faith, lest in ex-
treme dangers thereof, all the means for the relief thereof should be shut up.
Id. at 112-13 (converted to modern English).
424. Id. at 162.
425. G. SABINE, supra note 361, at 455-56; Peters, Thomas Hobbes, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 30, 44 (1972).
426. Hobbes lists, as ideas tending to the dissolution of the commonwealth, "[t]hat
every private man is judge of good and evil actions.. . . [T]hat whatsoever a man does
against his conscience, is sin;. . . [T]hat faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study
and reason, but by supernatural inspiration, or infusion." T. HOBBES, supra note 222, at
211-12 (emphasis omitted).
And as to rebellion in particular against monarchy; one of the most frequent
causes of it, is the reading of the books of policy, and histories of the ancient
Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and all others that are unpro-
vided of the antidote of solid reason, receiving a strong, and delightful impres-
sion, of the great exploits of war, achieved by the conductors of their armies,
receive withal a pleasing idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their
great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men,
but from the virtue of their popular form of government.
Id. at 214.
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developed a conception of the state as a mechanism for unifying a
people without virtue.427 Like Bodin, Hobbes suited his sovereign
to an atomized people more given to the pursuit of private wealth
than public service.428 For Hobbes, as for Bodin, sovereignty was
less a bulwark against commerce than it was an adaptation to it.
The mechanism Hobbes chose for unifying an atomized, ac-
quisitive people was the Roman corporation. Hobbes' sovereign
would aggregate its subjects into an artificial person by "person-
ating" or "representing" them.429 For this unity to be maintained,
it was crucial that Hobbes' sovereign, like the Roman emperor,
have a monopoly on the legislative function; 30 in addition, Hob-
bes' sovereign would acquire this monopoly in the same way as did
the Roman emperors-from the people. 31
The Hobbesian sovereign represented the people not only in
the sense that it acted in their place, but in the sense that it was
constrained to serve their interests. 3 2 While the Hobbesian sover-
427. Id. at 84 (only fear and avarice incline men towards peace); id. at 110 (coopera-
tion impossible without subjection); id. at 107 ("[a] multitude. . . made one person, when
they are by one person, represented").
[Tihere be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their agreement
constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in awe, and to
direct their actions to the common benefit. The only way to erect such a com-
mon power, . . .is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or
upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices,
unto one will.
Id. at 112.
428. See C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES
TO LOCKE 53-70 (1979).
429. T. HOBBES, supra note 222, at 105-08 (discussion of "artificial personation," "ac-
tors," "authors," and "authority").
Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by those whom
they represent. And then the person is the actor; and he that owneth his words
and actions, is the AUTHOR: in which case the actor acteth by authority .,..
So that by authority, is always understood a right of doing any act; and done by
authority, done by commission, or license from him whose right it is.
Id. at 105-06. Hobbes defines the commonwealth as
one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with an-
other, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the
strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and
common defense. And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and
said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.
Id. at 112.
430. Id. at 173-76.
431. Id. at 112.
432. "A good law is that, which is needful, for the good of the people, and withal perspic-
uous." Id. at 227. Such laws include provision for public charity and public employment.
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eign is subject to no positive law, its function is defined by natural
law. The function of Hobbes' commonwealth is to impose upon its
subjects what the law of nature decrees, which human nature
would not otherwise permit.
The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty, and do-
minion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in
which we see them live in commonwealths, is . . . getting themselves out
from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent. . . to
the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to. . .tie them
by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observa-
tion of [the] laws of nature. For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty,
mercy, and, in sum, doing to others, as we would be done to, . . .without the
terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our
natural passions.
433
The commonwealth artificially imposes altruism and public re-
sponsibility on a people without unity or virtue, so as to make pos-
sible the fulfillment of essentially private passions. The right to
make law is merely the right to impose one's judgment as to how
best to accomplish that purpose.""
Hobbes' commonwealth is established by covenant among the
subjects.3 5 What makes this covenant binding, if contracts in a
state of nature are unenforceable? The answer is that such a cove-
nant can only be enforced once it is first performed. Once the
subjects have placed sufficient power in the hands of the sover-
eign, the sovereign can ruthlessly suppress all challenges to the
unity of the commonwealth. Should the power of the sovereign
See also id. at 219-20 (duties of sovereign to people).
433. Id. at 109. As a consequence
[t]he law of nature, and the civil law, contain each other, and are of equal ex-
tent. For the laws of nature ... are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose
men to peace and obedience. When a commonwealth is once settled, then are
they actually laws, and not before; as being then the commands of the common-
wealth; and therefore also civil laws: for it is the sovereign power that obliges
men to bbey them.
Id. at 174.
434. In forming the commonwealth, subjects agreed to submit "their judgments to his
judgment." Id. at 112. "The sovereign is judge of what is necessary for the peace and
defense of his subjects." Id. at 116. "[A]nnexed to the sovereignty [is] the right of making
war and peace with other nations, . . . that is to say, of judging when it is for the public
good." Id. at 117. See generally Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and
Associations in the Common Law, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 599, 606-12 (1980) (elaboration of the
notion of judgment as the function of the sovereign).
435. T. HOBBms, supra note 222, at 112.
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ever dissipate, the unity of the commonwealth would immediately
be threatened. Thus the sovereign, in order to protect the welfare
of its subjects, must first and foremost preserve its power. Accord-
ingly, all power must be inalienably vested in the sovereign.4 36
The sovereign's power cannot be conditioned on fulfillment of the
terms of a covenant, because no covenant is enforceable except by
means of superior power, and no such power can coexist with the
commonwealth. Since the alienation of sovereign power precipi-
tates the dissolution of the commonwealth, any covenant that in-
volved the alienation of the power to make law would threaten
the continued existence of the sovereign as an artificial person.437
According to Hobbes, covenants calling for self-annihilation are
not merely unenforceable; they are void, according to the law of
nature.438 Hence, sovereigns may not, as may individuals, form
valid covenants with one another to subject themselves to a higher
authority. Sovereigns interact in a state of nature 39 which they
are powerless to leave.440 They may not convey to any other insti-
tution the right to coerce their subjects.
Where partisans of the republican state viewed commerce as a
threat to the integrity of the community, partisans of the imperial
state viewed commerce as, for good or ill, the central purpose of
social life. Accordingly, they rejected the republican model of so-
ciety as an organic unity and the republican identification of sov-
ereignty with the will of such an organic unity. Nevertheless,
republicans and imperialists shared a common conception of the
sovereign as trustee. To exercise the lawmaking func-
436. Id. at 114 (sovereign power cannot be forfeited by any wrongdoing); id. at 118(sovereign power indivisible); id. at 119 (grant of any part of sovereign power to another is
void).
437. Id. at 219. See also id. at 144 (sovereign intended to be immortal).
438. Id. at 86-87.
439. Id. at 232.
[T]he law of nations, and the law of nature, is the same thing. And every sover-
eign hath the same right, in procuring the safety of his people, that any particu-
lar man can have, in procuring the safety of his own body. And the same law,
that dictateth to men that have no civil government, what they ought to do,
and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to common-
wealths, that is, to the consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign assem-
blies; there being no court of natural justice . . . where not man, but God
reigneth; whose laws . . . as he is the author of nature, are natural.
Id. See also id. at 83 (international relations is Hobbes' model of a state of nature).
440. Sovereignty may be seized by the sovereign of another commonwealth as a result
of war, but apparently should not otherwise be given up. Id. at 145.
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tion-whether in legislation or treatymaking-meant to render
authoritative judgment as to the welfare of all subjects of the sov-
ereign. Because republicans and imperialists alike viewed sover-
eignty as a trust, both traditions viewed sovereignty as inalienable.
Each tradition found expression in the French Revolution, and
each shaped conceptions of the nation-state in nineteenth century
Europe. As political philosophers struggled to synthesize the two
traditions during the nineteenth century, the principle that sover-
eignty was inalienable assumed great importance. The most ambi-
tious and influential synthesis was Hegel's.
E. Hegel's Synthesis
Modern imperialists and republicans shared an image of trade
as a potentially disintegrative force. Each tradition developed a
contrasting image of the state as an integrative force. Each tradi-
tion protected the integrative function of the state from the mar-
ket by defining state power as inalienable. Republicans, viewing
freedom as collective, tended to identify it with the state. Imperi-
alists, viewing freedom as individual, tended to identify it with the
market. Republicans viewed the proliferation of trade as cata-
strophic; imperialists viewed the proliferation of trade as inevita-
ble. Hegel identified freedom with both the state and the market;
he viewed the proliferation of trade as both catastrophic and inev-
itable. He was, in short, a republican and an imperialist.
This contradiction was built into a conception of freedom
Hegel shared with many thinkers of the romantic period. For
these thinkers, freedom required both self-expression and self-
constitution. 441 The first seemed to require a celebration of one's
particular subjectivity; the second to require an escape from one's
particular subjectivity. The first seemed to require "submission"
to the passions; the second seemed to require subordination of the
passions to reason.
Hegel developed his dialectical logic as a tool for resolving
this contradiction. The fundamental axiom of this logic was that
finite things could not exist independently. 442 Everything that ap-
441. See C. TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 1-14 (1979).
442. Id. at 45-46. Hegel believed this to be true of a world endowed with Geist (spirit),
that is, capable of being understood by human thought. Taylor summarizes:




peared to be a discrete particular was really part of a seamless to-
tality. The identity of any particular was socially constructed; this
identity could only be defined by contrasting that particular with
something else.443 To see the true nature of any particular, how-
ever, meant to see it in relation to the totality of which it was a
part. This meant that for a person to identify herself as a particu-
lar required her to define herself by contrast to others. By identi-
fying individual self-expression as a conscious process, Hegel
could reason that self-expression required self-consciousness and
self-consciousness required an awareness of others. Because self-
expression required an understanding of one's social context, the
process of self-expression would actually induce a broadening of
perspective. This change in one's subjectivity would compel new
efforts at self-definition, and require still further investigation of
one's context. By reflecting on the extent to which one's identity
was shaped by other people, each person could come to under-
stand her true nature as an aspect of society as a whole. Accord-
ingly, the project of expressing one's subjectivity would produce a
reconstitution of the self, in which subjectivity would be tran-
scended.444 Yet in transcending one's particularity, one would not
completely lose it. As a result of this dialectic of self-conscious-
ness, an individual's identity would become a function of the his-
tory of her consciousness-the particular process by which she
came to realize a common human nature. Hegel's dialectic of self-
[T]he underlying principle of these ascending dialectics in which Hegel will
show that finite things cannot exist on their own, but only as part of a larger
whole. . . . is contradiction; and the contradiction consists in this, that finite
beings just in virtue of existing externally in space and time make a claim to
independence, while the very basis of their existence is that they express a spirit
which cannot brook this independence. The ascending dialectic reveals the con-
tradiction in things and shows from the nature of the contradiction how it can
only be understood and reconciled if things are seen as part of the self-move-
ment of the Absolute ....
Contradiction is thus fatal to partial realities, but not to the whole. ...
[T]he whole as Hegel understands it lives on contradiction. It is really because
it incorporates contradiction and reconciles it with its identity that it survives.
1d; see also id. at 66-67 for a discussion of Hegel's "proof" of the inherent contradiction of
finite entities.
443. Id. at 43. "Thus Geist cannot exist simply-Hegel would say 'immediately.' It can
exist only by overcoming its opposite. It can exist only by negating its own negation." Id.
444. See generally G. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 215-67 (J.B. Baillie trans.




expression and self-transcendence, therefore, required that society
be viewed both as an organic unity and as a collection of discrete
individuals.
Because Hegel saw human identity as ultimately social, he fol-
lowed Aristotle's view that virtue was possible only in an organic
state.44 5 Yet Hegel could not agree with Rousseau that the mainte-
nance of that organism justified suppressing the pursuit of private
interest."" Virtue might require identification with others, but
freedom required that such identification be achieved only as an
outgrowth of efforts at self-expression. In Hegel's view, private
control of property was the essential medium for self-expression.
If virtue required an organic state, freedom required a separate
realm of "civil society" for the accumulation and exchange of pri-
vate property-in short, a market.".
Unlike modern republicans, Hegel saw commerce as intrinsi-
cally valuable; yet he shared republican apprehensions about com-
merce's disintegrating effects. Hegel perceived, at the dawn of the
industrial revolution, that the proliferation of commerce was lead-
ing to a division of labor and the accumulation of capital. 44 The
accumulation of capital, he felt, would make possible ever increas-
ing automation.4 9 The resulting decrease in the demand for labor
would mean declining wages, and poorer working conditions:
"The amount of labour decreases only for the whole, not for the
individual: on the contrary, it is being increased, since the more
mechanized labour becomes, the less value it possesses, and the
more must the individual toil.' 450 Technological innovation also
threatened to reenforce the entropic effects of commerce. As ear-
lier republicans had foreseen, the spread of commodity produc-
tion reduced the independence of producers, so that events in dis-
tant places could determine the value of their product.
Technological innovation meant that economies of production for
particular goods could change suddenly, driving independent arti-
445. See C. TAYLOR, supra note 441, at 84.
446. See supra notes 394-402 and accompanying text.
447. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 41-53 (T. Knox trans. 1967) (1st ed. Berlin
1821) (individual freedom requires appropriation and use of property); id. §§ 189-201
(description of market).
448. Id. at § 199; see also S. AvINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 96 (1972).
449. HEGEL's PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 447, § 198.
450. G. HEGEL, JENAER REALPHILOSOPHIE I: DIE VORLESUNGEN VON 1803-1804, at 237
(1932), quoted in S. AVINERI, supra note 448, at 94.
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sans out of business. Similarly, economies of resource exploitation
and transportation could change suddenly, resulting in the aban-
donment by investors of communities that had grown dependent
upon them.
The connection between the particular sort of labour and the infinite mass
of needs becomes wholly imperceptible, turns into a blind dependence. It
thus happens that a far-away operation often affects a whole class of people
who have hitherto satisfied their needs through it; all of a sudden it limits
[their work], makes it redundant and useless. 51
Whole branches of industry which supported a large class of people suddenly
fold up because of a change in fashion or because the value of their products
fell due to new inventions in other countries. Whole masses are abandoned
to poverty which cannot help itself. There appears the contrast between vast
wealth and vast poverty . . . This inequality of wealth and poverty . . .
turn[s] into the utmost tearing up. . . of the will, an inner indignation...
and hatred . 52
Necessary as commerce may be for collective self-realization, if
unrestrained, it would lead to the disintegration of society and self
alike.
Hegel proposed that organic associations could help maintain
the integrity of society. Corporations, trade unions, churches and
community groups would provide the isolated individual with so-
cial insurance, and spiritual fulfillment.153 Such associations would
arise naturally as the struggles of the marketplace would draw to-
gether those threatened by the same forces. Because these groups
would be in conflict with one another, however, they could not by
themselves maintain the integrity of society. In Hegel's eyes only
the state could integrate the interests of all the various associa-
tions in society. The most important function of an association,
therefore, was to provide the individual with a political voice.45'
Like Bodin's state, Hegel's functioned to provide social insur-
ance not provided by the market; yet for Hegel, the catastrophe
redressed by the state was the market itself. This catastrophe
could not be redressed simply through redistribution of goods
451. G. HEGEL, supra note 450, at 239 (translated and quoted in S. AvINERI, supra note
448, at 93)!
452. G. HEGEL, supra note 450, at 232-33 (translated and quoted in S. AVINERI, supra
note 448, at 97).
453. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 449, §§ 252, 253.
454. Id. §§ 303, 308, Addition to § 290.
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from rich to poor, for freedom required that the poor be pro-
vided not only with subsistence, but with means of self-expression.
Like Rousseau, Hegel believed that a free people "does every-
thing with its own hands."' 455 What the poor needed was not wel-
fare, but work. Preferable responses to poverty, therefore, were
public employment or public subsidization of industry."56 Yet even
these responses could not solve the problems of poverty and social
unrest:
In this event the volume of production would be increased, but the evil
consists precisely in an excess of production and in the lack of proportionate
number of consumers who are themselves also producers, and thus it is sim-
ply intensified by ... the methods ... by which it is sought to alleviate it.
It hence becomes apparent that despite an excess of wealth, civil society is
not rich enough, i.e., its own resources are insufficient to check excessive
poverty and the creation of penurious rabble. 57
Under these circumstances, the only solution to poverty is the ap-
propriation of resources from other societies: "This inner dialec-
tic of civil society, thus drives it. . .to push beyond its own limits
and seek markets, and so its necessary means of subsistence, in
other lands which are either deficient in the goods it has overpro-
duced, or else generally backward in industry. ' 458 This program
can be facilitated by exporting the dissident unemployed: "Civil
society is thus driven to found colonies. Increase of population
alone has this effect, but it is due in particular to the appearance
of a number of people who cannot secure the satisfaction of their
needs by their own labor once production rises above the require-
ment of consumers. ' 459 In the face of industrial capitalism, the
maintenance of republican virtue at home seemed to require im-
perialism abroad.
The function of Hegel's state was the maintenance of the
freedom and virtue of all of its citizens. The realization of that
function, in his view, required simultaneously permitting the de-
velopment of industrial capitalism and guaranteeing the produc-
tive employment of all the state's citizens. The fulfillment of these
conditions, however, required the economic exploitation or politi-
455. See note 395 and accompanying text.
456. Id. § 245.
457. Id.
458. Id. § 246.
459. Id. Addition to § 248.
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cal domination of citizens of other states. Necessarily then, in
Hegel's view, not all people could be virtuous and free; not all
states could fulfill their functions. Inevitably, the vital interests of
different peoples would come into conflict, and states would be
driven into war.460
Like Machiavelli and Rousseau, however, Hegel saw war as
being perfectly compatible with the maintenance of virtue.
War is the state of affairs which deals in earnest with the vanity of temporal
goods and concerns . . . by its agency . . . the ethical health of peoples is
preserved . . . just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the
foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in
nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace.4"1
War strengthens social cohesion by calling forth sacrifice on be-
half of the collectivity.4 2 "It is the moment wherein the substance
of the state-i.e., its absolute power against everything individual
and particular, against life, property, and their rights, even
against societies and associations-makes the nullity of these finite
things an accomplished fact and brings it home to conscious-
ness." 46 3 Just as the individual realizes her own identity in the
struggle with others, and just as group identity is formed in the
struggle with other groups, so, too, national identity is established
in the struggle with other nations.
For Hegel, the nation-state was the ultimate source of virtue
on earth, and its very identity depended on conflict with other
nations.46 While the state made it possible for individuals to tran-
scend their own egoism, there was no higher principle governing
the relations of states than national interest. The pursuit of na-
tional interest was the sole reason for states to form treaties, and
the validity of a treaty for a state extended so far as the treaty
served that state's national interest.6 5 The maintenance of state
autonomy required that states not alienate their capacity to break
a treaty.
460. "[I]f states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonized, the matter
can only be settled by war." Id. § 334.
461. Id. § 324.
462. Id. §§ 325-28.
463. Id. § 323.
464. "The nation state is mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality
and is therefore the absolute power on earth. It follows that every state is sovereign and
autonomous against its neighbours." Id. § 331.
465. Id. §§ 336, 337.
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The fundamental proposition of international law . . . is that treaties,
as the ground of obligations between states, ought to be kept. But since the
sovereignty of a state is the principle of its relations to others, states are to
that extent in a state of nature in relation to each other. Their rights are
actualized only in their particular wills and not in a universal will with consti-
tutional powers over them. The universal promise of international law there-
fore does not go beyond an ought-to-be, and what really happens is that
international relations in accordance with treaty alternate with the severance
of these relations.
4 6
States could establish relationships based on cooperation, but any
attempt to universalize such cooperation would be ultimately
doomed:
With that end in view, Kant proposed a league of monarchs to adjust differ-
ences between states. . . . But the state is an individual, and individuality
essentially implies negation. Hence even if a number of states make them-
selves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an opposite
and create an enemy.
467
Like civil associations and nations, alliances among states are ce-
mented by struggle against a common enemy. Thus Hegel envi-
sions an international system characterized by two different types
of relationships among nations: associative relationships based on
mutual cooperation, and instrumental relationships based on ex-
ploitation. In a world permeated by commerce, Hegel believed,
no state could maintain itself without exploiting other nations,
and universal legal institutions could not be developed on the ba-
sis of cooperative relations alone.
This dualistic vision of international society accurately charac-
terizes the nineteenth century international system explored in
Chapter Three. Relations among the major powers of Europe
were based on cooperation: decisions regarding European affairs
were made by consensus rather than war, and domestic economic
policies were coordinated to permit a regime of free trade on the
continent. Relations between European powers and the preindus-
trial nations of Africa and Asia were characterized by military co-
ercion and economic exploitation. By the end of the nineteenth
century, even Russia could be characterized as an industrialized
European power, holding a vast undeveloped Asian empire by mil-
itary force. Only the Ottoman Empire posed a problematic case
466. Id. § 333.
467. Id. Addition to § 324.
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for this categorical scheme, because it stood at the geographic and
political margin between the two categories. Like other empires,
it contained territory both within and beyond Europe. But unlike
the other empires it lacked an economically and militarily viable
center of power. Too important to be allowed to fall subject to a
single power, too large and powerful to be peacefuly partitioned,
yet too weak to defend itself effectively, the Ottoman Empire be-
came a kind of collective protectorate. The method chosen for
accomplishing this-admitting the Ottoman Empire to the Euro-
pean Concert-required that the empire be treated as a cooperat-
ing major power. Yet the admission of the Ottoman Empire to the
European Concert was coerced rather than consensual, and the
Empire could not hold its own as a major power. Inevitably, the
pursuit of imperial ambitions impelled individual powers to form
bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire inconsistent with its
status as a member of the European Concert. This resulted in the
treaty conflicts examined in Chapter Three. The dual status of
the Ottoman Empire as Concert member and colony was the
Achilles' heel of the Concert of Europe system. Hence treaty con-
flict in fin de siecle Europe reflected the conflict between the two
different forms of international relations implicit in an interna-
tional system combining state autonomy with international
commerce.
In rejecting a property rule for the resolution of treaty con-
flict, members of the International Law Commission invoked the
principle of state autonomy. The alternative adopted by the Inter-
national Law Commission for the resolution of treaty conflict re-
flected a tension between two different conceptions of interna-
tional relations similar to that envisioned by Hegel. The
Commission's article on treaty conflict could be viewed as either a
liability rule for the protection of treaty entitlement or a license
to breach. The Commission's approach was ambiguous as to
whether treaties established relationships entailing mutual respon-
sibility.46 8 This ambiguity seemed to reflect disagreement among
Commission members. Some opponents of a property conception
of treaty entitlements seemed to prefer a conception of treaties as
establishing "subjective rights" based on relations of good faith.
Others invoked a Darwinian vision of progress toward interna-
468. See supra text accompanying notes 344-47.
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tional order that seemed incompatible with such relations. Each of
these conceptions of international relations can be seen as the de-
velopment of a different aspect of Hegel's nationalist perspective
on international society.
F. State Autonomy and State Responsibility
We have sketched the development of the idea of state auton-
omy up to the point of its integration into the modern system of
international law. We have seen how this idea militates against a
property rule for protecting treaty entitlements. In this section,
we will see how the idea of state autonomy can be combined with
the idea of good faith to generate a justification for a liability rule.
In explaining the appeal of a liability rule protecting treaty
expectations, we face a dilemma. On the one hand, we need to
justify the rejection of a property rule in favor of a rule which
permits treaty conflict to occur; on the other hand we need to
explain why treaty conflict should, nevertheless, occasion sanc-
tions. We need to explain why breach should occur but also incur
liability.
The principle of state autonomy disengages us from one horn
of the dilemma because it identifies a value preserved by permit-
ting treaty conflict. If we permit treaty conflict, we run the risk
that treaties will be broken, but we enhance the capacity of states
to preserve their legitimacy. States may preserve their legitimacy
by protecting the interests of their subjects (the imperial model)
or the solidarity of their citizens (the republican model). Propo-
nents of both approaches have argued that preserving the sources
of their legitimacy requires that states retain their capacity to
breach. This is the principle of state autonomy which requires re-
jection of a property rule.
If the principle of state autonomy is to contribute to the justi-
fication of a liability rule, however, it must not force us onto the
second horn of our dilemma. If the exercise of state autonomy
requires an unrestricted license to breach, it pushes us too far.
The principle of state autonomy can only help us understand the
appeal of a liability rule to the extent that it is compatible with
responsibility to other states.
Upon initial reflection, the effort to reconcile national auton-
omy with international responsibility may seem hopeless. Yet after
tracing the development of the idea of state autonomy, it is clear
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that it need not be antithetical to international responsibility. The
value supposedly served by the principle of state autonomy is the
preservation of sovereignty-that is, legitimate power. We have
seen that in both the republican and the imperial traditions, the
legitimacy of power depends upon the fulfillment of responsibility
to others. For Hobbes and Bodin the judgment of the sovereign is
unreviewable, but that judgment must be exercised on behalf of
the welfare of its people.469 For Rousseau, the judgment of a vir-
tuous electorate is unreviewable, but his criterion of virtue re-
quires that such judgment be exercised on behalf of the welfare of
all.470 The exercise of sovereignty seems to imply responsibility to
other persons-but what about other nations? Can one sovereign
nation be bound by responsibility to another? On this question,
the imperial and republican models yield different answers.
The imperial model demands that sovereign and subject be
distinct. The sovereign can be bound by obligations to the subject,
so long as the subject does not share in sovereignty; on the other
hand, the sovereign can have no binding obligations toward other
sovereign states.47 1
The republican model, by contrast, requires that sovereign
and citizen be one.4 2 For Rousseau, in fact, it is crucial that sover-
eignty be shared. The other persons to whom the sovereign is re-
sponsible must themselves be sovereign. In Rousseau's republic,
all citizens have fiduciary obligations to one another, yet all citi-
zens are sovereign because they retain the faculty of judging how
best to fulfill their obligations to all. Could republics also form as-
sociations while retaining their sovereignty? While it would be a
distortion to claim that Machiavelli or Rousseau advocated inte-
grating republics into larger federations, both seem to have ad-
mired loyalty to one's allies more than did Bodin, Hobbes, or even
Hegel. Moreover, the medieval communes that spawned the re-
publics of the Renaissance did form federations, which they
469. See supra text accompanying notes 416-24, 432-34.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 397-99.
471. This is true of Hobbes' sovereign; Bodin's sovereign poses a more complicated
case. See supra text accompanying notes 422-24.
472. Rousseau requires that sovereign and subject be united in the citizen. See supra
notes 396-402 and accompanying text. Ancient Greek republicans were perfectly content
with the idea of noncitizen subjects, or even slaves. See D. DAvis, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY
IN WESTERN CULTURE 69-72 (1966).
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viewed as extensions of the communal ideal. 7
Rousseau's republic provides us with a model of an association
that combines universal autonomy of action with mutual responsi-
bility. The apparent conflict between autonomy and responsibility
is resolved by identifying autonomy with the exercise of judg-
ment, and defining responsibility as an obligation to seek, in good
faith, the welfare of the association as a whole. If Rousseau's re-
public was an organism, good faith was its 9lan vitale.
This model of association-the organic group 74-- became a
persistent theme in nineteenth century European political and le-
gal thought, particularly in Germany, "the most fertile soil . ..
for the development of political theory in the nineteenth cen-
tury." 7 5 Hegel was not alone in envisioning the state as such an
organism. He followed close on the heels of Friederich Schelling
and J. J. Wagner,476 and was succeeded by the political theorists
Krause47 7 and Bluntshcli,47 ' and the historical jurists Gerber 47 9
and Gierke. 30
These thinkers differed from Rousseau in two related re-
spects: their historicism and their pluralism. Frightened by the ex-
cesses of the French Revolution, they believed that the Jacobin
effort to create a new society ex nihilo had merely annihilated an
existing one. The fallacy inspiring this effort, they believed, was
the assumption that institutions could derive their legitimacy from
a universal human nature, rather than the values and customs of
existing communities. Accordingly, many nineteenth century Ger-
man thinkers rejected the eighteenth century conceit that society
was the product of a contract, viewing it instead as the outgrowth
of an organic development. Since they saw the great mistake of
the French Revolution as the destruction of those communities,
customs and institutions that bound society together, these think-
ers joined Hegel in insisting that the legitimate state coexist with
other organic associations .48  Rousseau, however, was suspicious
473. See supra text accompanying notes 378-79.
474. See generally R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 236-91.
475. C. MERRIAM, HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE RouSSEAu 90 (1900).
476. Id. at 90-92 (Schelling expressed this view in 1802, and Wagner in 1804).
477. Id. at 95 (in 1828).
478. Id. at 100 (in 1844 and 1852).
479. Id. at 113 (in 1869).
480. Id. at 114 (in 1868, 1873, 1874, 1881 and 1887).
481. Id. at 90 (Wagner), 95 (Krause), 116-17 (Gierke).
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of associations within the state, viewing them as vehicles for the
assertion of private interest.482 Gierke, by contrast, was much
more sanguine about both privacy and divided loyalty:
Gierke. . .argues that the fellowship is brought about by the transfer-
ence of the association segment of the single individual. Although this seg-
ment becomes part of a communal organism, the process does not eliminate
the entire personality of the individual. . .. [T]here remains at every man's
disposal a realm in which his private will is supreme. He is free to join one
or more fellowships simultaneously, but no amount of associative activity will
fully occupy his time or satisfy all his individual needs and ambitions.483
Since, for Gierke, the state derived its legitimacy from the associa-
tive behavior of its members, it had no higher claim to legitimacy
than any other association: "The notions of an artificial personal-
ity and the concessive legitimization of the association were en-
tirely alien to Germanic law.'' Accordingly, there was no intrin-
sic reason why an individual could not participate in many
associations, including the state. Since these associations were
"real persons" according to Gierke,8 5 they could participate in
associations as well. It thus becomes possible to imagine entire
states forming organic associations with one another, without giv-
ing up their own claims to legitimacy; and if an individual can par-
ticipate in multiple associations, then so, presumably, could a
state. If a state could undertake obligations to another state with-
out losing its autonomy, perhaps it could undertake obligations to
many states.
If we view the treaty as such an organic association, animated
by good faith, we can begin to see why it could create an entitle-
ment to liability but not specific performance. Absent a property
rule, each party may determine whether or not it wishes to per-
form a treaty. If a breaching party is required to compensate the
other parties for the violation of their expectations, it is con-
strained to take into account the interests of all other parties to
the treaty in deciding whether or not to breach. If, for example, a
breaching state could somehow be compelled to provide the other
parties with compensation of greater value to them than actual
performance of the treaty, then breaches would only occur when
482. J. RoussEAu, supra note 395, at 137, 147, 150.
483. Heiman, supra note 365, at 22-23.
484. Id. at 19.
485. Id. at 6-18.
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they would make all parties better off.
It may be argued that the same result could be obtained by
means of a property rule. Under a property rule, any party could
avoid performing if it succeeded in buying the consent of all other
parties. Presumably, if the breaching party was willing to make
the other parties better off, then it would be rational for them to
consent to nonperformance. Both property and liability rules can
insure that breaches make all parties better off; but only a liability
rule can do so consistent with party autonomy. Under a liability
rule, each party would be constrained to benefit the other parties,
but would retain the right to judge how to best do so. One conse-
quence of this would be that states could form new associations,
even if it violated the expectations of their existing allies. A view
of treaties as fiduciary associations would permit the simultaneous
proliferation of treaties and profligation of their terms. If associa-
tion is valued, an image of treaties as associations can serve to ra-
tionalize treaty conflict as the cost of fostering association.
G. The Principle of Good Faith in International Law
We have seen that a view of treaties as organic associations
animated by good faith could justify the recognition of treaty ex-
pectations as liability entitlements. As we have noted,486 the Con-
cert of Europe functioned as such an association throughout the
nineteenth century. Yet the partisans of organic association dur-
ing this period showed little interest in international associations.
One might think that this was because treaties were commonly
analogized to contracts, which these admirers of organic develop-
ment were inclined to view as artificial. Yet though Gierke was
unwilling to conceive of associations as contracts, he was willing to
treat the contract as a kind of association.487 As a result of
Gierke's contribution to the process of drafting Germany's civil
code, this approach has profoundly influenced German contract
law.488 It is through the influence of German contract law that the
image of a fiduciary association has emerged in the law of treaties.
This image has come into sharpest focus with the increasing invo-
486. See supra text following note 467.
487. Heiman, supra note 365, at 50.
488. Id. at 62.
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cation by Socialist and Third World states48 9 of the doctrine of
clausula rebus sic stantibus-a doctrine adapted from German con-
tract law.
The doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus may be easily mis-
understood by one approaching it from the vantage point of a
common law legal system. It is generally explained in terms of one
of two theories: the consent theory and the performance theory.
Common law scholars, viewing these issues as separate because
they are temporally distinct, often misunderstand both theories.
The consent theory holds that the assumption of conditions
remaining the same is an implicit condition of all treaties.4  This
notion of an implicit condition is expressed in Article 62 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as follows:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with re-
gard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which
was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for termi-
nating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence of those cir-
cumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be
bound by the treaty.49 1
Taken in isolation, this passage implies that the basis for terminat-
ing the treaty is the intention of both parties to be bound only
under certain conditions. This makes the application of the doc-
trine a matter of interpretation rather than substantive review. It
also raises two problems. First, a logical problem: if the validity of
the treaty is impliedly limited by certain conditions, the treaty
should terminate automatically when those conditions obtain. It
should, in other words, become not merely voidable at the will of
one of the parties, but void irrespective of that will.492
The second problem is not logical but practical. It is that par-
489. See infra notes 502-08, 579-612 and accompanying text.
490. This view is favored by a number of English-speaking writers. See C. FENWICK,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 454-58, 545 (3d. ed. 1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW § 156 (1962); Hill, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Statibus in International Law, U. Mo.
SruD. 10 (1934); Lissitsyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 895 (1967);
McNair, Terminaison et Dissolution des Traites, 22 RECuEIL DES CouRs 476 (1928). For fur-
ther discussions of this view, see A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION 20
(1975); G. HARASZT1, supra note 28, at 372-74.
491. S. ROSENNE, supra note 26, at 324.
492. A. DAVID, supra note 490, at 20; Briggs, The Attorney General Invokes Rebus Sic
Stantibus, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 89, 93 (1942); Second Report of G. Fitzmaurice on the Law of
Treaties, [1957] 2 Y. B. Ir'L L. COMM'N 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/107/1957.
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ties cannot be expected to agree on unexpressed intentions. 49 3 Of
course, these two criticisms undercut each other-because unex-
pressed (perhaps uncontemplated) intentions are not easily ascer-
tained, interpretation is necessary; because interpretation is neces-
sary, voidness cannot be automatic. This relationship between the
two criticisms does not answer them-but it does point to the ex-
istence of a relationship between interpretation and invalidation
which suggests that the criticisms may be based on an incomplete
understanding of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine.
The second theory of clausula rebus sic stantibus focuses on
the cost of performance. It is expressed in Article 62 as follows: A
change in circumstances does not terminate a treaty unless "(b)
the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of
obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 4 94 Taken in
isolation, this criterion for the invocation of the rebus sic stantibus
doctrine is easily assimilable to the common law defense of impos-
sibility. It is therefore subject to all of the usual critiques: that it
really amounts to exterior substantive review of the terms of the
bargain, that it fails to give effect to the intentions of the parties,
and that it is arbitrary and intrusive.495
All of the above criticisms of the doctrine of clausula rebus sic
stantibus assume that the two expressions of the doctrine represent
distinct and incompatible criteria for its application. This view is
based on a metaphysics of contract law which is foreign to the
tradition within which the rebus sic stantibus doctrine derives its
meaning. We may call the theory of contract upon which this cri-
tique is based the classical theory. According to this theory, a con-
tract is formed by a "meeting of the minds" as to all terms and
conditions of the bargain. The contract consists of all the terms
and conditions agreed to. One may dispute whether or not the
written memorandum of the contract completely expresses the in-
tentions of the parties at the time of contract formation, and one
may argue about what the intentions of the parties were; but
whatever those intentions were is what the contract requires.
Given this view of contract, adjudication of contract disputes
493. See A. DAVID, supra note 490, at 36, 44.
494. S. ROSENNE, supra note 26, at 324; see also supra text accompanying note 491.
495. A. DAVID, supra note 490, at 31-32; F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S COMMENTARIES ON




may take one of two forms: (1) it may discover and give effect to
the intentions of the parties-this is interpretation; or (2) it may
violate the intentions of the parties by engaging in substantive re-
view of the terms of the contract. Given this scheme, the first cri-
terion for the application of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine is a
criterion of interpretation, and the second is a criterion of sub-
stantive review-and both cannot be invoked simultaneously. Yet
Article 62 in fact requires that both be invoked simultaneously.
The relationship between the two criteria is conjunctive rather
than disjunctive. Thus, from the standpoint of classical contract
theory, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as expressed in Article 62
is a conundrum, requiring substantive review of a nonexistent
contract. That the classical view of contract, however, seems in-
compatible with the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus should not be
surprising. While no major legal system continues to adhere to the
classical view without qualification, the French and Anglo-Ameri-
can legal systems retain its basic conceptual framework. Neither
system recognizes the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.4 1 6
The private law tradition in which this doctrine is most vital is
the German.4 97 The German tradition has developed a very differ-
ent metaphysics of contract, influenced by the organic imagery of
romantic political thought. A proper understanding of this view of
contract requires some background in the history of the German
private law system.
The German reaction to the French codification of private
law was as ambivalent as the reaction of German intellectuals to
the French Revolution generally: they were envious of French
achievements, but did not wish to share in them. 98 The origina-
496. A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSrFI 1099-1103 (1977); see also
id. at 1049-65 (French cases on impossibility and force majeure).
497. While the doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus is sometimes associated with Ro-
man law, see, e.g., Rogenmoser v. Tiefengrund, 59 B.G.II 372 (Swiss Federal Court, 1st
Civil Div. 1933), reprinted and translated in R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 505 (1970),
it seems to have received its first modern exposition from Aquinas. See T. AQUINAS, 41
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 161 (T. O'Brien ed. 1972) (ist ed. n.p.n.d). See G. HARAZSTI, supra note
28, at 328; de Taube, L'inviolabiliti des Traigs, 32 RECUEIL DES CouRs 291, 361 (1930). The
doctrine found expression in 19th century civil codes in Bavaria and Prussia, and was in-
voked in the international context by Prussia and Austria in the eighteenth century, and by
Saxony in the early nineteenth century. See G. HARAZSTI, supra note 28, at 331-33.
498. A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 496, at 61-62 (German historical school
of jurisprudence rejects adoption of French Civil Code); see also G. IGGERS, THE GERMAN
CONCEPTION OF HISTORY 7, 16, 20 (1983) (German historicism a reaction to post-revolution-
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tor of the historicist tradition in German jurisprudence, Friedrich
Karl Von Savigny, summed up this attitude best by urging against
precipitous codification. A legal system can only legitimately exist,
Savigny argued, as the expression of the customs and values of a
community. Germany, he claimed, had not yet sufficiently devel-
oped an indigenous jurisprudence to justify codification; any pre-
mature codification would simply reflect illegitimate foreign influ-
ence.499 Three implications of Savigny's argument found their
way into German contracts jurisprudence: (1) The law, because it
is embodied in the consciousness of the community, transcends its
written expressions.5 0  (2) The law develops historically toward
concepts rather than being derived logically from them.50 1 (3) The
law gives effect to communal, rather than merely individual,
will.5 02
In response to Savigny's directives, German private law schol-
arship flourished in the nineteenth century, first developing a
classical theory of contract derived from Roman law, then, under
the leadership of Gierke, a more fluid, collectivist vision. The
German Civil Code, adopted in 1896, combined elements of
both.503 During the economic crises of the 1920's and 1930's,
German courts interpreted the flexible standards of the Code to
permit contractual liability arising out of unconsummated negotia-
tions, invalidation of coercive contracts and termination or modifi-
cation of contracts on the basis of the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus.50
ary French domination).
499. A. VON MEHRE & J. GORDLEY, supra note 496, at 61-66.
500. Fletcher, supra note 23, at 984-95.
501. G. IGEas, supra note 498, at 10 (hostility toward conceptual thinking in histori-
cal tradition); A. VON MEHEEN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 496, at 73 (anticonceptualism
among "germanist" and "historicist" scholars); see, e.g., Heiman, supra note 365, at 56-63;
R. VON IHERING, LAw AS A MEANs TO AN END (1913).
502. Heiman, supra note 365, at 3-24. See also R. VON IHERING, supra note 501, at 59-
70; Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany, 53 S. CAL L. REV. 657, 673-92 (1980); Kommers, Politics and Jurisprudence in West
Germany: State Financing of Political Parties, 16 AM. J. JuRIs. 215-23 (1971).
503. A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 496, at 75-79.
504. Id. at 1003-24; Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith,
and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 H.Av. L. REv. 401, 402-07 (1964) (20th
century German courts develop Von Ihering's proposal that contractual liability be recog-
nized as a result of unconsummated negotiations). See also A. VON MEHREN & J. GoRDLEY,
supra note 496, at 1073-99; Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1041 (1976) (coerced and coercive contracts invalidated or modified pursuant to
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The vision of contract that has emerged within this tradition
is a very different one from that which inspired the classical tradi-
tion. Where the classical tradition views the contract as identical
to the terms agreed upon by the parties, the romantic tradition
distinguishes between the contract and the terms in which it is
expressed. The contract is conceived not as a momentary meeting
of the minds, but as an enduring relationship between the parties.
The intent to form a contract is not so much a matter of consent
to a particular bargain as the will to enter into a relationship char-
acterized by good faith and fair exchange. The function of the
contract terms is to indicate what the parties considered a fair ex-
change under the circumstances obtaining at the time of contract
formation. Under radically different circumstances, a different ex-
change or no exchange might be in order. To attempt to enforce
the original terms under such conditions is a violation of good
faith.505 In the terms of the analytic framework set forth in Chap-
ter Three, the contractual relationship is a source of objective
right; the terms of the contract give the parties subjective rights
against one another. If one abuses these rights by attempting to
enforce them in violation of good faith, these subjective rights
may be modified or revoked in furtherance of objective right.
If one rereads Article 62506 in the romantic spirit, its two cri-
teria become a synthesis rather than a contradiction. When, in
paragraph 1(a), the International Law Commission requires that
the absent circumstance have "constituted an essential basis of
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty," it should be
understood to mean that the circumstance is essential to the par-
ties' consent to be bound by the terms of the treaty. Thus, if the
essential circumstance is absent, the treaty does not terminate au-
tomatically; rather its terms are no longer binding. The signifi-
cance of paragraph 1(b) is that it provides a criterion for the appli-
cation of 1(a)-that is, the circumstances essential to their intent
to be bound are those which effect the fairness of the bargain be-
tween the parties. In reviewing the fairness of the bargain, an in-
-'general clauses" of German Civil Code); Cohn, Frustration of Contract in German Law, 3 J
COMP. LEGis. & INT'L L. (3d s.) 15-25 (1946); Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts
in Germany, 1914 - 1924, 33 MicH. L. REv. 171 (1934) (rebus sic stantibus read into Article
138 (on good faith) of German Civil Code).
505. See supra notes 215-17.
506. See supra notes 491-94 and accompanying text.
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ternational tribunal would not violate the intent of the parties but
would give it effect. The mistakes made by common law readers
of Article 62 are (1) the assumption that the essential circum-
stance is a condition for the validity of the treaty rather than the
applicability of its terms; and (2) that the intent imputed to the
parties is an intent to terminate the treaty in the event of changed
circumstances rather than an intent to deal in good faith regard-
less of the circumstances.
During the International Law Commission's deliberations on
the question of treaty conflict, some members defended a liability
rule in terms of the idea of good faith and the doctrine of clausula
rebus sic stantibus, or "changed circumstance." Consider the fol-
lowing arguments offered by Mr. Bartov of Yugoslavia against a
property rule:
A party might. . . claim that the conclusion of a later treaty conflicting with
prior obligations had been due to a change of circumstances. That was the
main argument against a strict rule. There had been cases in which states
had been compelled, sometimes to the detriment of prior obligations for cer-
tain parties, to change their position by reason of later treaties. During the
liberation movement, for example, the development and progress of the lib-
erated nations would have been impossible without new treaties which,
strictly speaking, conflicted with peremptory norms. On that point an anal-
ogy could be drawn to personal freedom. Individuals assumed obligations
which conflicted with their earlier obligations, and could be held answerable
for their conduct, together with any accessories, if they had acted in bad
faith. The pacta sunt servanda rule imposed an obligation to perform the
contract faithfully, but it did not involve renouncing freedom of action.' 7
Bartov believed that the idea of good faith had to be interpreted
in light of the tension between state autonomy and responsibility
to other states:
It had been asked during the discussion whether a party to a new
treaty made with a third State must have acted in good faith if both treaties
were to have effect. He had no wish to encourage States to act in bad faith,
but he believed that in order to meet the needs of ordinary political life and
facilitate international relations, States should not be obliged to remain
bound by vestiges of treaties that were still formally in force, but no longer
corresponded to reality. A State must be free to exercise its treaty-making
capacity, subject only to the proviso that in doing so it engaged its interna-
tional responsibility.50 8
507. Summary Records of the 703rd Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 200-01,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963.
508. Summary Records of the 742nd Meeting, [1964] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'W 126,
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Such rhetoric reflects a view of treaties as fiduciary associations. If
the interest generated by a treaty is identified with the relation-
ship between the parties rather than the precise terms of the
treaty, valid treaties can coexist, notwithstanding the fact that
their terms conflict.
We have seen that rejection of the view of treaty entitlements
as property can be defended in terms of the principle that states
must preserve their autonomy in order to exercise power legiti-
mately. In addition, we have seen that the protection of treaty en-
titlements by a liability rule can be reconciled with the principle of
state autonomy, provided that treaties are conceived of as organic
associations animated by mutual good faith. Finally, we have seen
that members of the International Law Commission showed some
support for this approach in the context of treaty conflict. Ac-
cordingly, we have completed one of the tasks we set for ourselves
at the outset of this Chapter: we have reconstructed the case for a
liability rule to resolve treaty conflicts, and confirmed that it is an
outgrowth of the intellectual milieu of nineteenth century
nationalism.
We have a remaining problem to consider, however. The In-
ternational Law Commission did not adopt a liability rule, not-
withstanding support for such a rule among its members. The
rule it adopted seemed to be a compromise between a liability rule
and a simple license to breach; yet the sanctity of treaty obliga-
tions is one of the fundamental principles of international law, re-
affirmed in the preamble to the United Nations Charter. 09 How
could a group of eminent international lawyers, convened for the
purpose of codifying the law of treaties, under the auspices of the
United Nations, countenance a license to breach? How can indif-
ference to breach be reconciled with a commitment to interna-
tional law? Surprisingly, an answer to this question, too, can be
culled from the intellectual legacy of nineteenth century
nationalism.
H. State Autonomy and World History
We noted earlier that a number of influential German jurists
and political theorists of the nineteenth century viewed the state
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1964.
509. See supra note 81.
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as an autonomous organic association. We noted also that by view-
ing the treaty as an organic association we could reconcile state
autonomy with state responsibility. It should not be assumed, how-
ever, that nineteenth century admirers of the organic state viewed
international relations as a forum for organic association. To the
contrary, they were inclined to view the state as the largest possi-
ble association. Gierke, for example, followed Hegel in viewing
the state as the "highest right on earth," 510 not to mention the
strongest power. "A will corresponding to such power is distin-
guished from every other, as a sovereign will, absolutely universal,
determined only through itself."""1 Gierke apparently did not en-
vision viable associations beyond the boundaries of the state.
We have seen that there is nothing intrinsic to the idea of an
organic association requiring such myopia. Hegel was able to im-
agine international federations characterized by solidarity. What
focused his attention on the problem of national solidarity was the
sense that worldwide harmony was simply incompatible with in-
dustrial capitalism. Mutually fiduciary relations might be possible
among groups of nations, but in the face of economic competi-
tion, such relations could never be universalized. For Hegel, an
international association would be the functional equivalent of a
state; the faith uniting such an association would still be an in-
stance of particular rather than universal solidarity. Hegel saw in-
ternational relations as fundamentally competitive rather than co-
operative. Virtue was particular rather than universal, and so
there could be no binding obligations between particular commu-
nities. Given Hegel's perspective on international relations, a li-
cense to breach treaties makes perfect sense.5 12
Nevertheless, Hegel's perspective on international relations is
at odds with some of the basic premises of his philosophical sys-
tem. That system, it may be recalled, required that only the uni-
versal be viewed as real. Accordingly, the identity and indepen-
dence of any particular community, state or federation had to be
viewed as ephemeral and, ultimately, illusory. Yet this meant that
particular communities could not be the ultimate source of value
510. Heiman, supra note 365, at 51.
511. C. MERRIAM, supra note 475, at 117.
512. Treaties do not have "the actuality of actual contracts. . . . Hence they should
not be viewed according to the way of civil contracts." G. HEGF., JENAER REALPHILOSOPHIE
261 (1967), quoted in S. AvINERI, supra note 448, at 201.
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on earth. Despite Hegel's vision of international relations as a
realm of irreducible conflict between particular values, his meta-
physical premises committed him to a view of the world as a har-
monious whole governed by a single framework of values. Hence
skepticism about international obligations posed the same prob-
lem for Hegel that it later did for the members of the Interna-
tional Law Commission. In each case, such relativism seemed in-
compatible with a deeply held commitment to the realization of
universal values.
Hegel's solution to this problem involved redefining cultural
relativism as historical relativism. Since the values of particular
communities could not be harmonized, their relationship to uni-
versal values could not be that of part to whole; instead Hegel
imagined the value system of each nation as a candidate for uni-
versal acceptance. He imagined "world history" as a teleological
process, culminating in the realization of universal values. In ob-
serving any struggle between nations, Hegel argued, it is impossi-
ble to determine which cause has the greater merit. Each is sub-
jectively "right." 513 Only hindsight can reveal which side was
favored by history.
The principles of the national minds are wholly restricted on account of
their particularity . . . . Their deeds and destinies in their reciprocal rela-
tions to one another are the dialectic of the finitude of these minds, and out
of it arises the universal mind, the mind of the world, free from all restric-
tion, producing itself as that which exercises its right-and its right is the
highest right of all-over these finite minds in the "history of the world
which is the world's court of judgment."514
From this exalted perspective, some nations count and others do
not:
The nation to which is ascribed a moment of the Idea is dominant in
world history during this one epoch, and it is only once that it can make its
hour strike. In contrast with this its absolute right of being the vehicle of
this present stage in the world's mind's development, the minds of the other
nations are without rights, and they, along with those whose hour has struck
already, count no longer in world history.515
As a consequence, some nations are justified in exploiting others:
The same consideration justifies civilized nations in regarding and treating
513. S. AVINERI, supra note 448, at 202.
514. HEG's PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 447, § 340 (footnote omitted).
515. Id. § 347 (footnote omitted).
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as barbarians those who lag behind them in institutions which are the essen-
tial moments of the state. . . . The civilized nation is conscious that the
rights of barbarians are unequal to its own and treats their autonomy as only
a formality. 516
By identifying universal value with progress rather than har-
mony or consensus, Hegel reconciled it with conflict and domina-
tion. Conflict had the dual merit of bringing out every nation's
best,517 and hastening the fall of those nations whose hour was
past. Accordingly, one should neither condemn the aggressor, nor
mourn the loser. "While absorbed in their mundane interests they
are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world
mind at work within them. The shapes which they take pass away,
while the absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to
its next higher stage."518 "It is not the universal Idea . . . which
puts itself in danger; it holds itself safe from attack. . . and sends
the particular passion into the struggle to be worn down. We can
call it the cunning of reason that the idea makes passions work for
it." 519
The notion that subjective passions could coincidentally con-
tribute to the realization of collective values had become increas-
ingly popular during the preceding century. Proponents of the
imperial state offered it as a response to republican anxieties
about the corrupting effects of commerce. 5 0 A well-constructed
constitution, argued Montesqiueu, could maintain the stability of a
polity without having to rely on the virtue of its citizenry.521 In
fact, argued Bernard Mandeville, free trade could transform pri-
vate vices into public virtue.5 22 Predictable punishment, argued
Bentham, would put self-interest in the service of the law. 523 Fi-
nally, and most famously, Adam Smith argued that the guiding
hand of avarice would continuously maintain the most efficient
516. Id. § 351.
517. See generally S. AVINERI, supra note 448, at 197-99.
518. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 447, § 345.
519. G. HEGEL, REASON IN HISTORY 105 (Hoffmeister ed. 1955), quoted in C. TAYLOR,
HEGEL AND MODERN SociETY 98 (1979).
520. See, e.g., A. HIRSCHMANN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERES 14-42 (1977).
521. See generally 2 C. MONTmQUIEu, THE SPInrr OF THE LAWS 149-83 (T. Nugen trans.
1949). See also, A. HIRSCHMANN, supra note 520, at 70-87.
522. See A. HIRSCHMANN, supra note 520, at 18; Sprague, Bernard Mandeville, 5 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 148 (Edwards ed. 1967).
523. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (1789).
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distribution of goods and division of labor.2 4
A crucial premise of these arguments was the expectation
that the pursuit of particular interest would generate conflict or
competition. Provided that the contending forces were properly
balanced, they could contribute to the maintenance of an equilib-
rium.2 5 Basic to these arguments, then, was the assumption that
conflict, rather than community, was a source of stability. Interna-
tional relations was the first context in which this principle was
articulated. After the Peace of Westphalia (1648), European polit-
ics were structured by the goal of maintaining a balance of power;
but until the Congress of Vienna (just six years before Hegel pub-
lished his Philosophy of Right), the preservation of this balance was
a goal for which the major powers were frequently compelled to
fight. 528  "Like the term 'interest' itself," wrote Albert
Hirschmann,
the notion of a balance of interests was transferred in England from its origi-
nal context involved with statecraft-where it yielded the concept of "bal-
ance of power"-to the conflict-ridden domestic scene. After the Restora-
tion and during the debate on religious toleration, there was much
discussion about the advantages that might accrue to the public interest
from the presence of a variety of interests and from a certain tension be-
tween them.5 
7
Hegel's image of international relations was shaped by his
observation of the balance-of-power system. What Hegel added to
this scheme was the idea of progress. In Hegel's eyes, conflict
would generate not stability, but continuous progressive change.
This addition, however, altered the prospects of losers in a con-
524.
It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose
them to turn their stock towards the employments which in ordinary cases are
most advantageous to the society. But if from this natural preference they
should turn too much of it toward those employments, the fall of profit in them
and the rise of it in all others immediately dispose them to alter this faulty
distribution. Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private interests
and passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock of
every society, among the different employments carried on in it, as nearly as
possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole
society.
A. SmrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 594-95 (E. Canaan ed. 1937) (Ist ed. London 1776),
quoted in A. HIRSCHMANN, supra note 520, at 110-11.
525. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
526. K. PoLANyi, supra note 117, at 6-7.
527. A. HmiScHMANN, supra note 520, at 51 (footnote omitted).
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flict. If the purpose of conflict was stability, private misfortune,
like private vice, was a necessary cost. In a balance of power sys-
tem, for example, it might be necessary to defeat an overly ambi-
tious adversary, but it would never be rational to utterly destroy
an enemy that might later be useful as an ally. If the purpose of
conflict is progress, however, its destructive consequences are not
necessarily counted as a cost. From such an evolutionary perspec-
tive, destruction is itself a benefit, steadily "improving" a system
by purging its retrograde elements.
Hegel was not unique among nineteenth century thinkers in
invoking progress as a justification for destruction, for it was dur-
ing this period that the idea of progress came to play a crucial role
in justifying the imperial state. Eighteenth century imperialists
had promoted the idea of balance in order to defend commerce as
a stabilizing force. Yet such a defense was required as a response
to republican perceptions of commerce as destabilizing. This re-
publican anxiety was expressed in terms of an increasing identifi-
cation of commerce with corruption rather than fortune. Fortune
was a universal entropic force, resistable by particular virtuous
communities, via a collective will that was bent on maintaining or-
der. Corruption, by contrast, was particular. Like virtue, it was
characteristic of both individuals and associations. Virtue was
helpless against it, because it appropriated the very will upon
which virtue depended. Commerce, conceived as routinized cor-
ruption, was an algorithmic force for change.
With the advent of the industrial revolution, proponents of
the imperial state no longer attempted to refute this charge. The
destruction of personality and community already observed by
Adam Smith in the late eighteenth century, 29 was accepted by
Hegel as the price of industrialization.529 Progress was the silver
528. See Heilbroner, The Paradox of Progress: Decline and Decay in The Wealth of Na-
tions, 34 J. Hisr. IDEAs 242-62 (1973).
529. See S. AVINERI, supra note 448, at 93 (Hegel quoting Smith on the consequences
of factory labor); Hegel did not agree with Smith's optimistic contentions, however:
Hegel accepts Smith's view that behind the senseless and conflicting clash of
egoistic interests in civil society a higher purpose can be discerned; but he does
not agree with the hidden assumption which implies that everyone in society is
thus being well taken care of. Poverty, which for Smith is always marginal to his
model, assumes another dimension in Hegel. For the latter, pauperization and





lining on the cloud that had threatened to spoil the enlighten-
ment. Recognizing that progress was merely the bright side of
corruption, Hegel was enough a republican to want it shipped
overseas.
I. The Progressive Development of International Law
By identifying international conflict as an instrument of pro-
gress, Hegel was able to reconcile his commitment to universal
value with his value relativism. As a consequence, he could ap-
plaud breach of treaty with complete indifference to the misfor-
tunes of the promisee. In reconciling a license to breach with
their commitment to international law, members of the Interna-
tional Law Commission adopted a similar strategy: they justified
the formation of new treaties in violation of older treaties in the
interest of "the progressive development of international law."
Lauterpacht and Fitzmaurice had both expressed misgivings
about a property rule because it wouldn't adequately protect the
interests of innocent parties to a later conflicting treaty. While
Lauterpacht and Fitzmaurice disagreed about the nature of a lia-
bility rule, both agreed that its appeal lay in its capacity to simulta-
neously protect the parties to both treaties. The rule drafted under
Waldock's guidance, however, provided little protection to the
parties to either treaty.5 30
Waldock defended this result by stressing the potential impor-
tance of future treaties.
[T]reaties today serve many different purposes, legislation, conveyance of
territory, administrative arrangement, constitution of an international or-
ganization, etc. as well as purely reciprocal contracts; and, even if it be ac-
cepted that the illegality of a contract to break a contract is a general princi-
ple of law ... it does not at all follow that the principle should be applied to
treaties infringing prior treaties.83 1
Waldock valorized "legislation" and "constitution" as opposed to
mere "contract." Treaties of the former type presumably would
have value for the international legal system, whereas treaties of
the latter type would be of value only to the parties. Waldock ad-
vised international lawyers not to obstruct the eventual legitima-
tion of institutions which would advance their goals: "The imper-
530. See supra text accompanying notes 344-48.
531. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 296, at 56.
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fect state of international organization and the manifold uses to
which treaties are put seem to make it unnecessary for the Com-
mission to be active in laying down rules which brand treaties as
illegal and void." 532 There was a prudential concern here as
well-Waldock was urging international lawyers not to undermine
the legitimacy of existing institutions of international law by enun-
ciating norms which those institutions could not enforce.
The principle of good faith may be reinterpreted as a veiled
expression of such cynicism. Brierly, another of the International
Law Commission's Special Reporters, exemplifies this view:
It is a truism to say that no international interest is more vital than the ob-
servance of good faith between states, and the sanctity of treaties is a neces-
sary corollary. On the other hand, the circumstances in which a treaty was
made may change, and its obligations become so onerous as to thwart the
development to which a state feels entitled; and when this happens, it is
likely, human nature being what it is, that a state which feels strong enough
will disregard them, whether it has a legal justification or not .... It may be
... that if international law insists too rigidly on the binding force of trea-
ties, it will merely defeat its own purpose by encouraging their violation. s
Brierly defends the principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus on the
ground that international law can't prevent breach anyway. This
is precisely the concern Waldock ascribed to Lauterpacht and
Fitzmaurice in interpreting their expressions of respect for the
principle of good faith. As a result, he assumed that the purpose
of a liability rule was not to compensate victims, but to permit
breach.
One of the delegates most vigorously supporting Waldock's
position was Mr. de Luna of (then fascist) Spain. For de Luna,
Waldock's proposal was preferable to both a property rule and a
liability rule based on the principle of good faith. de Luna be-
lieved that a property rule would "build a veritable bastion of ul-
532. Id.
533. J. BRIERLY supra note 120, at 331-32. Another example of such an interpretation
is provided by A. David:
For all practical matters . . .the fundamental right theory of termination
reaches the same conclusion as the implied term doctrine. This similarity of
conclusions arising from diametrically opposed theories is symptomatic of the
policy of flexibility of treaty obligations and adjustment to "circumstances" and
"conditions" on the basis of short-term interest, upon which peace in the classi-
cal balance of power was commonly perceived to depend.
A. DAVID, supra note 490, at 19-20.
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tra-conservatism or even reaction in international law, ' 534 which
would encourage "resort ... to the rebus sic stantibus clause, ' 5 35
paradoxically increasing "the danger of international anarchy.15 36
de Luna perceived the rebus sic stantibus clause as a source of anar-
chy because it permits states to modify or terminate restrictive
treaties based on substantive criteria of fairness. In an interna-
tional system including both fascist Spain and the national libera-
tion movements enamored of the rebus sic stantibus clause, "fair-
ness" is a matter of controversy. de Luna preferred to join
Waldock in licensing breach in the interest of the "progressive de-
velopment of international law. '537 This meant that breach would
be condoned where it received the acquiescence of other states,
particularly the Western powers that played a leading role in the
United Nations. 58 The pragmatic reasoning offered by Waldock,
Brierly and de Luna suggests that they assumed that breach was
best licensed according to a criterion much more readily discern-
ible than fairness-the criterion of naked power.
The phrase "progressive development" is drawn from the
United Nations Charter. It is employed in that context to describe
one of the conditions for the legitimacy of colonial rule. Article
13 provides that members in control of dependent territories
should "develop self-government, take due account of the political
aspirations of the peoples and . . . assist them in the progressive
development of their political institutions."'539 The implication is
that until institutions are developed which an observer (Western?)
would view as "progressive," colonial rule is legitimate. The role
accorded the colonial power by this article-benevolent trustee-
ship-is an essential feature of the imperial model of the state.
The phrase "progressive development" thus seems to be a cipher
for domination of one nation by another. In the context of treaty
law, the "progressive development of international law" seems to
entail the complete (that is, uncompensated) subordination of the
treaty expectations of some nations to the goal of preserving and
534. Summary Records of the 703rd Meeting, supra note 507, at 202.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 198.
537. See supra note 339.
538. See generally Steams, The Dilemma of Struggle Through the International Order, 11
INt'L J. Sor. L. 65 (1983) (assessment of the United Nations as an instrument of Western
powers).
539. U. N. CHARTmR, art. 73, para. 6.
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developing international institutions. According to Hegel, such an
institution "would be the domination of one nation, or would
merely be one people; its universality would be obliterated."'" 0
For the International Law Commission, as for Hegel, such domi-
nation was the price of international progress. Based on percep-
tions of the international system similar to Hegel's, certain mem-
bers of the International Law Commission saw the development
of international institutions as incompatible with treaty relations
based on good faith.
J. Alternatives to a Property Rule Summarized
The rejection of a property rule for protecting treaty expec-
tations is generally motivated by a commitment to the principle of
state autonomy. That principle is the outgrowth of two distinct
traditions in political theory, the republican and the imperial. The
first tradition values community and condemns commerce; the
second tradition values individuality and favors commerce. De-
spite their incompatibility, the two fused in nineteenth century na-
tionalism, as exemplified by Hegel's political thought. Extension
of the republic beyond the borders of a single state would involve
a view of treaties as fiduciary associations; expectations generated
by such treaties would be liability entitlements. Extension of the
empire beyond the borders of the state would involve a view of
treaties as relations of domination; expectations generated by such
treaties would be unenforceable. Nineteenth century nationalists
sought to protect the republican value of community from the ef-
fects of industrial capitalism by means of imperialism abroad.
Such nationalism therefore required a dualistic system of interna-
tional relations, combining association with exploitation. Ambiva-
lence in the International Law Commission between a liability
rule for the protection of treaty entitlements and a license to
breach reflects this continuing dilemma of nationalism.
540. JENAER REALPHILOSOPHIE II DIE VORLESUNGER VON 1805-06, 261 (Hoffmeister ed.
1967) quoted in S. AVINERI, supra note 448, at 202 n.20.
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VIII. NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM
We have identified two competing approaches to the problem
of treaty conflict and explored the arguments supporting each ap-
proach. One approach entails a view of the creation of conflicting
treaty obligations as the violation of objective right and the in-
fringement of a property entitlement. We have found that while
the arguments supporting this approach have been diverse, they
have shared a common vision of a harmonious international soci-
ety and a sovereign international legal order. This approach has
traditionally found favor with academic commentators since the
seventeenth century. The second approach rejects the first as vio-
lative of state autonomy. Instead, it entails ambivalence as be-
tween two responses to conflicting treaties: one which would rec-
ognize both treaties as sources of subjective liability entitlements;
another which would treat both treaties as legally unenforce-
able." ' This approach too is supported by a variety of arguments;
these arguments converge on an ascription of sovereignty to states
and a vision of the realm of international relations as fundamen-
tally competitive and entropic. This latter approach found favor
with the International Law Commission. Nevertheless, the former
view retains the support of important participants in the interna-
tional system." ' This Chapter will offer an explanation for the
persistence of these two approaches to the treaty conflict problem.
541. I am leaving open the possibility that one of the treaties might be enforceable by
the coercion of the parties themselves. In the context of treaty conflict, the invocation of
"progressive development"-which supports a license to breach- implies a clear prefer-
ence for the later of two conflicting treaties.
542. The most important proponent of the property view in the international commu-
nity is the Soviet Union. See infra text accompanying notes 613-14. During the I.L.C. de-
bates on the problem of treaty conflict, the Soviet representative was joined by the repre-
sentatives of Poland, India and Uruguay in expressing support for the property view.
Summary Records of the 687th Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 86.88, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER. A/1963 (Poland); id. at 88-89 (Soviet Union); id. at 91 (India); Summary
Records of the703rd Meeting, supra note 507, at 196-97 (India & Uruguay); id. at 197-98
(Soviet Union); Summary Records of the 742nd Meeting, supra note 508, at 120-21 (Soviet
Union & Uruguay); id. at 122 (Poland); id. at 123 (Uruguay); Summary Records of the
743rd Meeting, [1964] 1 Y.B. Ir'L L. CoMM'N 129, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1964 (So-
viet Union). China has, at times, expressed support for the property view as well. See H.
CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 54-56 (1972). Gyorgy
Haraszti, Hungary's representative to the International Law Commission, has also ex-
pressed support for this view: "In our opinion a solution of the problem has to be ap-
proached from the peremptory norms of international law." G. HARASZTI, supra note 28, at
304.
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It will suggest that the persistence of these two approaches can be
ascribed to the persistence of the visions of international society
underlying each. It will argue that, though these visions of inter-
national society are incompatible, both have persisted because
both have been viewed as crucial to the legitimation of interna-
tional law. As a result, proponents of each of the two approaches
to treaty conflict simultaneously adopt both views of international
society.
A. Monism in International Law
We shall begin by summarizing and contrasting the visions of
international society underlying the property and liability views. I
shall suggest that these social visions are reflected, but not fully
expressed, by two recognized approaches to the problem of legiti-
mating international law.
We have concluded that arguments for a view of treaty expec-
tations as property entitlements relied on the doctrine of jus
cogens. This doctrine, we have seen, is in turn dependent on the
notion of an "objective" international law, from which the sover-
eignty of individual nations can be derived.
The view that national sovereignty is derivative from the in-
ternational legal order is associated with a recognized school of
thought within international legal theory. This school of thought
is called "monism," because it sees international law and munici-
pal legal systems as part of a single, consistent legal order. '4 Mo-
543.' Lauterpacht offers a fairly succinct characterization of monism:
[T]he monistic doctrine denies, in the first instance, that the subjects of the two
systems of law are essentially different and maintains that in both it is ultimately
the conduct of individuals which is regulated by law, the only difference being
that in the international sphere the consequences of such conduct are attrib-
uted to the State. Secondly, it asserts that in both spheres law is essentially a
command binding upon the subjects of the law independently of their will.
Thirdly, it maintains that International Law and Municipal Law, far from being
essentially different, must be regarded as manifestations of a single conception
of law. . . . The main reason for the essential identity of the two spheres of law
is, it is maintained, that some of the fundamental notions of International Law
cannot be comprehended without the assumption of a superior legal order from
which the various systems of Municipal Law are, in a sense, derived by way of
delegation.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 21. For other comparisons of monism and dualism, see K.
HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 238-47 (1967), and Margolis, Soviet Views on
the Relationship Between National and International Law, 4 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 116-20 (1955).
These authors refer the reader to the following expositions of monism: DuGurr, TRAITf DE
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nists see national sovereignty as contingent upon compliance with
international law. Of course this principle requires some limita-
tion, else it would threaten to deprive any state of sovereignty for
the slightest violation of international law. Accordingly, monists
would simply refuse recognition to acts violating international law
rather than to the states committing such acts. Only those acts
consistent with international law would be recognized as legally
valid. Monists recognize that the state machinery of a nation may
act contrary to international law, but hold that when it does, it
acts without sovereignty. Monism views the international legal sys-
tem as a kind of imperial super-state5 4 and views the sovereignty
of nations as the Romans viewed the legal personality of associa-
tions: as a concession from the emperor. Since sovereignty is a
concession from the international legal order, an act contrary to
international law is an act ultra vires.4 5 Monists are proponents of
an expansive doctrine of jus cogens: for them any rule of interna-
tional law may become a peremptory norm.4 8
While monists would deny the municipal legality of acts vio-
lating international law, they insist that international law obliga-
tions are valid as municipal law. Accordingly, they view all treaties
as self-executing-that is, as automatically incorporated into mu-
nicipal law without any additional enabling legislation.
B. Monism as an Internationalist Social Vision
Thus far I have presented monism as a set of positions on
some important doctrinal issues in international law. Implicit in
these positions, however, is a certain picture of international soci-
ety. The reason that monism implies a peculiar perspective on in-
DRorr CONSTITUTIONNEL 7 (1911); H. KELsEN, supra note 135, at 424, 551-88; H. KRABBE,
THE MODERN IDEA OF THE STATE 55-57 (G. Sabine trans. 1930); G. SCELLE, PRECIS DE DROIT
DES GENs 27-49 (1932); Bourquin, Regles ghnirales du Droit de la Paix, 35 RECUEIL DES COURS
143-44 (1931); Kelsen, Les Rapports de Systene: entre le Droit Interne et le Droit International
Public, 14 REcuEIL DES CouRs 227, 274 (1926); Krabbe, L'Id6e Moderne de L'Etat, 13
RECUEIL DES CouRs 577 (1926); Kunz, La Primaute du Droit des Gens, 6 REVUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPARE [R.D.I.L.C.] 556, 588-89 (3d series 1925).
544. See supra text accompanying notes 248-49, 294.
545. For a description of the ultra vires doctrine in corporate law, see Schaeftler,
Clearing Away the Debris of the Ultra Vires Doctrine: A Comparative Examination of U.S., Euro-
pean and Israeli Law, 16 LAW & POLICY INT'L Bus. 71 (1984).
546. See generally supra, notes 260-94 and accompanying text.
547. See K. HoLLowAY, supra note 543, at 240-47.
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ternational society is because its conclusions are counterintuitive:
the conclusion that the legitimacy of state governments is depen-
dent upon international legal institutions, and that such states can
have no legal system independent of such institutions does not
square with observation. Even if it be admitted that many states
could not govern their own populations without the recognition,
support, tolerance and commerce of other states,"4 8 there is no
reason to think that most nations are dependent upon interna-
tional law and its institutions. No simple positivism can justify con-
ceiving international legal institutions on such a grand scale.
We have, however, encountered two major traditions of polit-
ical thought which accord authority to legal systems on the basis
of normative rather than positive criteria. One of these is the nat-
ural law tradition. This tradition retained the universal and hier-
archical structure that we have attributed to medieval political
theory, and it played a role in the development of the imperial
tradition in modern political theory. Within the natural law tradi-
tion, positive law is valid only ins6far as it conforms to universal
imperatives. In this sense, every sovereign is seen as a mere agent
or fief of natural law, just as, in medievel political theory, every
crown owed fealty to God. Within the modern natural law tradi-
tion, however, the source of common obligation is human nature
rather than divine authority. Only one law is valid for all nations,
because human nature is everywhere the same.
A second jurisprudential tradition that might conceivably be
marshalled on behalf of monism is the romantic tradition associ-
ated with Rousseau, Savigny, Hegel and Gierke. This suggestion is
clearly counterintuitive, in light of the nationalistic sentiments of
those thinkers. Nevertheless, Hegel was committed to the realiza-
tion of universal values. Since he saw the social conditions im-
posed by industrial capitalism as the chief barrier to the realiza-
tion of such values in a world-state, it is worth speculating about
what sort of social conditions might have rendered such a state
possible.
The romantic tradition, though vigorously opposed to the
natural law tradition in eighteenth and early nineteenth century
Germany,549 was just as vigorously opposed to positivism in the
548. 0. BErrz, supra note 135, at 42-44.
549. G. IGGERS, supra note 498, at 4-6.
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later nineteenth and twentieth centuries.550 Romantic jurispru-
dence retained a republican insistence upon civic virtue as a pre-
requisite to sovereignty. In the eyes of Rousseau and Savigny, the
mere maintenance of order did not indicate the presence of a le-
gitimate legal system. In order to be recognized as legitimate, a
legal system had to embody the will or spirit of an organic com-
munity. If no such group spirit characterized a governed popu-
lation, therefore, the institutions of its government could not be
legitimate.5 52 If, on the other hand, such an organic community
550. FLETCHER, supra note 23, at 984-85.
551.
[T]he general will alone can direct the forces of the state in accordance with
that end which the state has been established to achieve-the common good;
for if conflict between private interests has made the setting up of civil societies
necessary, harmony between those same interests has made it possible. It is
what is common to those different interests which yields the social bond; if
there were no point on which separate interests coincided, then society could
not conceivably exist. And it is precisely on the basis of this common interest
that society must be governed.
J. RoussEAu, supra note 220, at 69.
In the earliest times to which authentic history extends, the law will be found to
have already attained a fixed character, peculiar to the people, like their lan-
guage, manners, and constitution. Nay, these phenomena have no separate exis-
tence, they are but the particular faculties and tendencies of an individual peo-
ple, inseparably united in nature, and only wearing the semblance of distinct
attributes to our view. That which binds them into one whole is the common
conviction of the people, the kindred consciousness of an inward necessity, ex-
cluding all notion of an accidental and arbitrary origin.
F. SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSRER ZEIT FOR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1814)
(A. Hayward trans. 1831), cited in A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 62
(1977).
552.
[W]hen the social tie begins to slacken and the state to weaken, when particular
interests begin to make themselves felt and sectional societies begin to exert an
influence over the greater society, the common interest becomes corrupted and
meets opponents; voting is no longer unanimous; the general will is no longer
the will at all.
In the end.. . when the social bond is broken in every heart. . . then the
general will is silenced. . . and the people enacts in the guise of law iniquitous
decrees which have private interests as their only end.
J. RoussEAu, supra note 220, at 150. "Law grows with the growth, and strengthens with
the strength of the people, and finally dies away as the nation loses its nationality." F.
SAVIGNY, supra note 551, at 63;
If we consider legal relations in abstraction from any particular content they
may have we are left with a general entity which regulates the common life of
many men in a definite way. If one goes no further than this abstract concep-
tion of many men one can easily be led to think that law is their invention, an
invention without which the external freedom of individuals could not exist.
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was present, the will of that community, rather than its enacted
law or governing institutions, was its true law.
Like the natural law tradition, therefore, the romantic tradi-
tion offers a concept of law that transcends positive law. The dif-
ference is that it is explicitly particularistic and relativistic, rather
than universal and absolute. Within romantic jurisprudence, legal
validity is contingent on the will of a particular community identi-
fied with a particular historical experience. Romantic jurispru-
dence is obsessed with presence: the actual presence of an organic
community is a prerequisite to legitimate institutions, and the im-
mediate presence of its members to one another is part of what
makes such a community organic. Within such a conceptual
framework, international law could command exclusive legitimacy
only in the presence of an actual universal community, character-
ized by some kind of collective consciousness.
Both the natural law tradition and the romantic tradition of-
fer conceptions of law that transcend positive law. Accordingly,
monists may appeal to either one in justifying the monumental
role they accord to international law, in the face of its diminutive
performance. Yet the application of either concept to interna-
tional law requires adherence to a view of international society as
fundamentally harmonious. Monism is not merely a doctrinal posi-
tion, but an anthropological faith-for the monist must believe
that all human beings, whether as a consequence of nature or his-
tory, are bound by the same values.
C. Dualism in International Law
Monism is commonly contrasted with a competing view of the
relationship between national and international authority that is
referred to as "dualism." The dualistic view, not surprisingly,
holds that the actions of states in the international sphere are sub-
ject to dual authority. States are bound by both international and
municipal law, according to dualists, but these obligations are in-
But such an accidental collection of an undefined aggregate of men is an arbi-
trary supposition totally lacking in truth. And if it ever had happened that men
were thrown together in this way they would undoubtedly lack any power to
produce law since necessity does not entail the power to satisfy it.
F. SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN R6MIscHEN REcIs 18 (1840), cited in A. VON MEHREN &
J. GORDLEY supra note 496, at 65.
5051985]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
dependent of one another. 53 The claim that international law and
municipal law are separate spheres, expressed by Fitzmaurice, 4
exemplifies this posture. From a dualistic perspective, noted Lau-
terpacht, "the Law of Nations is a law not above, but between,
sovereign states, and is therefore a weaker law." 5 H.E. Cohen
offers as an example of dualism
the theory of national sovereignty as formulated by [Ad6har] Esmein. To his
mind [international law] was still incompletely formed; whatever validity it
had was due to the strength of opinion or of the treaties into which the state
enters. Apart from this, there is no international community forming a
union superior to the states.5 56
For the dualist Georg Jellinek, as well:
[I]nternational law was a law among states, not the law of a civitas maxima
operating on individuals. Because this is so, the rules of international law
553. Lauterpacht summarizes the dualistic position as follows:
[T]he Law of Nations and the Municipal Law of the several States are essen-
tially different from each other. They differ, first, as regards their sources. The
sources of Municipal Law are custom grown up within the boundaries of the
State concerned and statutes enacted by the law-giving authority. The sources
of International Law are custom grown up among States and law-making trea-
ties concluded by them.
The Law of Nations and Municipal Law differ, secondly, regarding the rela-
tions they regulate. Municipal Law regulates relations between the individuals
under the sway of a State and the relations between the State and the individ-
ual. International Law, on the other hand, regulates relations between States.
The Law of Nations and Municipal Law differ, thirdly, with regard to the
substance of their law: whereas Municipal Law is a law of a sovereign over indi-
viduals subjected to his sway, the Law of Nations is a law not above, but be-
tween, sovereign States, and is therefore a weaker law.
[T]he Law of Nations can neither as a body nor in parts be per se a part of
Municipal Law. Just as Municipal Law lacks the power of altering or creating
rules of International Law, so the latter lacks absolutely the power of altering
or creating rules of Municipal Law.
I L. OPPENHEIM,, supra note 26, § 21; Margolis, supra note 543. For the most prominent
expositions of dualism, see H. TRIEPEL, V6LKERRECHT UND LANDESRECHT (1899) and Triepel,
Les rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne, I RECUEIL DES COURs 77 (1923), and
1 D. ANzILorr, CORSO Di DIRrrro INTERNAZIONALE 47-61 (1928).
554. See supra text accompanying note 203. Fitzmaurice claims that he is neither a
monist nor a dualist, on the ground that both positions falsely assume that national and
international law sometimes come into conflict-an assumption which is in fact validated
by instances of treaty conflict. Fitzmaurice's effort to adopt a middle position between mon-
ism and dualism is reflected in his effort to construct a middle position between the prop-
erty and liability approaches to treaty conflict. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 203.
555. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 21.
556. H. COHEN, REcENT THEORIES OF SOVEREIG Y 86-87 (1937) (citing A. ESMEIN, ELE-
MENTS Du DRorr CONSTrUTTONNEL 36 (1896)).
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were subordinate to the interests of the states. "International Law was made
for the states; not the states for International Law." Treaties and conven-
tions are therefore subject to the higher, primary interests of the individual
states. The strength of international law depends upon the will of the indi-
vidual states . . . . It is, in other words, subordinate to state sovereignty.
57
Because dualists view the spheres of municipal and interna-
tional law as independent, they are not committed to the view that
an international legal obligation implies any obligation under mu-
nicipal law. Accordingly, they do not share the monist's view that
treaties are automatically incorporated into municipal law.55 Sim-
ilarly, they need not assume that an act violating international law
is without municipal validity.
While dualism does not compel acceptance of the liability
view of treaty entitlements, it is an integral part of that view. To
the dualist, the formation of a treaty and the performance of a
treaty are separate functions: the decision whether or not to per-
form a treaty is within the scope of a state's sovereignty. Since
that sovereignty is independent of the international legal order, it
doesn't become forfeit when a state violates international law.
From a dualistic perspective, international law is not in a position
to call a conflicting treaty invalid as municipal law. Unlike monists,
therefore, dualists are not compelled to call conflicting treaties in-
valid from the standpoint of international law. Neither, however,
are they compelled to accord such treaties validity in international
law. Dualism is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the
treatment of treaty expectations as liability entitlements. That is
why the comments of Fitzmaurice were so ambiguous on the ques-
tion of treaty conflict. Yet to the extent that international law is
dependent upon the consent of states, its rules are merely conven-
tional. If dualists believe this, it is hard to see how they could ac-
cord international law the authority to invalidate other interna-
tional conventions. Hence, the subordinate status accorded
international law by dualists could encourage them to accept the
validity of conflicting treaties. On the other hand, the skepticism
of dualists regarding international law could lead them to question
the validity of any treaty.
557. H. COHEN, supra note 556, at 89 (citing G. JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE
349 (1960)).
558. See K. HOLLOWAY, supra note 543.
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D. Dualism as a Nationalist Social Vision
As the previous Chapter revealed, the dualism of the oppo-
nents of a property rule is wedded to the images of international
society which give it content. These images are themselves charac-
terized by a dualistic opposition between national and interna-
tional society. This may be demonstrated by a review of the ratio-
nales for alternatives to a property rule.
Both a liability rule and a simple license to breach are sup-
ported by the principle of state autonomy. That principle involves
the assumptions that treatymaking, as an aspect of the general
power of lawmaking, is an attribute of sovereignty; that the func-
tion of the sovereign power is the maintenance of some source of
legitimacy; and that the sovereign power, as a conditional grant, is
an inalienable entitlement. The alienation of the power to make a
treaty would be an infringement of that entitlement. If treaties
conveyed specifically enforceable property entitlements, they
would alienate the power to make conflicting treaties. Accord-
ingly, the principle of state autonomy, which entails the inaliena-
bility of sovereignty, requires that treaties convey nothing more
than liability entitlements.
The principle of state autonomy is the offspring of two in-
compatible models of the state, the republican and the imperial.
The republican model conditions legitimacy on the virtue of the
people; the imperial model conditions legitimacy on the people's
welfare. The republican model identifies the sovereign as an or-
ganic association characterized by solidarity and mutual fidelity;
the imperial model identifies the sovereign as trustee of the inter-
ests of a collection of discrete individuals. Both traditions view
commerce as a disintegrative force. The republican state is an in-
noculation against commerce; the imperial state is a balm for its
most painful symptoms. Both models are structured by fundamen-
tal dichotomies. For the republic, commerce is external and the
basic oppositions-stability and corruption, virtue and fortune,
minuteman and mercenary, citizen and slave-all reflect a persis-
tent tension between the republic and its external surroundings.
For the empire, commerce is internal, and the tension between
state and market expresses itself in the basic dichotomies of public
and private, sovereign and subject, and positive law and natural
law.
In the nineteenth century, features of both models were in-
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corporated by theorists of the nation state. On one hand, the
great powers of Europe sought to nurture the commerce favored
by the imperial tradition. On the other hand, the unprecedented
disintegration of society wrought by that commerce seemed to ne-
cessitate affirmative efforts to foster the solidarity valued by the
republican tradition. Nationalists proposed that public welfare be
insured by a series of associations culminating in the state. Be-
cause of their commitment to commerce, however, they proposed
financing these welfare functions through economic exploitation
of foreigners rather than solely by means of an internal redistribu-
tion of wealth. Nationalists wished to displace the conflict between
collective sovereign and individual subject onto the relations be-
tween peoples. The result was a vision of social life sharply di-
vided between altruistic association and exploitation.
This dichotomy expressed itself in the responses to treaty
conflict that the members of the International Law Commission
saw as compatible with the principle of state autonomy. On the
one hand, they saw states as responsible to their partners for the
consequences of treaty conflict. On the other hand, they denied
international institutions any role in enforcing that responsibility.
This doesn't mean that they despaired of controlling treaty con-
flict; rather they assumed that allies would compensate or other-
wise mollify one another if they made conflicting treaties. If they
didn't do so, that would be a good sign that their alliance had
ended, and that international cooperation would be furthered
more by the performance of the later treaty than by the perform-
ance of the earlier. In other words, they assumed that when states
exercise their autonomy, they always act consistently with either
the principle of good faith, or the progressive development of in-
ternational law.
Monism reduces the complexity of international society to
fantasy in order to reconcile it with international law; dualism
reduces international law to tautology in order to reconcile it with
the reality of conflict.
E. The Relationship Between Monism and Dualism
The view that treaty expectations are a form of property rests
upon a monistic view of the relationship between municipal and
international authority. This position in turn entails a static vision
of international society. The view that treaty expectations are, at
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best, liability entitlements, rests upon a dualistic conception of the
relationship between municipal and international law, in turn in-
spired by a vision of international society which is diachronic and
therefore dualistic.55 9 The confrontation between these two social
visions can be likened to a similar dispute within literary theory.
Robert Cover's recent Foreword to the Harvard Law Review
began with the claim that the narrative structure of myth reveals
the "nomos" of a community.560 By "nomos," he meant a shared
picture of the world, shaped by a group's common normative per-
spective. 5 1 In making such a claim, Cover implicitly identified
himself with the structuralist tradition in anthropology, which as-
sumes that the interpretation of myth requires familiarity with el-
emental patterns of signification peculiar to the culture producing
it.562 Adherents of hermeneutic approaches to interpretation
would go still further, arguing that the interpretation of a culture
requires not merely familiarity with, but entry into, the culture's
fundamental ontology. 5 3 Many contemporary literary theorists,
559. Note that I am not arguing that beliefs about the structure of international soci-
ety determine positions on issues of international law in any mechanical way. In general, I
doubt whether monistic positions in international law have been inspired by sincerely held
beliefs that international society was already harmonious and unified: at best, such positions
have been inspired by nostalgia for a harmonious world. Nevertheless, monistic positions in
international law entail belief in such a world. As a result, those scholars committed to a
view of international society as contentious or chaotic have confronted monistic positions
on issues of international law. The monists have not really believed that international soci-
ety was harmonious, but have hoped it would become so; the dualists have not necessarily
objected to this hope, but have generally thought it vain.
560. 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 5 (1983).
561. Id. at 4, 32.
562. See J. CULLER, STRucTuRALiST PoEcs 40-54 (1975); V. LEiTCH, DECONSTRUCTIVE
CRITICISM 16-23 (1983); C. LEvi-STRAUSS, The Structural Study of Myth, in STRUCRAL AN-
THROPOLOGY (1983); C. LEvI-STPAuss, THE SAVAGE MIND 135-61 (1966).
563. See W. DILTHEY, SELFcrw WRTNGS 186-95, 218-31, 260-63 (H. Rickman ed.
trans. 1976). Dilthey and subsequent partisans of hermeneutics have acknowledged that in
making another culture one's own, one transforms it by entering into a dialogue with it. A
popular modern exponent of the hermeneutic method of anthropology is Clifford Geertz,
though he chafes at the label. See generally C. GRTz, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 14
(1973) ("Verstehen" is an overly "bookish" term for the method he recommends). Geertz
criticizes Levi-Strauss' method as substituting analysis for genuine involvement. Id. at 345-
60. Geertz' celebrated study "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," id. at 412-53,
is itself a mythic celebration of hermeneutic method. Upon arriving in a Balinese village,
Geertz can learn nothing because, as an outsider, he is offered no social recognition. Be-
cause he does not exist for the culture, the culture cannot exist for him. All this changes
when he joins the villagers in flight from a police raid during a cockfight. By submitting to
the culture's norms, he had entered it. The village warms to him and yields to him its
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however, view interpretation less as a form of understanding than
as a process of transformation and change. Some have been par-
ticularly interested in the phenomenon of misunderstanding-the
power of readers to generate a plethora of interpretations from a
single text.564 Others have focused on the experience of read-
ing-the power of a text to suspend and surprise the reader.
They have looked at narrative as the evocation of a change in the
reader's consciousness, rather than the instantiation of a recogniz-
able, prefigurative pattern. 6 5 Approaches to narrative that are
aimed at accountingfor interpretation require that the reader and
text exist within a single nomos-they are as monistic as they are
static. Approaches to narrative that are aimed at giving an ac-
count of interpretation-that are themselves narratives of the
struggle between text and reader-are necessarily dualistic.566
Whether gospel is dogma or prophecy depends on how you
preach it.
Law has a similarly chameleonic nature, best summed up in
the oxymoron "legitimate force. ' 567 The criterion by which we
recognize its presence is coercion: a norm cannot be legal if it is
secrets. As a result of this incident, too, he realizes that the cockfight is a key to the entire
culture of the village; yet he is ultimately able to understand the cockfight only because of
similarities between the village's culture and his own (e.g., "cock" is a phallic symbol in
both). I identify Cover more with structuralism than with hermeneutics because of what I
perceive to be an attitude of detachment towards the normative orders he describes, ac-
companied by a taxonomic impulse. Other readers may disagree. In any event, one of
Cover's colleagues at the Yale Law School, Owen Fiss, has explicitly embraced a hermeneu-
tic approach to the phenomenon of legal interpretation. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpreta-
tion, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
564. The most notable of these is Harold Bloom. See, e.g., H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF
INFLUENCE (1973); H. BLOOM, A MAP OF MISREADING (1975); H. BLOOM, KABBALAH AND CRIT-
iCiSM (1975); H. BLOOM, POETRY AND REPRESSION (1976).
565. See, e.g., R. BARTHES, THE PLEASURE OF THE TEXT (1973).
566. Jonathan Culler refers to the
struggle between the monism of theory and the dualism of narrative. Theories
of reading demonstrate the impossibility of establishing well-grounded distinc-
tions between fact and interpretation, between what can be read in the text and
what is read into it, or between text and reader, and thus lead to a mon-
ism . . . .Stories of reading, however, [require] dualisms: an interpreter and
something to interpret, a subject and an object, an actor and something he acts
upon or that acts on him.
J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 74-75 (1982).
567. Weber defines the modern state as an institution exercising a monopoly on legiti-
mate force. See M. WEBER, I ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 56 (1978). He defines law as those
norms guaranteed by state coercion, or occasionally, by "an organized coercive apparatus
for the nonviolent exercise of legal coercion." Id. at 313-14.
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merely a description of voluntary behavior; legal norms make peo-
ple do something that they don't want to do. On the other hand,
we justify legal systems in terms of a criterion of legitimacy: a
norm cannot be legal if people obey only out of fear. People obey
legal norms because they want to. The paradox is easily recon-
ciled by any first year law student: legal norms change what peo-
ple want to do.568 Emphasize the phrase "change people," and the
above story becomes a tragic story of coercion, conflict, and mind
control. 69 Emphasize the phrase "what [they] want," and you
have a snapshot of a happy family visiting the zoo-gratified chil-
dren, gorged on ice cream, posed in front of equally docile ani-
mals, encaged. Daddy, of course, is taking the picture. Both ac-
counts, moreover, may be equally accurate: if coercion is effective,
consensus should be the result. Which account we see then de-
pends only upon which side of the ledger we look at.
F. The Internal Contradictions of Internationalism
The paradoxical feature of international law discourse is that,
consistently, both accounts show up on the same side of the
ledger. 57 0 International law is simultaneously portrayed by the
same participants as a product of coercion and as a manifestation
of consensus; dualism shows up as both a profit and a loss. If the
institutions of international law have failed to become effective, it
is not simply because of a lack of consensus among the nations, as
the dualists claim. Lack of consensus would merely indicate the
need for coercion in establishing an effective legal system. If some
nations supported the establishment of an effective international
568.
Our jurisprudence . . . while not oblivious to deterministic components, ulti-
mately rests on a premise of freedom of will. This is not to be viewed as an
exercise in philosophic discourse, but as a governmental fusion of ethics and
necessity, which takes into account that a system of rewards and punishments is
itself part of the environment that influences and shapes human conduct.
U.S. v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J.).
569. See, e.g., A. Katz, Foucault, supra note 23 (arguing that the attempt to legitimate
legal norms by reference to the "normal" behavior of populations helps produce the very
behavioral norms on which it purports to rely).
570. I cannot claim with any confidence that international law is unique in this re-
spect; it may be that other bodies of doctrine are greeted with equal ambivalence by most
of those they govern. But international law does differ in this respect from, say, criminal




legal system and some did not, we could conclude that the sup-
porters simply were not powerful enough to enforce their views.
In fact, though, no powerful state seems unambivalently enthusi-
astic about international law. It is not so much that the coercion
of some states has been inadequate to impose consensus on other
states as that there has not been sufficient consensus within power-
ful states to motivate coercion against other states.
G. Monism and Dualism in American Diplomacy
If any state has seemed suited to the role of international leg-
islator, surely the United States has. The United States emerged
from World War I as the most prosperous of world powers; it
emerged from World War II with its economy stimulated but still
unscathed, with the gratitude and admiration of most of the
world's population, and with a monopoly on what have come to be
called "strategic arms"-in short, with something very like "a mo-
nopoly on legitimate force. "571 American presidents were the
chief architects of the settlement of both world wars. At the close
of World War I, the American president designed the first global
legislature. At the close of World War II, American presidents
reestablished such a legislature on American soil, and organized
an international monetary system based on American currency.572
Thus by the end of World War II, the leaders of this country
seemed to have the will as well as the wherewithal to create an
effective international legal system.
Nevertheless, the United States has not always taken positions
on questions of international law that indicate support for interna-
tional authority. It has flirted with monism on some occasions, du-
alism on others.
American officials have vigorously disapproved of interna-
tional legal doctrines inspired by romantic nationalism. While
American presidents have advocated independence for Third
571. See supra note 567 (legitimate force).
572. F. SCHURMANN, THE LoGic OF WORLD PowER 3 (1974) (America dominated world
at close of World War II; world system was shaped by U.N., new monetary system and
atomic bomb); id. at 61-62 (U.N. was perceived originally as agent of U.S. power and na-
tions joined it for protection); id. at 47, 67-68, 72-73 (American foreign policy at close of
World War II viewed at home and abroad as exportation of New Deal; America admired
throughout world, even by communists, as progressive force).
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World territories colonized by European powers, a American dip-
lomats have traditionally refused to recognize a right to national
self-determination.5 7 4 They have instead taken the position that
sovereignty is conferred by the recognition of other nations and is
a function of the capacity to govern and to meet international ob-
ligations. 57 5 In their view, decolonization could be justified on
pragmatic grounds, to the extent that it could be expected to sta-
bilize "developing areas," yet they feared that attributing sover-
eignty to the will of Third World peoples would have a destabi-
lizing effect. 7 6 In fact, it was precisely in order to preclude the
appearance of militant "national liberation movements" 577 that
American policymakers encouraged colonial powers to hand over
authority to "responsible" native regimes. 7 Where such national
573. F. SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 67 (Wilson); id. at 69 (Roosevelt).
574. There is a continuing debate over whether the principle of self-determination
confers enforceable rights on every people or simply enunciates a United Nations policy.
The principle is enunciated as a goal of the U.N. in its Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1,
para. 2. It was recognized as a right by the United Nations General Assembly in the "Dec-
laration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples," although
General Assembly resolutions- have no binding force. See G.A. Res. 1514, 6 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). Nevertheless, the principle was applied by
the International Court of Justice in a recent Advisory Opinion. See Advisory Opinion on
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12. Some scholars have argued that the principle has evolved
into a conventional norm conferring a right. See, e.g., R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 90, 106
(1963); W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
12947 (1977). Others have vigorously disputed this conclusion. See, e.g., Gross, The Right of
Self-Determination in International Law, in NEW STATES IN THE MODERN WORLD 136 (M. Kil-
son ed. 1975); Sinha, Is Self-Determination Passg?, 12 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 260, 271
(1973). The traditional criterion of membership in the international community was the
effectiveness of a nation's government as expressed by its ability to control a population,
carry on international relations, and meet international commitments. See Tinoco Case (Gr.
Brit. v. Costa Rica), 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924). This continues to be the effective stan-
dard by which the international system generally operates, and the standard favored by the
United States in most instances. See Schwenninger, The 1980's: New Doctrines of Intervention
or New Norms of Nonintervention?, 33 RUTGERS L. Rzv. 430 (1981); Rostow, Book Review,
82 YALE L. J. 826, 848, 853-54 (1973) (reviewing J. MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR
(1972)).
575. See supra note 574. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§§ 100, 101, 103 (1962).
576. See Rostow, supra note 574, at 846-54. In Rostow's view, treating self-determina-
tion of peoples as an enforceable right would (I) encourage Soviet and other foreign inter-
vention in civil wars and (2) deter American and other foreign intervention in civil wars.
Paradoxically, Rostow views the first consequence as destabilizing, but does not view the
second consequence as stabilizing. Id.
577. See infra note 618.
578. F. SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 69, 72, 93, 95 (America effectively assumes the
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liberation movements have ultimately prevailed, they have some-
times sought to breach or renegotiate what they viewed as ex-
ploitative treaties imposed upon them by the "mother" country
during the decolonization process, invoking the doctrine of
clausula rebus sic stantibus.579 American diplomats have therefore
joined with monists5 0 in condemning this doctrine, even though
it was at least once invoked by an American Attorney General. 81
mantle of the British Empire after World War II, with the avowed aim of insuring security
as well as independence). See also Ahmad, The Neo-Fascist State: Notes on the Pathology of
Power in the Third World, in FIRST HARVEST: THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STuDIES 1963-83, at
68 (1. Friedman ed. 1983).
579. This rationale for termination or modification was first employed by the Soviet
Union to justify reevaluation of Russian treaty commitments after the revolution, and has
been embraced by Soviet scholars, except for a brief period, immediately after World War
II, when they became particularly concerned about Western modification of post-war
agreements without Soviet consent. G. HARAszTI, supra note 28, at 352-57; J. TRmiKA & R,
SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF SovIET TREATIES 131-41 (1962). The People's
Republic of China adopted a similar position after its revolution. See H. CHIu, THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 92, 103-10 (1972). Other Third World na-
tions abrogated or successfully renegotiated treaties after independence as well. See Sum-
mary Records of the 703rd Meeting, [1963] 1 Y. B. Ir'L L. COMM'N, supra note 507, at 201
(statement of Barto of Yugoslavia); id. at 90 (statement of Elias of Nigeria). During the
debates of the International Law Commission on Article 62 (concerning the doctrine of
clausula rebus sic stantibus), representatives of Third World nations wanted the doctrine to
be interpreted as expansively as possible for that reason. See Summary Records of the
695th Meeting, [1963] 1 Y. B. IN'L L. COMM'N 147, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/156/
1963 (statement of Elias of Nigeria); id. at 256 (statement of Tabibi of Afghanistan); 18
U.N. GAOR C.4 (791st mtg.) para. 41, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.778.836 (1963) (comments
of N'N'ang of Cameroon).
580. Hans Kelsen, a leading exponent of monism, see supra note 543, is also a leading
opponent of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 358-60 (1952).
581. In 1940, President Roosevelt suspended the application of the International
Load Line Convention. Acting Attorney General Francis Biddle justified this action on the
ground that the convention presumed peacetime conditions. This opinion was severely crit-
icized by Herbert Briggs, the distinguished international lawyer who eventually became the
United States Representative to the International Law Commission. See Briggs, supra note
492, at 89-96. Briggs has consistently opposed the view that this doctrine, or any related
theory, could justify unilateral termination or suspension of a treaty. Briggs, Rebus Sic
Stantibus Before the Security Council: the Anglo Egyptian Question, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 762-69
(1949); Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 68 Am. J. INT'L L. 51 (1974). Other American commentators have
acknowledged the widespread acceptance of the doctrine, but have argued that suspension,
modification, or termination of a treaty due to change of circumstance can only be based
on the mutual intention of the parties, rather than on some objective standard of fairness.
See, e.g., C. HILL, THE DOCTRINE OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1934);
Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 AM. J. Ir'L L. 896,
912 (1967). Such an interpretation of the doctrine, of course, would destroy its utility for
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Yet American officials have never really embraced monism.
Despite the Constitution's injunction that treaties be considered
"the law of the land," American courts have effectively gutted the
doctrine of automatic incorporation, partly in response to legisla-
tive pressure.582 On the issue of treaty conflict, moreover, Ameri-
can diplomats and policymakers have clearly opted for the dual-
istic posture. During the deliberations of the International Law
Commission, the United States representatives consistently sup-
ported the approach developed by the Special Reporters. 83 As we
noted in the previous Chapter, support for this position implied a
willingness to countenance treaty conflict. On at least three occa-
sions the United States appears to have undertaken conflicting ob-
ligations: (1) in 1794, when it agreed with Britain to exclude for-
eign privateers from its ports, contrary to an earlier treaty with
France; 58 (2) in 1903, when it agreed to exempt Panamanian ves-
sels from canal tolls in violation of an earlier agreement with Brit-
ain;585 and (3) after World War II, when it agreed to the creation
of West Germany as a NATO member without Soviet consent. 8 6
national liberation movements.
582. See V. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS AND NATIONAL LAW 55-65
(1982); McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 MINN. L. REv. 709,
748-50 (1958). The most notable case in this regard is Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal.2d
718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (denied the validity of the human rights provisions of the United
Nations Charter as American law). During the course of the Sei Fujii litigation, the Senate
came within one vote of approving a Constitutional amendment nullifying the Constitu-
tion's automatic incorporation clause. This amendment was apparently motivated by con-
cern that courts would invoke international human rights agreements against segregation
and other forms of race discrimination. V. LEARY, supra, at 62.
583. Summary Records of the 685th Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 79, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963; Summary Records of the 742nd Meeting, supra note 508, at
123-24; Summary Records of the 857th Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 98-99,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966; Law of Treaties, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CosM'N 75, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1; Reports of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 357, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/
Add.1; Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties 165-66,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11 (1st Sess. 1968).
584. See supra note 123.
585. Id.
586. J. TiusKA & R. SLuSSER, supra note 579, at 120. The American decision to create
an economically and militarily strong West Germany as a bulwark against communism was
first signalled in 1947 by the unification of the British and American occupation zones and
the creation of a West German currency. These maneuvers coincided with the develop-
ment of plans, that Soviet intelligence was probably privy to, to rearm Germany. Thus, to
the Soviets, America's unilateral decision to reorganize the administration of West Ger-
many was not merely a technical violation of its Yalta and Potsdam commitments. See F.
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Moreover, the United States has often encouraged its allies to cre-
ate conflicting treaties: in inducing Haiti to agree to harbor
American privateers during the Civil War, the United States
caused Haiti to violate an international convention;587 in signing
the Bryan-Chamorro treaty, the United States participated in Nic-
aragua's anticipatory breach of its treaty obligations to Costa
Rica;5 8 in mediating the Camp David negotiations, of course, the
United States encouraged Egypt's apparent violation of its Arab
League commitments; 58 9 finally, and most recently, in invading
Grenada at the request of the Organization of Eastern Carribean
States, the American government condoned an application of that
organization's charter in apparent violation of the member states'
obligations under the charter of the Organization of American
States (of which the United States is a member). 90
It is tempting to explain the apparent ambivalence of Ameri-
can leaders toward international law as simple cynicism: the preva-
lence of the view that international relations constitute a Hobbes-
ian state of nature591 conditions us to expect that great powers will
obey international law only when it is in their interest to do so.
Yet if we imagine a unified leadership ruthlessly pursuing a deter-
SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 216-17.
587. See supra note 123.
588. See supra text accompanying'notes 130, 140.
589. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 108.
590. The United States justified the invasion of Grenada on the grounds that the Or-
ganization of Eastern Carribean States (O.E.C.S.) had requested their intervention. By vir-
tue of a 1981 agreement, this organization is empowered to request foreign military assis-
tance in the event of a unanimous vote of the member states. Since Grenada was not
consulted by other member states, it appears that these states themselves violated the
O.E.C.S. charter in requesting U.S. assistance. Presumably, the other member states took
the position that the legitimate government of Grenada could not be consulted because it
had been overthrown. Nevertheless, in requesting U.S. intervention, these states appear to
have violated their obligations under the Organization of American States charter. This
charter forbids intervention in the affairs of a member state without that state's request.
The charter further requires that any such intervention be carried out by the O.A.S. and
done so with the actual or putative consent of the Grenadian government. They might
have been able to arrange an intervention consistent with the charter of the O.A.S. In this
sense, the O.E.C.S. charter was not necessarily inconsistent with the O.A.S. charter, but by
requesting aid directly from the U.S., the O.E.C.S. member states interpreted their charter
in a manner inconsistent with the O.A.S. charter. By acceding to this request, the U.S.
condoned this interpretation. See Chayes, Grenada was Illegally Invaded, N.Y. Times, Nov.
15, 1983, § 1, at 35, col. 1. Cf. Rostow, Law 'Is Not a Suicide Pact,' N.Y. Times, Nov. 15,
1983, § 1, at 35, col. 1.
591. C. BErrz, supra note 135, at 13, 50.
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minate national interest we confront an anomaly: the reluctance
of the United States to use international law as an instrument of
national policy. Given the power and popularity of the United
States in the postwar era, American leaders could have fashioned
an international order to their own liking. Yet the attempts of
some leaders to do so were resisted by others. American ambiva-
lence toward international law is not dictated by the vagaries of a
single national interest over time, but by persistent conflict be-
tween distinct interests.
Observers have distinguished two durable competing tradi-
tions of thought in American foreign policy, one internationalist
in orientation, the -other nationalist in orientation. 59 2
H. Internationalism in American Politics
The centerpiece of the internationalist view in American for-
eign policy has always been free trade. Though they are propo-
nents of laissez-faire economics, internationalists are partisans of
intervention in foreign affairs. Because they identify American in-
terests with the unrestricted mobility of American capital, they
are advocates of a homogeneous world market. 93 As a result, they
are opponents of protectionism and regulation abroad, as well as
at home. Nevertheless, they have generally rejected gunboat di-
plomacy as a means of enforcing their preferences; for a second
persistent feature of the internationalist viewpoint has been an
emphasis on stability. Internationalists have feared that war would
encourage protectionism, disrupt commerce, and render overseas
investments insecure. Accordingly, they have functioned as a
peace lobby within the foreign policy establishment." 4
The apparent tension within the internationalist viewpoint
between the urge to prescribe policy for other governments and
the antipathy toward military intervention has been mediated by a
monistic vision of international society. Under conditions of peace
and stability, internationalists argue, all countries will eventually
develop relatively unrestricted market economies compatible with
international capitalism. War is therefore unnecessary, as well as
592. F. SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 48-60; Klare, The Assault on the Vietnam Syn-
drome, in FIRST HARvEsT: THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, supra note 578, at 143.
593. F. SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 48, 56; Klare, supra note 592, at 147.
594. F. SCHUMANN, supra note 572, at 50-52.
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counterproductive, as a means of coercion. The economic incen-
tives created by the ordinary operation of a self-regulating mar-
ket, they argue, should be sufficient; if not, judicious use of eco-
nomic aid could do the trick.59 5 This confidence in the persuasive
power of capitalism assumes common motivations on the part of
the leaders of all nations. Accordingly, internationalists view ideol-
ogies hostile to international capitalism-whether protectionist or
socialist-as fundamentally inauthentic. Thus they may view so-
cialism as a coercive strategy on the part of a disgruntled group
bent on wrongfully seizing capital without feeling seriously
threatened by it. Internationalists remain confident that once the
new management has established possession of a country's capital,
it will invest it in the world market.598
Some observers sympathetic to internationalism view nation-
alist ideologies as themselves creatures of international capitalism.
Ernest Gellner has argued that such ideologies generally are im-
posed from above, rather than percolating spontaneously from be-
low, and that they are imposed for the purpose of facilitating the
penetration of market capitalism. They do so, he argues, by legiti-
mizing the erection of a national system of public education
which, in turn, proliferates a homogeneous, literate and techno-
cratic culture likely to have more in common with the elite cul-
tures of other countries than with native traditions.597 The prod-
uct of a successful nationalist movement, he implies, is a well-
socialized work force, unconstrained by loyalty to any particular
tradition, community or method of production, and a cosmopoli-
tan elite capable of interacting with its counterparts in other
countries. Internationalists within the American foreign policy es-
tablishment, such as Max Millikin and W.W. Rostow, have in fact
argued that the United States should generate nationalism in "un-
derdeveloped" areas as a means of bringing them into the world
market.198 From the perspective of the internationalists, national-
ist ideology need not be taken seriously.
595. See generally M. MiuLLmU & W. RosTow, A PRoposAi- KEY TO AN EFFECTIVE FOR-
EIGN POLic (1957).
596. Id.
597. E. GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 57-58 (1983).
598. See M. MiLLKIN & W. RosTow, supra note 595.
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I. Nationalism in American Politics
Nevertheless, the internationalist position has been persist-
ently and effectively challenged by nationalist ideologues within
the American foreign policy establishment. Nationalists have tra-
ditionally favored protectionism, an isolationist posture towards
Europe, and an interventionist posture towards certain regions in
the Third World.5 99 Nationalists identify the national interest with
insuring markets and resources for American manufacturing,
rather than the construction of a world market in which all na-
tions may compete. Accordingly, they have been anxious to estab-
lish limited, but uncontested spheres of American influence. In
particular, they have advocated American economic domination
of the Pacific and Latin America as natural continuations of
America's westward expansion. 00 This tradition is very close in
spirit to the militant nationalism of Machiavelli. It justifies
America's manifest destiny on the basis of a conception of virtue,
consisting of entrepreneurial ingenuity, military courage and
Protestant Christianity. It views the world beyond American bor-
ders with mistrust and has traditionally looked to military inter-
vention and missionary Christianity in order to literally create is-
lands of order in a sea of chaos.60 ' Moreover, the millenarian
imagery of manifest destiny has always been accompanied by the
shadow of apocalypse: isolationists have traditionally warned that
participation in European affairs would embroil America in global
conflict; latter day nationalists believed the millennium was at
hand when America acquired a monopoly on the Bomb, and that
armageddon was around the corner when she lost it.602 The Mc-
Carthy witchhunt was a predictable response to this disappoint-
ment: American nationalists have typically ascribed the frustration
of their ambitions to corruption and betrayal. They have gener-
ally viewed the internationalist current in American foreign policy
as the product of a conspiracy of Eastern banking interests con-
trolled by English, Jewish or other "foreign" capital. Their phobic
599. F. SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 56-60.,
600. Id. at 56-58.
601. Id. at 57 (Nationalist image of American virtue based on role of three institutions
in penetrating the Pacific and Latin America: Missionary Protestantism, the Navy and free
enterprise; discussion of the cultural and material links between the three).
602. Id. at 56-58 (isolationist attitude towards Europe); Id. at 83-91 (nationalist posses-
siveness toward nuclear weapons).
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view of communism as a clandestine contagion was merely an
elaboration of this tradition. 03
J. Nationalism, Internationalism and Capitalism
The conflict between nationalism and internationalism within
American foreign policy is not simply a difference of opinion
about how best to achieve a common end, but a conflict between
opposed interests. Nor is this conflict peculiar to American ruling
elites: Franz Schurmann has argued that it is an example of con-
flicts inevitably engendered by the development of a world market
system.604 The distinctive feature of such a system, according to
Karl Polanyi, is the absorption of local patterns of resource distri-
bution into the broader currents of international trade, with the
result that the availability of even locally produced goods becomes
dependent upon worldwide supply and demand. A world market
permits rapid industrialization and resource exploitation, as well
as the constant movement of capital to ever more profitable in-
vestments. This rapid development and mobility, however, pro-
duces the massive social and economic dislocations anticipated by
Hegel and described by Polanyi.60 5 Waves of investment can up-
root populations, destroy communal institutions and natural re-
sources, and disintegrate traditional systems of production and
distribution, leaving nothing in their path when they recede as
suddenly as they have come. For all the wealth that industrializa-
tion may generate on an international scale, it may wreak devasta-
tion within the scope of a single region. The destructive conse-
quences of free trade, moreover, are not confined to workers:
capitalists who invest heavily in static assets such as land, build-
ings, heavy machinery or natural resources, may find themselves
ruined when the tradewinds shift.60
As a result of these dislocations, Polanyi argues, the move-
ment of capital meets with localized resistance, both from disgrun-
tled workers and peasants, and from the managers of the less suc-
603. Id. at 58-59 (conspiracy theories linking Northeastern, British, Jewish and Bol-
shevik interests are a traditional feature of American nationalism). For a classic expression
of the phobic attitude toward communism characterizing American leadership in the cold
war era, see Dennis v. U.S., 241 U.S. 494, 561-79 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
604. F. SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 62-65.
605. K. POLANYI, supra note 117, at 68, 129.
606. Id. at 130-35. See also F. SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 63-64.
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cessful sectors of the economy. Such resistance, particularly in the
form of worker violence, disrupts trade, eventually cutting into
the profits of even the more successful sectors. Thus an ever in-
creasing segment of the elite looks to the state to mollify the dis-
contented. The result is the legislation of a safety net for the un-
successful sectors of the economy-protectionism for business,
and social welfare programs for workers. This in turn interferes
with the mobility of capital and slows the pace of industrial devel-
opment, at the same time that it requires ever greater expendi-
tures of government revenue. Thus, pressure increases on the
state to attempt to speed the pace of economic development by
managing the national economy. When this sort of state capitalism
becomes sufficiently widespread, trade is seriously hampered and
the world market is in danger of collapse, as occurred in the wake
of World War 1.07
Naturally, the world market has a defense against this eventu-
ality. When states institute nationalistic economic policies, foreign
investment tends to flee. This will encourage local elites to reinsti-
tute free trade policies, resuscitating the cycle of development,
devastation and discontent. Fred Block has recently noted:
Polanyi's arguments were of obvious relevance to the international economic
situation of the 1970's .... Citizens in country after country were told dur-
ing the 1970's that they could not afford various types of social policy mea-
sures because of their potential damage to the country's international com-
petitive position in a context of increas[ing] conflicts over markets. And in
those periods of economic contraction, 1974-75 and 1980-83, existing redis-
tributive policies came under attack on the grounds that they prevented the
readjustments that were necessary for improved performance in world mar-
kets....
* . . The French Socialist government pursued redistributive and expansion-
ary policies while the rest of the major economies were contracting. The
result[s] were higher rates of inflation and mounting balance of payments
difficulties. The currency markets forced a series of devaluations of the
Franc and ultimately the Mitterand government was forced to reverse many
of its policies and pursue a program of austerity.
... In the context of widespread plant closing, [American] management in-
sisted that unless workers made substantial wage concessions, it would be
impossible for the firms to compete effectively against foreign producers.
They argued that the discipline of the international marketplace dictated
some downward adjustment of overly high American wages.608
607. Id. at 163-219.
608. F. Block, Social Policy and Accumulation: Beyond the New Consensus 12-13 (un-
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The effort to construct a world market is a Sisyphean task,
for such a market undermines the conditions for its own success: a
world market can only be established under conditions of stability,
yet its effects are inherently destabilizing. As a result, even a
power wholly committed to capitalism must remain ambivalent to-
ward internationalism.
K. Monism and Dualism in Soviet Diplomacy
A similar ambivalence toward internationalism seems to char-
acterize socialist powers. Soviet positions on doctrinal issues in in-
ternational law have been as eclectic as American ones. In fact,
even though the American doctrinal positions that we have dis-
cussed seem contradictory, the Soviet government seems systemat-
ically to disagree with them. Where American diplomats have op-
posed recognizing a right to national self-determination, Soviet
diplomats have been among the most ardent advocates of such a
right. Where Americans have feared that recognition of such a
right would encourage militant "national liberation move-
ments, ' 60 9 Russians have supported recognition of such a right for
precisely this reason. 10 Apparently, Soviet diplomats view na-
tional sovereignty as a creature of popular will rather than inter-
national institutions. They have encouraged application of the
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus because it could be invoked by na-
tional liberation movements to justify altering treaty arrange-
ments with Western powers.""' They have found this doctrine par-
ticularly appealing because it resonates with the historicist strain
in marxist thought. From the Soviet viewpoint, successful national
published manuscript) (prepared for M. REIN, L. RAINWATER & G. ESPRING ANDERSON, STAG-
NATION & RENEWAL).
609. See infra text accompanying note 618 (discussion of national liberation
movements).
610. The Soviet commitment to the liberation of colonized peoples was first enunci-
ated by Lenin. See generally V. LENIN, IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM
(1917). Early Soviet treaties and official statements enunciated a commitment to the self
determination of peoples, and early theoretical writings, particularly of the influential
Korovin, explained this commitment in terms of the goal of national liberation in Asia. See
J. TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, supra note 579, at 198-202. Soviet international lawyers since that
time have viewed national sovereignty as the foundation of international law, and have
characterized monistic theories as a reflection of "hegemonic imperialism." Margolis, Soviet
Views on National and International Law, 4 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 116, 120-22 (1955). See gener-
ally G. HARASZTI, supra note 28, at 327-416; supra text accompanying notes 543-52.
611. See supra notes 489-509.
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liberation movements represent the triumph of the proletariat in
the dialectic of class struggle. They view such an event as a funda-
mental change of circumstance, because marxism views the iden-
tity of a society's ruling class as its most fundamental characteris-
tic. From this perspective, the interests of the dictatorship of the
proletariat are necessarily in conflict with those of the bourgeois
regime it replaces.6 1 2 Soviet commitment to dualism in interna-
tional law reflects the dualism of a marxist social vision.
This makes it all the more startling that the Soviet Union has
consistently favored the monistic position on the question of
treaty conflict. In the International Law Commission debates, the
Soviet representative continued to support a property rule, long
after it was clear that the Commission had rejected it. Despite his
country's approval of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, he was in-
sistent that the Commission express its commitment to the sanctity
of treaty obligations.""3
The appeal of this principle to Soviet diplomats stems from
the precarious international circumstances that faced the new So-
viet regime in the wake of its revolution. As a member of the Eu-
ropean Concert, Russia had expected consultation on all questions
affecting the European balance of power. That expectation was
recognized in a network of treaties. Of course, the Concert was an
exclusive club, and Russia's membership had depended not only
on its might, but on its acquiescence in the development of a
world market as well. When, after World War I, a defeated Russia
began to detach its economy from the market, it was excluded
from European diplomacy and attacked militarily. Soviet support
for the sanctity of treaties reflects a fear that Russia cannot afford
to be excluded from international institutions, even if it opposes
their aims. 14 The dilemma of capitalist powers has concerned the
extent to which they should create a world market system. For
marxist states, the dilemma has been to what extent they should
612. G. HARASZTI, supra note 28, at 382-92 (historicist interpretation of rebus sic stan-
tibus doctrine consistent with marxism; Korovin approved clause but restricted its applica-
tion to social revolutions). J. TRISKA & K. SLussER, supra note 579, at 131-41 (Soviet theo-
rists subsequent to Korovin, most notably Pashukanis, view clause as generally applicable to
revolutionary societies because of their continuous development); Margolis, supra note 543,
at 120 (law is a superstructural incident of class interests; class interests of bourgeois-liberal
and socialist nations are inalterably opposed).
613. See supra note 542.
614. See J. TusKA & R. SLUSSER, supra note 579, at 118-20.
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participate in a world market system not of their own making.
Nevertheless, their ambivalence toward international law is a
product of the same contradiction that shapes capitalist attitudes
toward international law.
L. Revolutionary Internationalism
Because a self-regulating market system distributes the bur-
dens of development unevenly, marxism's political opportunities
always arise in the localized struggles of communities, particularly
those victimized in capitalism's advance. Yet the mobility of capi-
tal in a world market system makes some marxists feel that capital-
ism cannot be combatted effectively on a local or even national
level. Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that nationalism provides
a devastatingly effective obstacle to successful class struggle. Politi-
cal boundaries, he has argued, permit multinational capital to
shop for favorable conditions and escape political accountability
while disguising class differences as national differences. 15 Capi-
talism, he claims, recruits its managers from the Western industri-
alized, or "core," nations, while exploiting inhabitants of under-
developed, or "peripheral" nations. Wallerstein is an
internationalist: he believes that capitalism has succeeded in estab-
lishing a world market system and that all people derive their
identities from their positions in that global system. In this con-
text, national self-determination is at best a Quixotic goal for
Third World peoples, and may actually reenforce their exploita-
tion.616 Third World nations cannot afford the protectionist poli-
cies sometimes adopted by Western powers, because they cause
them to become less self-sufficient; on the other hand, nationalist
rhetoric may legitimize the efforts of Western powers to protect
615. Wallerstein, A World System Perspective on the Social Sciences, 27 BRrr. J. Sor- 343,
351-52 (1976); Wallerstein, Class Formation in the Capitalist World-Economy, 5 PoL & Soc'Y
367, 373 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wallerstein, Class Formation].
616. Wallerstein, The 'Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,' 110 NEw LEFr REV. 65 (July-
Aug. 1978) (brief description of the world system); Wallerstein's view that capitalism is an
integrated worldwide market system seems influenced by the work of the path breaking
economic historian, N.D. Kondratieff. See Kondratieff, The Long Waves in Economic Life, 17
REv. ECON. STAT. 105-15 (1935). For Wallerstein's conception of social identity in such a
world system, see Wallerstein, Class Formation, supra note 615. On the distinction between
"core" and "peripheral" nations and the prospects of the peripheral nations for self-deter-
mination, see Wallerstein, Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of
Transformation Within the Capitalist World Economy, 17 AmR. STUD. REv. 1-26 (1974).
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profits harvested in the Third World. On the basis of such reason-
ing, Soviet leaders have traditionally argued that the revolution-
ary struggle should center on the industrialized nations. Workers
could seize the means of production, they reasoned, only where
those means were located.61'
M. Revolutionary Nationalism
This conclusion has been contested by a competing marxist
tradition. National liberation movements, patterned on the Chi-
nese Revolution, fuse marxism with romantic nationalism.
Stressing the historicist elements in each of these traditions, par-
tisans of national liberation argue that marxism must take on a
new meaning when applied in a non-western cultural setting. 18 In
their view, the Soviet insistence on the centrality of industry is
ethnocentric. Marxist and capitalist internationalism share not
only a specific preference for industrial over agrarian society, but
a more general materialism: both view societies as fundamentally
economic rather than political or cultural orders. Yet much of the
rhetoric of national liberation implies that non-western cultures
have deliberately subordinated economic development to other
values. The revolutionary strategy of national liberation is pre-
mised on the belief that these cultural commitments can enable
non-western societies to resist the corrupting power of the world
market." '
The social vision of the national liberation movements then is
ultimately dualistic: it identifies virtue with the realization of cul-
turally specific values. The revolutionary internationalism of tradi-
617. See 2 A. ABDEL MAiK, SOCIAL DIALECTIC 81-84, 87-90 (1981).
618. Id. at 78-114. Abdel Malek both exemplifies this form of marxism, and describes
its development. The Chinese Revolution serves as a model for national liberation move-
ments because (a) it was a struggle for national independence as well as economic reorgani-
zation; (b) because the dominant revolutionary class was agrarian rather than urban; (c)
because the primary locus of struggle was therefore rural rather than urban; (d) because
the primary method of struggle was therefore guerilla warfare, rather than industrial con-
frontation; (e) because the focus of organization was therefore the mobilization of existing
organic communities rather than the organization of industries; and (0 because the revolu-
tionary ideology incorporated indigenous cultural traditions. See 2 SELECrED WORKS OF
MAO TSE-TUNG 305-34, 339-84 (1965).
619. A. ABDEL MALEK, supra note 617, at 71-77, 157-72 (primacy of the political over
the economic as determining factor in revolutionary struggle); id. at 191-201 (national lib-
eration movements turn revolutionary struggle into the construction of new civilizations
which transcend the materialism of western civilization).
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tional marxism, by contrast, is monistic: it identifies virtue with
the realization of species being, and views conflict as ultimately
ephemeral. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders have been forced to heed
the call of revolutionary nationalism. Because international capital
wreaks its worst devastation at a distance, the peripheral nations
are the sites of the greatest instability and discontent. The strug-
gle for liberation can catalyze those feelings of discontent into a
sense of community, but one that will be characterized by a spe-
cific historical identity. Western marxists may think Third World
nationalism naive and parochial, but they cannot ignore it because
it constitutes the greatest potential reservoir of support for revo-
lutionary change . 20
N. National Liberation and International Law
On the other hand, Third World nationalists cannot afford to
spurn internationalism, no matter how much they may suspect
that it is a cover for Western imperialism. Because of the Third
World's economic dependence upon, and military vulnerability to,
the West, its peoples cannot achieve any significant measure of
self-determination without Western acquiescence. As a conse-
quence, national liberation movements have appealed to interna-
tional institutions to guarantee a legal right to national self-
determination.621
Partisans of international institutions have responded to this
appeal for strategic reasons. Since, for the reasons we have just
discussed, none of the major powers have offered the institutions
of international law unqualified support, partisans of such institu-
tions have courted the favor of the Third World. The role that
the United Nations has been able to play in legitimating post-colo-
nial governments has in turn enhanced its own prestige. 22 Ac-
cordingly, academic supporters of strong international institutions
have sought to reconcile the principle of national self-determina-
tion with internationalism by grounding it in the international law
of human rights. They interpret self-determination as consisting
of representation in a democratic government, and justify such
representation on the grounds that it is a necessary means to guar-
620. F. SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 72.
621. See Stearns, supra note 538.
622. F. SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 69.
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antee the protection of any particular group's civil liberties and
material needs. The criterion of adequate representation, there-
fore, becomes the extent to which a particular group's human
rights are protected: the right of national self-determination col-
lapses into the human rights of individuals. 23
Charles Beitz has argued, however, that the principle of self-
determination is incompatible with an international law of human
rights. The ideal of self-determination as advanced by the national
liberation movements is romantic and historicist; it is premised on
the belief that value is determined by cultural context. Self-deter-
mination therefore entails not simply the liberation of a nation's
people, but of its culture as well. Therefore, it requires not that
each member of a people be treated in accordance with a univer-
"sal standard of justice, but that the people as a whole be free to
develop their own vision of justice. The principle of self-determi-
nation, in short, embodies a dualistic social vision. The ideal of an
international law of human rights, by contrast, entails a monistic
view of international society. Beitz-himself a proponent of
human rights-criticizes the principle of self-determination be-
623. Internationalist interpretations of the principles of self-determination rid it of
nationalist content by reducing it to some combination of the following three universal
principles: anticolonialism, representative democracy and antiracism. For the classic articu-
lation of the reduction of self-determination to independence from colonial rule, see R.
EMERSON, SELF DETERMINATION REVISITED IN THE ERA OF DECOLONIZATION (1964). See also H.
Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, Commis-
sion on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1 (1980). De Arkchaga,
Growth of the International Community and the Principles of Self Determination of Peoples, 7 REV.
INT'L AFF. 767 (1982). The difficulty with this view is that it does not necessarily permit
peoples to define themselves or even to choose their own systems of government. "The
Declaration of Friendly Relations" adds that groups subjected to racial discrimination
within an independent state should also be accorded self-determination. See C.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). Thus the
test of whether a government is adequately representative for any particular group is a
universal one: it turns on the extent to which their civil rights are respected. Support for
this general approach to the problem is expressed by a number of commentators. U.
UMOZURIKE, SELF DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1972); Carey, Self-Determination
in the Post-Colonial Era: The Case of Quebec, 1977 A.S.I.L.S. INT'L L.J. 47; Cassese, The Self-
Determination of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 92 (L. Henkin ed. 1981);
Cassese, Political Self-Determination-Old Concepts and New Developments, in UN LAW/FUNDA-
MENTAL RIGHTS (A. Cassese ed. 1979); Eritrea's Claim to Self-Determination, 26 INT'L COMM'N
JURISTS REV., June 1981, at 8; Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of
Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Richardson, Self-Determination,
International Law and the South African Bantustan Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185
(1978). Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention, 11 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 45 (1981).
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cause of its implicit cultural relativism.
One of his arguments is premised, like Wallerstein's, on the
assumption that the economies of all nations are linked in a single
world system: economic activity in one country affects inhabitants
of other countries. Economic interdependence, he argues, entails
that national self-determination is not only impossible, but im-
moral as well. A community cannot prescribe rules valid only for
its own members if those rules will affect people beyond the com-
munity's borders. 24
A second argument is based on skepticism that communities
actually will be characterized by cultural unity. A government that
views its function as the advancement of a particular culture may
become a vehicle for the persecution of minorities.625
A third argument is based on skepticism about the possibility
of popular sovereignty. Since few governments in fact represent
their peoples, argues Beitz, we cannot adopt popular sovereignty
as a criterion of legitimacy. Instead, we should judge the legiti-
macy of a government by the justice of its institutions.626 However
laudable, support for an international law of human rights is anti-
democratic.
In practice, Beitz's internationalist criterion of legitimacy may
be a mandate for imposing Western values by force. Schurmann
has argued that President Kennedy's decision to introduce Ameri-
can ground troops into Vietnam was motivated by political rather
than military considerations. Kennedy was concerned that the fla-
grant corruption and violence that characterized the Diem regime
would cause it to lose popular support to the Viet Cong. American
advisers were sent to force Diem to reform; when Diem failed to
do so, he was assassinated.627 The United States may or may not
have intervened in Vietnam in order to protect South Vietnam
from North Vietnamese aggression-but they occupied the coun-
try in order to protect South Vietnam from the South Vietnamese
government. The notion of international human rights is a de-
624. C. BEITz, supra, note 135, at 35-50 (view of international relations as consisting of
distinct, autonomous states is empirically false).
625. Id. at 109-10. Beitz's belief in the likelihood of such persecutions is based on his
commitment to the third argument.
626. Id. at 78-79, 96.
627. F. SCHURMANN, supra note 572, at 436-49 (Kennedy administration saw introduc-
tion of ground troops as means of controlling Diem regime); id. at 448 (helped plot Diem's
overthrow).
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scendant of the idea of universal natural rights invoked by the im-
perial tradition in political theory; the dark side of that tradition
is its legitimization of paternalistic domination. Noble as the de-
sire to insure human rights abroad may be, it has been the heart
and soul of American imperialism . 28 National liberation move-
ments probably cannot avoid seeking support from revolutionary
and reformist internationalism, but such support is often offered
as a Trojan horse.
Any time a national liberation movement appeals to interna-
tional law for help it places itself in an awkward position, because
it is essentially inviting foreign intervention. When, therefore,
Egypt abandoned its treaty obligations to the Palestine Liberation
Organization in order to make a separate peace with Israel, the
P.L.O. found itself in a dilemma: the P.L.O. could only argue that
the Egyptian action was void if it was willing to adopt a property
conception of treaty entitlements; but to adopt this position was to
endorse a monistic view of international society which would pre-
clude the validity of claims to self-determination. The P.L.O.
could not invoke the protection of international law without seem-
ing to abandon its own revolutionary nationalism.
628. Id. at 16-17 (imperialism typically characterized by revolutionary ideology); id. at
105-07 (containment policy inspired by such an ideology); id. at 72-76 (Roosevelt succeeded
in promoting U.S. to world leadership in part because of progressive ideology); id. at 419-
22 (Kennedy containment policies resurrected Roosevelt's idealized sense of natural mis-
sion); id. at 436-39 (intervention in Vietnam motivated by desire to influence oppressive
regime).
Eric Foner suggests a relationship between antislavery liberalism and nineteenth cen-
tury imperialism. See E. FONER, FREE Son.. FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 72 (1970) (quoting 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1848-1858, at 255 (R. Basler ed. 1953) and Letter from Charles Sumner
to Francis Bird (Sept. 11, 1857) (available in Houghton Library, Harvard University)):
The Republicans. . . accepted the characteristic American vision of the United
States as an example to the world of the social and political benefits of democ-
racy, yet believed that so long as slavery existed, the national purpose of pro-
moting liberty in other lands could not be fulfilled. Lincoln declared in 1854
that slavery "deprives our republican example of its just influence in the
world-enables the enemies of free institutions to taunt us as hypocrites," and
Charles Sumner agreed that the institution "degrades our country, and pre-
vents the example from being all-conquering." William Seward believed that
the spread of American economic influence would be accompanied by the ex-
port of America's egalitarian political institutions. The nation, he wrote, had a
mission and responsibility "to renovate the condition of mankind" by proving
at home that the "experiment in self-government" could succeed, and by aiding
abroad "the universal restoration of power to the governed."
Id. at 72.
DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY
Yet international law, like the world market system and revo-
lutionary internationalism, cannot claim legitimacy without ac-
commodating nationalist sentiment. Legitimation requires consen-
sus, but such consensus does not arise spontaneously merely as a
result of our common occupation of the same planet; consensus
arises, if at all, from the common struggles and shared exper-
iences of particular communities. In the world we live in, such
communities are the only possible sources of legitimacy. Any seri-
ous effort to increase the acceptance of international law must
therefore appeal to such communities for support; yet this re-
quires that international law root its legitimacy in the myth of in-
ternational consensus. The difficulty with this myth is not so much
that it's false, as that it's unappealing. If, as Hegel suggested, na-
tional identity is dependent upon international conflict, the myth
of international consensus threatens the very identities of the
communities to whom international law appeals for support.
This Article has revealed a discourse divided against itself.
The discourse of international law contains contradictory proposi-
tions because it is carried on in the context of a culture pro-
foundly ambivalent about the legitimacy of international institu-
tions. The source of this ambivalence is a contradiction endemic
to the marketplace economy which that culture haunts. The per-
petuation of this world market requires a culture systematically
ambivalent toward legal institutions generally.
While the market is generally thought of as a system of distri-
bution by private means, the maintenance of that system requires
a supplementary system of distribution to insure that some goods
be distributed to all players. This supplementary function is per-
formed by the "public sphere," that is, legal institutions. Yet such
institutions are a mixed blessing for the world market. The main-
tenance of legal institutions requires their acceptance as legiti-
mate; this in turn requires the presence of some community capa-
ble of so accepting them. Markets, however, destroy communities.
Thus the market at once requires legal institutions and destroys
their requisite conditions.
So much is true of both national and international legal insti-
tutions; yet there is one important difference between them which
renders national legal institutions more viable. While the market
destroys communities, it also engenders new ones. These new
communities, coalescing in localized resistance to the international
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market, may become sources of legitimacy for states erected on a
national level. From the standpoint of a world market, it is the
very function of such states to represent the interests of relatively
deprived communities, lest these communities vanish from the
market system altogether. Yet precisely to the extent that they ef-
fectively represent these interests, nation states threaten to disrupt
the world market system. In this sense, the world market system
could more easily maintain itself if local institutions could be re-
placed by an international "public sphere"; yet local communities
would see in such a development the defeat of their interests. If
we have rightly estimated the significance of legal institutions in
the setting of a world market, one of their crucial functions is co-
optation, and legal institutions cannot successfully fulfill that func-
tion unless they are identified with particular communities.
Because the nation-state serves to represent the interests of
dissident communities within the world market system, it is a
mixed blessing from the standpoint of those communities as well
as from the standpoint of the world market system. The nation-
state can blunt some of the most devastating effects of the world
market system, but it cannot detach its people from that system.
Because the market is a worldwide equilibrium system, localized
resistance is more likely in the short run to further burden the
resisting community than to destabilize the market as a whole."2"
Localized struggle, in other words, is economically risky; the diffi-
culty is that no other form of struggle seems culturally possible.
Nationalism has been a nursery for anticapitalist sentiment, but it
has been a prison as well. Hence the path to social change appears
to lead beyond the borders of the nation-state. When we peer
down that path, however, we glimpse at a psychic wilderness de-
void of community and identity. Law cannot lead us there until
629. The idea is that the world market can adjust to the withdrawal of any particular
community so long as many communities do not all withdraw at once. Shortages created by
the withdrawal of one supplier will be expressed in terms of higher prices which in turn
will induce new suppliers into the market. The particular firms that had developed trade in
such a community may suffer, but other firms will take their place. Only if the disruptive
effects of a single community's withdrawal are localized to the extent that the affected
community is also induced to withdraw from the market, does the first withdrawal actually
erode the market system. Otherwise, it simply provides opportunities for suppliers and
markets that might not otherwise have arisen. Thus the market survives while the with-
drawn community suffers. Eventually, argue internationalists, economic interest will drive
the withdrawn community back into the world market.
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politics paves the way. Our final Chapter will assess the difficulty
of developing political identities that transcend the nation-state.
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IX. THE RETURN
The question arises how far a nomadic people, for instance, or any
people on a low level of civilization, can be regarded as a state. As once was
the case with the Jews and the Mohammedan peoples, religious views may
entail an opposition at a higher level between one people and its neighbors
and so preclude the general identity which is requisite for recognition.630
A. The Dialectic Recollected
Our journey began in the disputed territory of the Promised
Land. In attempting to make a separate peace with Israel, Egypt
violated its agreements with other Arab nations. The source of
the conflict lay in the incompatibility of simultaneous commit-
ments to Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the
face of their conflicting claims to sovereignty. The legal conse-
quences of the conflict were less easily determined.
It seemed fairly clear that Egypt's separate peace was illegal;
whether it was legally invalid, however, remained an open ques-
tion. The answer to this question depended upon whether the for-
mation of the treaty violated objective right or merely infringed a
subjective right. The former view entailed that a treaty would
confer a property right to performance and alienate the capacity
to create a conflicting treaty. The latter view entailed that a treaty
would confer only a liability right to compensation in the event of
nonperformance, and would be perfectly compatible with the con-
ferral on another of a liability right to the performance of a con-
flicting obligation. Each of these two conceptions of treaty entitle-
ments has received scholarly and diplomatic support.
Treaty expectations have generally been viewed as property
entitlements by monistic jurists. Monists view actual sovereignty as
the creature of an international order, and view any act violating
international law as invalid for municipal law as well. They reject
the possibility of a conflict between valid legal obligations because
they insist that law is a coherent unity. This assumption rests in
turn on a faith in the fundamental homogeneity of all human soci-
ety, often reinforced by a view of human identity as individually,
rather than culturally, determined.
The view of treaty expectations as property entitlements has
630. Hwm's PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHr, supra note 447, § 331.
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been rejected by dualist jurists. Dualists view international obliga-
tions as creatures of national sovereignty. They are inclined to dis-
parage the notion that international law could place limits on the
treatymaking powers of states, since they see the validity of inter-
national law as dependent on the consent of states. Dualists see
treaties as potential sources of state responsibility, but they tend
to see such responsibility as "subjective"-dictated by the will of
the parties rather than an international order. Accordingly, dual-
ists seem to vacillate between a view of treaty expectations as lia-
bility entitlements and a view of treaty expectations as wishful
thoughts. Their dichotomy between national society and interna-
tional society is reflected in a further dichotomy between interna-
tional relations based on good faith, and international relations
characterized by conflict and exploitation. Dualists view interna-
tional relations as a forum for conflict because of a belief that
human society is composed of discrete communities; this belief is
reinforced by a view of human identity as culturally rather than
individually determined.
The social vision of monism is lent plausibility by the ubiqui-
tous penetration of a market system of resource distribution. In
replacing traditional systems of resource distribution, the market
eliminates an important support for the integrity of communities.
The mobility of capital, technology and labor generated by such a
system has a homogenizing effect on culture, and a disintegrative
effect on social groups. Because it discounts the importance of the
communities destroyed by the world market, monism plays an ide-
ological role in justifying the entrenchment of a world market.
The social vision of dualism is lent plausibility by the struggle
of particular communities to maintain or reconstitute themselves
in the face of this market threat. In protecting their peoples
against the destructive effects of a world market, governments
adopt protectionist, social welfare, and expansionist policies which
bring them into conflict with other states. The social vision of du-
alism plays an ideological role in justifying resistance to a world
market because it presents the resulting conflict as inevitable.
The two postures coexist in international jurisprudence be-
cause the interests supporting them coexist in world politics.
Neither interest can afford to defeat the other. A world market
cannot survive if it systematically destroys temporarily marginal
communities that may yet again produce and consume. On the
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other hand, those communities most injured by a world market
can least afford to detach themselves from it because they are
least capable of surviving in isolation.
That communities cannot survive in isolation entails that they
must engage in relations with one another; it does not require
that those relations be mediated by a market that constantly
threatens to destroy communities. The romantic tradition in polit-
ical theory generated powerful images of community which could
be deployed in a variety of contexts, including transnational ones.
The imagery of community has nevertheless been appropriated by
nationalist movements that attempt to define themselves as auton-
omous. As a result, it has been exceedingly difficult to build politi-
cal communities across state lines. While nationalism has facili-
tated the expression of localized resistance to the market, it has
impeded the development of forms of international relations that
might challenge the market. This means that nationalist move-
ments express a romantic desire for community, but in a form
which precludes the realization of that desire. The reason that na-
tionalism precludes the realization of community is that it requires
that incipient communities efface one another.
Consider the Camp David negotiations discussed in Chapter
II. Dualist jurisprudence theoretically permits one state to keep
faith with several nations even if the goals of those nations con-
flict; yet Egypt was forced to choose between Israel and Palestine
because each claimed a right to preclude performance of the
other's treaty. Each saw recognition of the other as a denial of its
own sovereignty because the identity of each required the nonex-
istence of the other. Such self-deception demands to be met with
duplicity. If international relations are to be transformed, our po-
litical identities must be conceived in recognition of other
communities.
What induces communities to define themselves in terms
which efface one another? In this Chapter, I will suggest that this
type of collective identity is partly the product of a nationalist tra-
dition in historiography. By this I do not mean that oppressed
peoples fight wars against one another because they read the
wrong books; I mean that people's collective identities are shaped
by their historical experience, and that a nationalist movement
within one community impacts on other communities in ways that
engender new nationalist movements. When one community iden-
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tifies itself as a nation-state, it forces other communities to do like-
wise. Because national identity proliferates in this way, nationalism
can be characterized as a tradition, not only in the writing of his-
tory, but in the way history is experienced. To illustrate this
point, I invite you to return with me to the Promised Land. Let us
attempt to reconstruct how its Jewish and Arab claimants each
came to identify themselves in terms which effaced one another.
B. A Dialectical History
Zionism cannot be understood apart from its social origins in
nineteenth century Europe. It was at once an example of Euro-
pean nationalism and a reaction against it. Such a response to na-
tionalism, though paradoxical, is not unusual: Dov Ronen has sug-
gested that available national identities are "activated" when a
group or institution that presents itself as "alien" is perceived as a
barrier to a group's material aspirations. 31 Thus one nationalism
begets another. Various nineteenth century European nationalist
movements, most notably the German, arose in simultaneous imi-
tation of, and resistance to, French nationalism. Zionism was a
similarly imitative reaction against these nationalist movements.
I have described these movements as contradictory forces, si-
multaneously expressing and diffusing resistance to the advance of
the market. Nationalism could fulfill the latter function to the ex-
tent that it could reassure interests threatened by the market that,
by virtue of their membership in a community bound by affective
ties, the state would look after them. Nationalism was not, how-
ever, the only ideology serving to diffuse discontent in the nine-
teenth century market society.
Liberalism-the voice of the imperial tradition in mass polit-
ics-defended the market as the scourge of entrenched hierarchy,
assuring laborers that "property" in their own labor would make
them the jural and social equals of owners of capital. The legiti-
mating force of this feature of liberalism was its implicit promise
that current suffering could be redeemed by future prosperity;
that vulnerability to the mobility of capital could be transcended
through individual social mobility.632 The success of this legitimat-
631. D. RONEN, THE QuEsT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 53-98 (1979).
632. The identification of progress with the movement from a society based on status
relations to ones based on contract was articulated by Sir Henry Sumner Maine. See H.
1985] 537
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ing function required the emergence of a stratum of relatively
privileged, educated laborers; such laborers, by virtue of liberal
ideology, could identify with owners of capital, thereby forming a
distinct middle class and depriving laborers of their most articu-
late voices.633 As ideology, nationalism and liberalism were in ten-
sion with one another: nationalism required its adherents to view
themselves as members of a collective; liberalism required its ad-
herents to view themselves as individuals. Nevertheless, national-
ism reenforced liberalism in important ways. Nationalism justified
an interventionist state; this in turn called for an expanded state
apparatus, and the development of a civil service. Civil service em-
ployees, however, were natural recruits for the new middle class.
Moreover, as Ernest Gellner has argued, the formation of a civil
service required a greatly expanded educational system which fa-
cilitated the expansion of other professions as well. 3 Nationalism
helped create the middle class in which liberal ideology took root.
For European Jews, liberal ideology had considerable appeal.
The status society that prevailed in preindustrial Europe may or
may not have been more exploitative than the market society that
replaced it. It was particularly burdensome for Jews, however, not
so much because it exploited them as because it excluded them.
Such society linked political, economic and religious life in an or-
ganic unity. Religious deviance banished Jews from agriculture
and most trades, as well as subjecting them to periodic violence
and forced migration. As a result, European Jews lacked precisely
those characteristics associated by republican theory with virtue:
land, artisanal skills, participation in civic life, and identification
with a particular polis. Instead they were characterized by those
traits associated with corruption: mobility, foreignness, and, if
they were "fortunate," participation in commerce. Liberalism
could therefore appeal to European Jews for three reasons: First,
in encouraging the expansion of the market, liberalism cast mobil-
ity and commerce in a new and more favorable light. Second, lib-
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 156-65 (10th ed. Boston 1963) (1st ed. London 1860). The origins of
this ideology are traced in C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDU-
ALISM 1-72 (1977). A German variant of this tradition was articulated by Wilhelm von
Humboldt. See G. IGGERS, supra note 498, at 90-123; see generally H. LASKI, THE RISE OF
EUROPEAN LIBERALISM (1971).
633. See Wallerstein, Class Formation, supra note 615, at 367-68.
634. E. GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 19-52 (1983).
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eralism promised the erosion of the rigid social structure from
which Jews had been excluded, substituting a combination ofjural
equality and a fluid market. Third, liberalism offered to dramati-
cally reduce the social significance of ethnicity and religion.
In viewing citizens as individuals, rather than members of
communities, liberalism implied that a religious faith was akin to a
personal preference, opinion, or taste. Religious conviction of any
sort was an expression of arbitrary subjectivity, and therefore not
essentially different from an investment decision. Religion was a
private matter; public life was secular. Liberalism accordingly
promised to release Jews from the ghetto on the condition that
they ghettoize their Jewishness. Orthodox religious leaders
spurned this offer as an invitation to apostasy; yet many Jews re-
sponded to it, seeing religious orthodoxy as an aspect of the medi-
eval social order that they longed to escape. For them, liberalism
promised unprecedented opportunity to participate in civic
life-opportunity that was concretely represented by admission to
the civil service and the professions."5
These ambitions created a difficulty for the newly ascendant
market society. Prior to the nineteenth century, antisemitism had
been a fact of social life in Europe, but not a problem. In republi-
can political theory, antisemitism took the form of an identifica-
tion of Jews with corruption, particularly the corruption of the
marketplace. When, therefore, republican theory was marshalled
against international capital in the nineteenth century, antisemit-
ism was an integral part of its rhetorical arsenal. Recall that the
positive function of nationalism in accomodating Europeans to the
world market lay in convincing them that the bureaucratic state
had an affective base, and could therefore adequately substitute
for the organic communities laid waste by industrialization. The
emergence of Jews into the civil service and other quasi-public
professions, such as journalism, education and law, undermined
that claim; it gave rise to the accusation that the state was an in-
strument of corruption, rather than an exponent of virtue. On the
other hand, denying Jews admission to these professions would
undermine the claims of liberalism that the deprived could best
635. On the reception of liberalism among European Jews, see generally W. LAQUEuR,




advance their interests by pursuing them individually rather than
collectively, and that poverty was the product of private vice
rather than systematic oppression. This then was "the Jewish
Question" disputed by Marx and Bruno Bauer: the Jewish pres-
ence in market society drove a wedge between nationalism and
liberalism, revealing their incompatibility.6 36
In the face of this contradiction, European market society
stood to benefit from Jewish emigration. As Herzl persuasively ar-
gued to Western leaders, they had three choices: They could pro-
tect the civil rights of Jews and thereby provoke antisemitic reac-
tion (as eventually occurred in most of Western Europe); they
could collaborate with antisemitism and drive the Jews into the
arms of revolutionaries (as occurred in Russia); or they could "Let
[His] people go."163 7 But why to Palestine? To understand the ap-
peal of this feature of the Zionist program to Western powers, it
must be placed in the context of another anxiety plaguing the
leaders of these nations throughout the nineteenth century: the
so-called Eastern Question.
The Eastern Question, we may recall, concerned the fate of
the areas controlled by the Ottoman Empire. Once feared by all
of Christendom, by the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire
had so weakened that it entered the Concert of Europe as a vir-
tual dependency. As a result, it administered a vast area in a man-
ner consistent with the Concert's aim of establishing a stable
world market. In so doing, it spared the European powers the
risks of direct colonial rule. Because the Ottomans were indige-
nous to the region, reasoned the Europeans, they would better
know how to stabilize it, and their rule would be more easily ac-
cepted as legitimate; on the other hand, because they served at
the pleasure of the European Concert, their loyalty to European
interests was assured. In short, Ottoman power functioned like a
sort of stabilizing middle class, representing the Orient within the
European Concert while representing European interests in the
Orient. The difficulty lay in the steady erosion of Ottoman power.
A sudden collapse would certainly disrupt the world market and
might so destabilize the European balance of power as to bring
636. B. Bauer, TheJewish Problem, in THE YOUNG HEGELIANS 187-97 (L. Stepelevich ed.
1983); Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 24-51 (R. Tucker ed.
1972).
637. Herzl, First Congress Address, in THE ZIONLS IDEA, supra note 635, at 229-30.
540 [Vol. 34
DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY
down the entire system. On the other hand, direct European in-
tervention in anticipation of such a collapse would surely upset the
balance of power.6 38 Accordingly, European powers throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were constantly
courting "responsible" indigenous elites that could one day be
pushed headlong into the breach. To the extent that Jews could
represent themselves as civilized Orientals, they became plausible
candidates to partially replace the Ottoman elite.63 To Western
European Jews, Zionism offered an opportunity to form a chapter
of the European middle class in exile. To the colonial powers, it
offered a "native" population for Palestine, already colonized in
advance.
As long as Western European Jews felt confident in the tri-
umph of liberalism, they had little reason to present the Zionist
case to their governments. But for the strength of liberal ideology
in the West, however, Jews might never have gained sufficient
voice in public affairs to make such a case. While Zionism devel-
oped into a mass movement among Eastern European Jews in the
1880's, it was only when Western European Jews became involved
in the late 1890's that the movement gained the ear of the major
powers. What prompted the Jews of Western Europe to join a na-
tionalist movement was the ascendency of antisemitism in mass
politics as a result of the economic crisis of the early nineties. The
Dreyfus affair in France, in particular, convinced many that the
bureaucratic state could never be truly neutral and secular in gen-
tile society. They embraced European nationalism as a means of
realizing their previously absorbed European liberalism. In a
sense, they became separatists rather than revolutionaries because
they were so well integrated into European society."' They had
638. E. CRANKSHAW, THE SHADOW OF THE WINTER PALACE THE DRIFT TO REVOLUTION
1825-1917, 138-56 (1978). K MARX, THE EASTERN QUESTION (1897).
639. E. SAID, supra note 53, at 25-30.
640. Interest in emigration generally, and to Palestine in particular, was present
among Russian Jews prior to any expression of interest in their plight by West European
Jews. See THE ZIONIST IDEA, supra note 635, at 142-98 (writings of Smolenskin, Ben-
Yehudah, Lilienblum and Pinsker). In the face of the massive pogroms of 188 1, large num-
bers of Jews were politicized. A mild expression of interest in a modest resettlement plan
by a French Jewish relief organization galvanized interest in emigration both to America
and to Palestine. See J. FRANKEL, PROPHECY AND POLITICS: SOCIAISM, NATIONALISM & THE
RUSSIAN JEws, 1862-1917, at 51-132 (1984). Nevertheless, Walter Laqueur described the
Zionist movement in this setting as "comatose" because it lacked the economic and politi-
cal means to achieve its goals. See W. LAQUEUR, supra note 635, at 75-83. On the origins of
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seen some of the bourgeois life, and it suited them; Zionism of-
fered an opportunity to secure it in a setting free of antisemitism.
By succeeding in this program, Western European Jews repro-
duced the same contradiction between liberalism and nationalism
in a new setting, begetting a new community of second class citi-
zens-Arabs-within an ostensibly neutral state.
Because Western European Jews were so well integrated into
European society, however, they could neither populate a separa-
tist mass movement, nor present a convincing picture of unassimil-
able Orientals. Western European Jewry constituted the move-
ment's foreign ministry, but the social base of the movement lay
in Eastern Europe. For Eastern European Jews, Zionism resolved a
somewhat different set of contradictions. Throughout the nine-
teenth century these Jews-the bulk of the European Jewish pop-
ulation-continued to live a ghettoized life dominated by religious
tradition. Here, in the Schtetl, liberalism had much less appeal,
for three reasons. First, it had no proven track record of improv-
ing conditions for Jews, as it had made almost no headway in Rus-
sian public life. Because there was no substantial Jewish middle
class in Russia, liberalism had little social base among Jews. Sec-
ond, Jews had little reason to expect support from the bureau-
cratic state, which pursued overtly antisemitic policies. This be-
came particularly clear in the 1880's, when the government
supported massive pogroms."' Third, in challenging religious tra-
dition and communal life, liberalism conflicted with the principle
norms of Schtetl society. Assimilators were traitors, in league with
the oppressor.842
political Zionism in Western Europe, see id. at 84-135. On the relationship between West
European Zionism and antisemitic demagoguery in Western Europe, see C. SCHORSEE, Polit-
ics in a New Key: An Austrian Trio, in FIN DE SIi-LE VIENNA. POLITICS AND CULTURE 116-80
(1981). While the impetus for Western European Jews to become active in supporting Zi-
onism can be explained as a response to the steady rise of antisemitism in West European
mass politics from the seventies to 1895, the early successes of Zionism in gaining a hearing
in the corridors of power can be explained in terms of the decline in mass antisemitism
after that time. See W. LAQUEUR, supra note 635, at 29.
641. J. FRANKFI, supra note 640, at 1-2, 51-53, 97-107; Hertzberg, supra note 635, at
40-45.
642. See, e.g., Smolenskin, The Haskalah of Berlin, in THE ZIONIST IDEA, supra note 635,
at 154-57 (condemning the German Jewish enlightenment as a flight from Jewish identity).
For a more modern treatment of the same theme, see J. CUDDIHY, THE ORDEAL OF CIVILITY




On the other hand, life-and death-in the Schtetl were
unendurable. Since the isolation of the Schtetl was externally im-
posed, tradition too could sometimes seem like a passive collabora-
tor. Like other medieval communities in need of a justification for
social change, Jews revived the apocalyptic themes in their theo-
logical tradition. One manifestation of this tendency was utopian
socialism. Under no illusions as to their class status, Russian Jews
leapt eagerly into the arms of revolution." 3 Yet the special
trauma of antisemitism, combined with the bonds of community,
seemed to argue for a more explicitly Jewish solution; such a solu-
tion could not be constructed, however, without redefining Jewish
identity.
This was accomplished through the construction of a republi-
can ideology out of Jewish materials. Zionists borrowed their cri-
tique of European Jewish life from European antisemitism: ortho-
doxy and liberal assimilation were equally corrupt because they
were diaspora ideologies, reflecting a parasitic existence at the
margins of society. Jews had indeed become contemptible because
they were without a land or nation; in Europe, they could never
be more than scheming servants to their hosts. The only solution
was a republic: their own land, their own language and culture,
and their own political institutions. They interpreted the Torah as
the narrative of a collective escape from bondage, the recovery of
a promised land and constitution of a society, rather than as a
code of law. Authentically Jewish life should therefore revolve not
around observance, but republican virtue-agriculture, physical
labor, intellectual creativity, military courage, collective pragma-
tism and personal sacrifice.6 " After the pogroms of the early
1880's, utopian socialism increasingly expressed itself among Jews
in this republican form." 5
Zionism, though partially conceived on the model of Euro-
pean nationalism, was a movement for independence from Euro-
pean society. Nevertheless, it succeeded in part because it was sold
to the European powers as a means of creating a dependent "Ori-
643. See J. FRANKEL, supra note 640, at 28-47, 171-287.
644. See THE ZIONIST IDEA, supra note 635, at 290-328 (writings of Berdichevski, Bren-
ner and Klatzkin).
645. See THE ZIONIST IDEA, supra note 635, at 330-87 (writings of Syrkin, Borochov,
Aaron and Gordon). See also J. FRANKEL, supra note 640, at 288-364; W. LAQUEUR, supra
note 635, at 270-337.
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ental" state. Jews wanted to leave Europe in part because they
were identified as European; they succeeded in part because they
were identified as Oriental. To some extent, they may have
shared this self-perception. Edward Said has analyzed Zionism as a
European imperialist ideology, premised on contempt for the
"Orient." I think that he correctly identifies the appeal of Zion-
ism to the Western powers, but misses its meaning to its adher-
ents. For Eastern European Jews, Zionism was the transcendence
of the Schtetl: a confining, tradition-bound, unproductive, para-
sitic, servile and stateless existence. In their eyes, the Arabs of Pal-
estine shared all of these conditions. They could imagine building
a vital society in Palestine that marginalized the existing inhabi-
tants because they saw those inhabitants as embracing a medieval
life like the one that Jews had been forced to lead in the intersti-
ces of European society.' 6 European Zionists knew nothing of the
Arabs; the contempt that they felt for them could only have been
self-contempt." 7  They expected Palestinian Arabs to content
themselves with the Schtetl because they saw them as pre-Zionist
Jews.
Palestinian Arabs responded by developing their own Zion-
ism.646 Prior to the Zionist presence in Palestine, the Arab inhabi-
646. What they failed to acknowledge was that the medieval character of life in the
Schtetl had only become anomalous with the advent of a bourgeois market society in 18th
century Germany, and an industrialized society in late 19th century Russia. Thus, as soon
as Zionism established a "developed" economy in Palestine, the persistence of traditional
social and economic life among Palestinian Arabs was oppressive; contact with interna-
tional markets also made that traditional social life less economically viable.
647. For a sophisticated argument that Jewish revolutionary thought has traditionally
combined an assault on Western civilization with an embarassed apologia for the vulgarity
of Schtetl as perceived by the West, see generally J. CUDDIHY, supra note 642. Edward
Said's defense of Palestinian nationalism fits this pattern, as does, I suppose, this Article.
See E. SAID, supra note 53.
648. Said is explicit in drawing parallels between Zionism and Arab responses to it.
Each manifested the dark side of republicanism, the identification of the foreign with
corruption:
The internal solidity and cohesion of Israel, and of Israelis as a people and a
society ...eluded the understanding of Arabs generally. Thus to the walls
constructed by Zionism have been added walls constructed by a dogmatic, al-
most theological brand of Arabism. Israel has seemed essentially to be a rhetor-
ical tool provided by the West to harass the Arabs. What this perception en-
tailed in the Arab states has been a policy of repression and a kind of thought
control. For years it was forbidden ever to refer to Israel in print; this sort of
censorship led quite naturally to the consolidation of police states, the absence
of freedom of expression, and a whole set of human rights abuses, all suppos-
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tants did not identify themselves as "Palestinian" or demand polit-
ical independence. In the face of Jewish nationalism, however,
Arab nationalism in Palestine coalesced around the issue of Jewish
immigration. When Palestinian Arabs were displaced as a result of
the 1948 partition and war, they developed a specifically Palestin-
ian, diaspora nationalism .6 9 Cognizant of the fact that Zionism
had succeeded in part by capturing the conscience of the Western
powers in the wake of the Holocaust, Palestinian nationalism de-
veloped a similar strategy. Accordingly, it has adopted some of the
rhetoric and many of the contradictions of Zionism. On the one
hand, it attacks Zionism as ethnocentric, likening it to Nazism. 50
At the same time it makes biblical arguments for exclusive Arab
title to Palestine, claiming descent from the Philistines who were
edly justified in the name of "fighting Zionist aggression," which meant that
any form of oppression at home was acceptable because it served the "sacred
cause" of "national security."
For Israel and Zionists everywhere, the results of Zionist apartheid have
been equally disastrous. The Arabs were seen as synonymous with everything
degraded, fearsome, irrational and brutal. Institutions whose humanistic and
social (even socialist) inspiration were manifest for Jews-the kibbutz, the Law
of Return, various facilities for the acculturation of immigrants-were pre-
cisely, determinedly inhuman for the Arabs. In his body and being, and in the
putative emotions and psychology assigned to him, the Arab expressed
whatever by definition stood outside, beyond Zionism.
E. SAID, supra note 639, at 88. Said here treats Arab hostility to Israel as derivative from
Zionist attitudes toward Arabs. He stops short of saying that Palestinian nationalism is itself
derived from Zionism. But Palestinian nationalism is no more easily separated from Israel-
phobia, than Zionism is from Arab-phobia. We have seen that Zionism is from Arab-phobia
and we have seen that Zionism involved an absorption of the republican nationalism that so
often inspired Western antisemitism. That antisemitism was first internalized as a critique
of Jewish life, then projected onto Palestinian Arabs. In developing a diaspora nationalism
of their own, Palestinian Arabs adopted the political theory of Zionism, but endeavored to
replace it as the true Palestinian nativist movement. In so doing, it took over from Zionism
the Zionist critique of Jewish life which Zionism had applied to the Palestinians; it also
adopted the European and American nationalist view of Jews as displaced foreign repre-
sentatives of international capital.
649. See D. RONEN, supra note 631, at 86-89; E. SAID, supra note 639, at 115-25.
650. "Zionism is. . . racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist and colo-
nial in its aims, and fascist in its methods." PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER art. 22, re-
printed in J. MooRE, supra note 4, at 1089. "Terrorist Jews massacred more than 350 aged
Arab men, women and children with barbarism exceeding that of the Nazis." Nakhleh, The
Liberation of Palestine Is Supported by International Law and Justice, in J. MOORE, supra note 4,
at 125. The Palestinian strategy of attacking Zionism as ethnocentric has borne fruit in a
number of condemnations of Zionism by nations outside of the region, most notably the
United Nations General Assembly resolution declaring that "zionism is a form of racism
and racial discrimination." G.A. Res. 3379, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 83, U.N.
Doc. A/10034 (1975).
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displaced by the first Jewish return." 1 It proposes a tolerant social
democratic state in Palestine, but insists upon the expulsion of the
Jewish residents of the region.6 52 By appointing Zionism as the
representative of Palestinian Arabs, the European powers have in
fact turned Palestinians into Zionists. In the meantime, Israel is
fast becoming the "Oriental" society that the Western powers
imagined: the principle beneficiaries of her "right of return" have
been Jewish refugees from Arab lands. The result, however, has
been an erosion of Western support. As Israeli society becomes
increasingly traditional, religious, bellicose and authoritarian, the
West is no longer so willing to assume that it is culturally superior
to its Arab neighbors.
Israelis and Palestinians have each defined themselves in
terms of destinies that deny the existence of the other; yet the
meaning of both identities is dependent upon the same historical
context, a context in which each of the two parties is a crucial
part. Each people, in denying the other, denies an essential fea-
ture of itself, thereby inspiring an irredentism that is psychic as
well as political. The return claimed as a matter of right by Israe-
lis and Palestinians alike is the return of the repressed.
C. Towards a Dialectical Identity
The shared social vision of Zionism and Palestinian national-
ism illustrates the historical myopia of nationalism generally. This
myopia undermines the strategic value of nationalism as an instru-
ment of social change. Because the market legitimates itself by ap-
peal to individual interests, its success is in part dependent upon
the establishment of an individualistic society. Resistance to the
market has often been mediated by nationalism because national-
ism requires the construction of a collective identity. The creation
of such an identity in turn requires the recognition of a common
history. Because histories are narratives of change, they entail a
dualistic vision of society, a tension between text and context. Yet
groups that have attempted to understand their own struggles in
nationalistic terms have been driven to view their own histories as
651. "[T]he Palestinians were the descendants of the Philistines and Canaanites and
have lived continuously in Palestine since the dawn of history, even long before the ancient
Hebrews set foot in the country." Cattan, Sovereignty over Palestine, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 14.
652. See supra note 73.
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the autonomous unfolding of national destiny. Accordingly, they
have substituted for their real histories mythic futures devoid of
context. The vulnerability of such myths lies in their inability to
explain how communities come to recognize a common identity in
advance of any history. The ancient Hebrews did not, after all,
view their return to Zion as the fulfillment of their own promise,
but of God's; they did not choose their own destiny, they were
chosen for it. So too, every subsequent Millenarian ideology has
been dependent upon a deus ex machina to explain its ultimate tri-
umph. For a modern nationalism, that deus ex machina is provided
by the state. The state, for Hegel, was "God's way in the
world."6 53
By annointing the state as history's agent, nationalism effaces
the role of other communities in the development of national
identity. Nationalists inherited a republican perception of all for-
eigners as corrupt individuals rather than virtuous members of
civic communities; Renaissance republicanism was a relativism
with only one frame of reference. Yet for all its xenophobia, the
Renaissance republic recognized its contingency on events abroad.
Nationalists, by contrast, drew from the imperial tradition a vision
of the state as invulnerable. The identification of the state with
God is simply a natural extension of the paternalistic role ac-
corded it in the imperial tradition. For many historians influenced
by Hegel, the state was the "objective" expression of a people's
spirit, and a people's true history narrated the constitutional de-
velopment of its state.6 54 Since the state was the repository of the
national spirit, actual contact between members of different na-
tions, commercial or intellectual, could not effect their national
cultures. Such contact took place in a private sphere which was
ephemeral, subjective and unreal.
Nationalists, since Hegel, have failed to take seriously the pos-
sibility of transnational communities because of their insistence
that political identity can be realized only through the state. The
principle of state autonomy proceeds from the assumption that
states cannot simultaneously fulfill the dreams of their own people
653. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 447, § 258. "Es ist der Gang Gottes in
der Welt, das der Staat ist." See S. AVINERI, supra note 448, at 176-77 for a discussion of
various ways of translating this phrase.




and their responsibilities to one another.
Yet the basic premises of Hegel's thought suggests that iden-
tity is never developed in isolation. No individual can fulfill her
own promise autonomously. Hegel argued that the individual be-
comes conscious of herself as a subject only through struggle
against another; that she can only understand her subjectivity by
seeing herself in relation to the other; that she can only transcend
that subjectivity by gaining recognition from the other; and that
she cannot receive such recognition without also conferring it.o0 B
She cannot, in short, achieve any control over her destiny without
recognizing her dependence on others.
Communities, too, lose control of their destinies when they
repress awareness of the communities around them. As the Arab-
Israeli dispute sadly illustrates, when a collective ideology refuses
to acknowledge the context that engendered it, it cannot generate
a realistic strategy for transforming that context. Zionism and Pal-
estinian nationalism each identify themselves in terms of the same
destiny: undisputed sovereignty in the Promised Land. Each has
the power to realize the other's identity, but not its own. Neither
can gain any control of its own destiny without offering the other
recognition.
Communities may develop in the ordinary course of coopera-
tive social life; but a sense of community-a collective self-con-
sciousness-is the product of a collective struggle, not its cause.
This means that collective identities are ultimately dependent
upon the forces against which they have struggled. Their mythic
texts are given meaning by the very contexts they have sought to
transcend. This is as true of struggles for dominance as it is of
struggles for independence. Ren6 Girard has followed Freud in
arguing that all cultures originate in acts of violence, a secret
which their literatures at once repress and reveal. 56 On the other
hand, Edward Said has interpreted Western accounts of Oriental
societies as efforts to come to terms with repressed elements of
Western culture. 657 Eugene Genovese has argued that white
Southern society derived its identity from mastery over slaves,6 8
655. See supra note 444.
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while Orlando Patterson has revealed that a crucial feature of that
mastery was an effort to strip slaves of their histories and social
identities. 59 The result, as Genovese has shown, was that slaves
constructed a new society, culture and collective identity rooted in
their shared history of exploitation. 6 0
So too, the other in us will not remain repressed. The catego-
ries imposed upon her become her rallying, cries: Call her slave,
and she will proclaim slavery sovereign; call her untouchable and
you shall not touch her; displace her and she shall not "know her
place." Every act of sovereignty inscribes a history upon the ruled;
every history is a claim to sovereignty. No people chooses to exist,
but every people is Chosen. The inherent contradictions of sover-
eignty will not be resolved until we base our communal identities
on the recognition that our histories of domination and oppres-
sion are what bind us together, that our promises are not ours to
keep. Then every weary, wounded people will come down to the
River Jordan to bathe amidst the blood of every other and none
shall claim to be clean.
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